With regard to the issue of the EU's future, the government supports a stronger but slimmer EU with a clearer division of tasks between the EU and the member states. It further supports reforms protecting citizens' rights in relation to the EU and involving national parliaments more extensively in the co-operation, as well as providing greater openness and subsidiarity in the Union.
The active efforts within pragmatic EU policy contrast with a more hesitant attitude towards institutional changes. In Denmark's opinion, EU problems are not due to inadequate institutions, but lack of political will. However, since the early 1990s Denmark has been more open to changes, partly in the light of the EU expansion towards the east and the Union's key role in European policy after the Cold War.
Over the years, the Danish aim has been to maintain the European Council as the EU's key decision making unit. On the other hand, there has historically been considerable scepticism in relation to the European Parliament, although this scepticism has now declined markedly. Unlike most small member states, Denmark does not regard the Commission as a natural ally, which is connected with Denmark's basic view of the EU as an intergovernmental co-operation between independent states rather than a supranational co-operation heralding a political union. Nonetheless, certain elements in Danish EU policy are based on the EU as a political rather than merely a diplomatic system.
This applies to the efforts to change the EU's political culture towards greater openness and democracy. For instance, Denmark has taken the initiative in establishing an EU Ombudsman institution, increasing access to EU documents and opening council meetings. Denmark also supports greater subsidiarity in the EU - a concept which significantly translates into Danish as nærhed (closeness).
Following the EC membership in 1973, the politicians felt they had been given a mandate to enter into an increasingly close economic co-operation, but not an extensive political integration. While Denmark has often been very active in the development of what may be called the pragmatic EC/EU co-operation, the attitude towards development of the institutions and especially the 'Union' has been more cautious. In the foreign and security policy area, the attitude towards co-operation has been very positive in relation to foreign policy, but cautious in relation to security policy.
Johnny N. Laursen and Thorsten Borring Olesen (A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark’s Nordic and European Policies, pp. 223-59) examine the viability of Nordism, i.e. close co-operation and possible integration of policies of the Nordic states as seen from the Danish point of view. They point out that Nordism proved to be possible only in the field of “low-level politics” (e.g. labour protection), while all attempts to achieve any closer co-operation in the field of “high-level politics” (e.g. the Nordic Security Union in 1948 or the Common Nordic Market in 1970) have failed due to the considerably differing priorities of the Nordic states.
On September 14th, Sweden voted decisively against joining: 56% said no; 42%, yes. Along with Britain and Denmark, Sweden will continue to stand aside from the European Union's 12 other countries that have abandoned their old currencies.
It has often been argued in Brussels that the Swedes' aversion to the euro has been driven mainly by a general hostility to the EU, by an unfocused sense that their welfare state is threatened by the EU, and by a broad resistance to change, especially among older people. The evidence, however, suggests other reasons.
Voters in the 18-30 bracket voted more heavily against joining the euro than any other age group. The same exit polls that accurately predicted a no to the euro also showed that 60% of voters want Sweden to remain in the EU. Indeed, sentiment towards the Union has actually warmed since Sweden first voted to join in 1994. Asked to list the issues that had mattered most, the antis put the welfare state only fourth. Their two biggest worries were about democracy and sovereignty; national control of interest rates came third.
Swedish voters may have taken note of the voices in Berlin, Paris and Brussels that have long extolled monetary union as a "political project"--a crucial step on the road to political union in Europe. The yes campaign tried to counter concerns about sovereignty with arguments about influence. The leaders of all the biggest parties and of most of Sweden's largest companies argued that the country risked being marginalised in the EU if it shunned the euro. Such arguments resonated with diplomats, international businessmen and the wealthy (Stockholm's richest suburb voted 75% in favour) but did not impress ordinary people, who may wonder how much influence a country of 9m can have in a Union soon to number 450m.
Goran Persson's Social Democratic government had tried other arguments. Fairly late in the campaign, Mr Persson began to argue that the euro helps secure peace in Europe. Many yes voters cited this argument in explaining their choice. But the issue of peace cuts less ice in pacific Sweden, which has fought no war for almost 200 years, than in France or Germany.
The yes campaigners tried, above all, to focus the debate on the economy. But in the event, exit polls suggest that economic issues mattered less than expected. When Sweden voted to join the EU in 1994, its economy was in big trouble. But this year Sweden is forecast to grow at 1.5% against 0.5% for the euro area; Swedish unemployment is at 5.4% compared with 8.9% in the single-currency zone. And the euro area is in a mess over its efforts to enforce fiscal discipline on countries using the single currency (see Charlemagne,) page 54.
The murder of Anna Lindh has made the outcome of Sweden's approaching referendum on the euro harder to predict. The popular foreign minister was keenly in favour of adopting Europe's new currency, and her death may arouse sympathy votes on September 14th. The most recent polls, conducted before she died, had given the no's a lead of at least nine percentage points.
The government and its pro-euro business allies had thrown everything--including far more money than the other side, and, lately, a measure of political deviousness--into changing voters' minds. The yes-campaigners had been hoping that enough waverers would decide in the end to follow their leaders' advice, much as in 1994, when the country voted by a narrow margin and only after a great show of reluctance to join the European Union.
Sceptics allege that the euro area's poor performance is not just down to bad luck. Economic policy in the euro area is a mess. The European Central Bank has been widely criticised for keeping interest rates too high for too long, and for adopting an unduly severe target for inflation: a ceiling of 2%, to be contrasted with the Swedish central bank's milder target of 2% plus or minus 1%. At the same time, euro-area co-operation on fiscal policy is in disarray, with the rules for budget deficits laid down in the stability and growth pact criticised or flouted by France, Germany and others. Since Sweden appears to conduct economic policy more intelligently than does the euro area, and since the results are currently superior, why switch?
Goran Persson, the prime minister, and his allies emphasise the long-term costs of staying out: less influence for Sweden in the EU, and less inward investment. Whether Sweden, with or without the euro, can expect to exert much influence in the Union seems doubtful, but fears about investment might prove well-founded.
Sweden competes successfully in the market for global capital. Measured by trade and by flows of investment, it is one of the most open economies in the world. No doubt it would continue to do well outside the euro area, but the question is whether it would not do even better as part of the single-currency zone. With time, and assuming that the EU will eventually repair its defective euro arrangements, the price for retaining the krona is likely to be some net loss of investment due to exchange-rate uncertainty.
This cost must be set against the benefit of retaining control over interest rates. Sweden's labour market is not the most flexible in the EU: the labour force is highly unionised, wage-bargaining is relatively centralised, and the country has an enormous public sector. This, it might be argued, strengthens the case for an independent monetary policy. On the other hand, the smaller and more open the economy, the greater the benefits of exchange-rate fixity; and Sweden is small and very open. Whatever the precise balance may be, it certainly lies more in favour of euro membership for Sweden (and for Denmark) than it does for Britain.
As in Britain, opposition to the euro in Sweden reflects discomfort with the broader thrust of European political integration as much as, or more than, it expresses doubts about the single currency itself. Many Swedes worry that deeper integration will eventually threaten the Swedish welfare state. Winning support for adoption of the euro might have been easier if the two issues had been kept separate--if the government had promised a further referendum on the new European constitution, for example. That is where voters' reservations about deeper integration are very much to the point.
The prime minister has neither promised a further referendum on the constitution nor ruled one out. Whatever the outcome on September 14th, after the struggle, embarrassment and, now, tragedy of the past few months, Mr Persson may feel that asking citizens what they think is best avoided.
Norway’s approach to European integration has been hesitant where there have been four attempts by Norway to join the EEC or EU. Norway became a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960, when the organisation established an alternative to the EEC. EFTA was aimed at free trade in industrial goods as opposed to farming and fish in which Norway had substantial interest.
‘Norway has applied for full membership of the EC and the EU four times, reached the point of finalisation twice and rejected full membership in a public referendum twice’ (Miles 1996). The ‘Peoples movement against Norwegian Membership of the Common Market’ provoked a huge debate and mobilisation against membership, with discussion about the national implications of union. The new applicants found the circumstances surrounding membership now very different because they intended to join a community already well established. The EEC had in time established its basic structure and identity and new members were obliged to accept the community, as with little or no opportunity for input into the organisations structural foundation. People grew very sceptical of supposed economic benefits of membership, especially the Common Agricultural Policy, which threatened the livelihood of Norway’s small and inefficient farmers, heavily subsidised by the state.
In addition loss of sovereignty emerged as an issue. People feared that membership would ‘take away political control over the economy and would lead to social injustice’. Voting opposition to EU membership began with questions about preserving democracy. Moving ‘hundreds of the main decisions from the national parliament and the national government to Brussels- to a political superstructure, a huge, political machinery which is completely impenetrable, incomprehensive to the ordinary citizen’ concerned the Norwegian people. Whereas western democracies have parliaments effective in shaping policy, the European Parliament (“EP”) remains effectively powerless. The national governments appoint Commissioners, but they feel no particular obligations to Parliaments, deciding on their own tasks and merely ‘giving their blessing to what the Heads of Government have decided upon in advance’.
The EP only passes resolutions relating to about twenty percent of the EU’s budget, while the legislative process is virtually impotent, because the Commission can write law in which the Council of Ministers has the final say. The Council of Ministers, representatives of national governments, constitutes the EU’s power centre with both legislative and executive roles; they implement national laws at home and pass new EU law, which later becomes national law. This significantly undermines separation of powers. Also, although the Council of Ministers has the right to represent their individual countries, they are only representing the opinion of the governing party, which may not even represent the majority of the electorate. In the ‘Yes’ campaign, Prime Minister Brundtland responded to the people’s reservations about the EU’s legitimacy by describing EU membership as ‘additional democracy’, which would give Norway more control over policies with international contexts. Also, she emphasised the twenty-five million Nordic citizens would have a larger weighted vote in the Council if Norway, Sweden and Finland were members, giving the Nordic bloc thirteen votes in the Qualified Majority Vote.
However, political democracy and involvement have been engrained into Norwegians at the local level, and it was almost impossible to dismiss or subvert the people’s fears. The ‘No to EU’ campaign was wisely based in part on legitimacy issues. The forty-year old ‘democratic deficit’ debate appeared once again, this time on Norwegian soil, reflecting the average citizen’s removal from the ‘powers that be in the European Union.’ This debate effectively played a part in the referendum defeat.
Surrendering any power to a supranational organisation is a direct loss of state sovereignty. Norway’s government includes important internal constraints regarding European policy, including the referendum requirement, which made EU membership difficult. The 1994 anti-membership campaign portrayed Brussels as remote and interfering, with a different agenda from that of Norway. The European issue “opened up old territorial and cultural cleavages that cut across the functional and economic divisions in Norwegian society”
Norway’s independence has not been long lived. Norway was subservient to Denmark from 1536 to 1814, to Sweden from then until 1905, and to Germany in World War II. Norway eagerly protects this newfound sovereignty, a fact that has changed very little despite a larger and more dynamic EU. Although Norway had already given up state sovereignty through membership in institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, EFTA and the EEA, the people saw EU membership as much greater loss. The ‘ever closer union’ envisioned in TEU Article 1 and the Treaty of Rome, with no boundaries, no restraints, scared the Norwegian people. The common policies seemed to go too far, from the CFSP to the common market. The Norwegian people did not perceive the benefits of EU membership as outweighing this loss of sovereignty.
EU membership raises issues of post industrial politics, those of environment, culture, women’s rights and democratisation. In 1972 and again in 1994, the majority of the Norwegian voters were not prepared to turn to the Community to resolve these issues. Perhaps as the gap lessens between the centre and periphery of Norwegian society, as Europe finds itself more deeply integrated and as Norway’s economic dependence on petroleum becomes apparent as a liability, Norway may find itself in a position to stand amongst its EU neighbours. However the Norwegians seem content to pursue their own social and economic objectives within the clutches, but outside the grasp of the EU.
Bibliography
Sundelius, Bengt. "Nordic co-operation: a dead issue?" World Today 1977 33(7): 275-282.
Tiersky, Ronald, ed. Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
Tiilikainen, Teija and Ib Damgaard Petersen, eds. The Nordic Countries and the EC. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1993.
Turner, Barry and Gunilla Nordquist. The Other European Community: Integration and Cooperation in Nordic Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982
http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Etud8-en.pdf
Egeberg, M., Schaefer, G.F., and Trondal, J. (2003), ‘The Many Faces of EU Committee Governance’, West European Politics, 26 (July)
Jenssen, A.T., Pesonen, P., and Gilljam, M. (eds.), To Join or not to Join: Three Nordic referendums on Membership in the European Union (Oslo; Scandinavian University Press).
Urwin, D.W. (1995), The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945 (Harlow: Longman)
Pesonen, P.,Jenssen, A.T., and Gilljam, M (1998), To join or not to Join; in Jenssen et al. (1998) page 16-17.
Von Dosenrode, S.Z. (1998), ‘Denmark: The testing of Hesitant Membership’, in Hanf and Soetendorp (1998).
Dag Seirstad, Nei til EU: Norway – EU, 1961-1994 (visited Feb.19 2000) The Treaty of Rome established the EEC.
Clive Archer, Norway: the One that got away, in The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union 147, 148 (John Redmond ed., 1997). The EFTA countries originally included Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, but now include Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein – John Redmond, Introduction, in the 1995 Enlargement of the European Union 1, 5 (John Redmond ed., 1997)
Dag Seirstad, Nei til EU: Norway – EU, 1961-1994 (visited Feb.19 2000) The Treaty of Rome established the EEC.
J.Marsh, The Changing Role of the CAP: The Future of Farming In Europe (1991).
10Clive Archer, Norway: the One that got away, in The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union 149 (John Redmond ed., 1997).
11 Dag Seirstad, Nei til EU: Norway – EU, 1961-1994 (visited Feb.19 2000) The Treaty of Rome established the EEC.
Thomas Pedersen, The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Challenge of Enlargement, in The European Community in World Politics 31, 33-34 )(Ole Norgaard, Thomas Pedersen & Nikolaj Petersen eds., 1993)
Roy Denman, Opinion, Two-Tiered Europe Needs a New Vision for Integration, International Herald Tribunal, Sept. 8 1999, at 6.
Lee Miles, The European Union and the Nordic Countries: Impacts on the Integration Process, in the State of the European Union: Building a European Polity? 317,323 (Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey eds., 1995).
S.M Lipset, The Revolt Against Modernity, in Mobilization, Centre-Periphery Structures and Nation Building 470.
