This composition within the two chambers allows for diffusion rather than a concentration of powers within Parliament. Thus the HOL can be seen as undertaking a complementary role to the HOC and also doubling as a check and balance constitutional role.
Restrictions on the exercise of powers by HOL
Parliament Act 1911/1949
Until 1911, HOL enjoyed equal powers with the HOC and that the relationship between the two Houses was governed by convention. In 1909 the HOL rejected the Finance Bill containing Lloyd George’s budget, which, was a breach of convention. In light of the HOL’s rejection, the King was asked to create more peers to ensure passage. He refused and the Parliament was dissolved. In 1910, the Bill received the electorate’s consent after the government secured a majority and was passed based on the threat of creating peers so that the Bill is passed or the House of Lords accepts it - the Parliament Act 1911 was enacted.
Due to the enactment of the Parliament Act 1911, HOL’s veto powers were abolished and only their delaying powers remained. They had to approve money bills within a month, without amendments and they could delay other bills for three parliament sessions. However, following Parliament Act 1949, the HOL’s delaying powers were reduced again from three parliament sessions to two parliament sessions. Also, where HOL rejected a public bill twice or amended the bill in an unsatisfactory manner to the HOC, the government may leapfrog HOL’s consent and go straight to for the Royal Assent.
However this leapfrog procedure has been used rarely since the enactment of Parliament Act 1949 and was used in the enactment of the Hunting Act 2004. The Parliament Act 1911 and 1949 can be seen as reduced HOL’s powers so much so that HOL can be seen as irrelevant as their consent is not valued and appreciated as much as pre-1911.
Salisbury convention
Lord Salisbury, a Conservative who sat in the Lords till his death, developed a doctrine of the mandate over this period which argued that the will of the people and the views expressed by the House of Commons did not necessarily coincide with HOL’s views, and that in consequence, the House of Lords had an obligation to reject. Hence referring back to the electorate, particularly contentious Bills, usually involved a revision of the constitutional settlement, which had been passed by the Commons. Hence, the doctrine as understood today is that HOL should not reject bills at the second or third reading.
This convention can be seen as self-imposed by HOL and established the primacy of HOC and this served as a self-legitimising attempt. This was supported by Lord Strathclyde who believed ‘that the unelected House must not challenge the clear mandate of the elected one.
HOL delaying Bills reflected on the government bills and raised concerns that a manifesto bill should not be subjected to ‘wrecking amendments’ which would change the government’s manifesto intention as proposed in the Bill and the manifesto is not to be revised or rejected at this stage.
The relationship between the HOC and HOL evolved when considering the War Damages Bill 1965, where if the matter raised issues important to justify such drastic action (intervention with a manifesto Bill) and if the issue is such that the electorate can understand it and express approval for the House of Lord’s position (tries to reconcile its role with public legitimacy of its actions).
HOL’s significant contribution despite restrictions
Despite the many restrictions HOL may have, they still play a crucial role in parliament. As of 21 January 2014, in the parliament session 2013-2014, it defeated 9 bills, the highest number of defeats since 2000. For example, the Child Support Bill 1991 Rationale of the Act was where unmarried separated mothers on state benefit were to be placed on statutory duty to reveal the details of the father of the child so that the Child Support Agency could track them and enforce their financial duty to support the children. However, the Government’s position was unconditional revelation needed. Peers suggested presence of defence in the Act supporting withholding information. Eventually, a clause was inserted comprising a defence of reasonably withholding information.
- In the Crime and Disorder Bill 1998, the rationale of the Act was to lower the age of consent for sexual intercourse between makes from 16 to 18 years. This was to equalise the protection given to heterosexuals to that given to homosexuals. It was also in line with the European Commission’s approach, which stated that failure to bring this on par could constitute an ECHR contravention. However, House of Lords were more conservative in wanting to keep the age of consent to 18 and rejected the provision and the provision was dropped by the Commons, giving in to the Peers due to the ending the Parliamentary session. They did not prefer to lose the entire Bill.
- HOL is unelected therfore can be seen to be unaccountable. However they are independent and politically balanced as their debates not controlled by party whips. They also have expertise and distinctiveness due to the technocrats. However HOL can be seen as a weak second chamber, having not much power and they would have lesser motivation as compared to HOC for they are not paid. These factors affect the turnout among all groups in the chamber.
Reform proposals
At present, the advantage of the House of Lords is it is more political balanced as there is no political party with significant majority and the peers are not seated based on political party affiliation. This provides for diffusion rather than a concentration of power within Parliament.
If the House of Lords were to be fully elected, the election process would have to be different since having two mirroring legislative chambers would undermine their complementary roles and their objective to act as checks and balances on each other. This would compromise the quality of debates as debates could now be subject to time limitations if connected to elections mandates and also compromise the nature of scrutiny of legislation, which was previously dictated more by the Lords’ perception of matters of public interest rather than political party’s agenda. This was also because they are away from day to day politics
However, on the other hand, an elected House of Lords would possess greater legitimacy through elections and would increase the willingness of the House of Lords to use its powers more fully.
If HOL were to be partially elected; coalition government’s proposals would allow the retention of other non-electable categories and allow the Salisbury convention to continue to operate against the unelected peers. A hybrid chamber could comprise some peers (elected) with legitimacy and others with not. Some peers would be seen to be more legitimate than others.
Nevertheless, not being fully elected allows the composition of the House of Lords to be determined to be more representative of the society. There is more pressure on them to be legitimate in the eyes of the electorate since they need to justify their presence.
If the HOL became fully appointed, this would not be good as the HOL would be rival chambers to HOC, thus losing the essence of a bicameral legislative system.
In conclusion, the bicameral system in UK can be seen to be largely successful one as compared to having one chamber that can act as a check and balance on each other. They can also facilitate a deliberative approach to legislation for one chamber is free of the ruling government, to enhance oversight of the executive branch and can also be seen as a monitor to ensure it abides its election manifesto. This would help hinder the passage of flawed or reckless legislation. However the only hindrances of having an bicameral legislative systems slows down the passing of legislation and is expensive to maintain two legislative houses.