“If the substance of the will is thought or reason, and the will is only free when it follows nothing but its own thought, the thought or reason in question turns out not to be that of man alone, rather than of the cosmic spirit which posits the universe.
Here again it can be seen how Hegel saw the view of the individual of continuing on something that already exists. This is free rational will. For Hegel it was something the Revolutionaries did not grasp. He saw that they had an understanding of Kant and Rousseau’s theories of absolute freedom, but, their theories were not based in reason. Rationality was important to Hegel and, as far as he was concerned, was superior to understanding. Understanding lacks reason. This is one of the main criticisms of the Revolutionaries, that they understood the ideas of freedom of Rousseau and Kant, yet due to lack of reason, they did not realise that those ideas were hollow and flawed.
Hegel’s idea of freedom was different to Kant’s idea of human freedom. Kant’s idea looked to free the individual but Hegel saw true freedom as the freedom of the will to follow it s own thought. He saw the will as being made of thought or reason. And that will was ‘only free when ideas of absolute formal freedom. Freedom from people, the state and nature interfering with the individual was empty for Hegel. He saw everything moving towards the self-understanding of reason. The individual was the vehicle for this. He also saw society at the end of history and stated others would realise this if they saw the will become free to follow nothing but its own substance, thought. This became Hegel’s idea of radical autonomy. “The will should obey nothing but itself, its own immanent rationality”. The idea of absolute freedom was weak because any idea to found a society on nothing but freedom would aim to destroy the society that already exists and anything that arises from its destruction. This is what the French Revolutionaries tried to do. Once the political systems that existed and had alienated them were destroyed, they turned on each other and any institutions that they saw as impinging on their freedom, such as the church. Hegel then was looking for a society founded on more than the struggle of individual wills. A society with no means to an end or end to a means. The concepts needed to be overcome.
His criticism of the French Revolutionaries was also a criticism of Rousseau. He explained and dismissed the concept of absolute freedom.
“He interprets Rousseau as a philosopher of an epoch in which, the external order being abolished, every man was free to transform his inner conviction into political reality. In that epoch, freedom was ‘absolute’ because there was no community any more, only isolated individuals, private persons.
When Hegel then goes on to discuss absolute freedom, or Rousseau’s abstract idea of it, he states that it leads to a ‘fury of destruction’. To explain this underlying idea we need to look at the world posited by geist. This means that humans are at the root of all things and that thought and being are one. This is true but for the Revolutionaries thought or geist was that of humans. Therefore they viewed the whole of society as trying to impose on human will. Hence this leads to the fury of destruction that the Revolutionaries embarked on. They sought to destroy the buffer that existed between the individual and the state in the form of classes and groups. For Hegel the general will of a state must be represented by a single person or government. This means then that the community becomes two diametrically opposed wills, the general will represented by government, and the universal will represented by the masses. Without the buffer that class groups provide, the Revolutionaries then start to see everyone else an encroaching on their personal freedom. This is what Hegel refers to as bad infinity. This is what the Revolutionaries reject anything they see as an unacceptable constraint on their own freedom, leading them to destroy even the institutions and mechanisms that they had created themselves. Good infinity is when the class buffers exist between the state and the individual, Hegel saw these as the family and the corporations.
Hegel would also criticise the Revolutionaries for trying to put into practice the abstract ideas of Rousseau that would not lead to a durable state. He saw Rousseau’s idea of a social contract as an artificial way of uniting the general and universal will. He saw that it produces a group of individuals struggling against one another. He rejected the idea that a state could be totally destroyed and something new put in its place. This also, again ties in with the idea of the universal spirit or geist that exists at all times. The idea of continuing on something that already exists.
“One may be dissatisfied with political life, one may even propose to destroy it, but one may only do so in order to create a new political reality more satisfying than the old…, must not irresponsibly condemn the state without putting something equally concrete in its place.
He is condemning not the idea of the Revolution but the failure of the Revolutionaries to reject their understanding of absolute freedom in favour of rationality that the individual cannot find true freedom of will, with will following its own reason, outside the context of the state where good infinity exists.
Hegel still supported Revolutionary principles. He saw the Revolution as a positive in as much as it made people aware that they could obey rules and laws subjectively. It made people aware of their rights and he saw it as a conscious effort by people to assert freedom of the individual. The actual criticism came in fact that the Revolutionaries failed to create something concrete in place of the state they had destroyed rather than something based on absolute freedom.
It is clear to see then that Hegel did justify the French Revolution in as much as it was an attempt to assert individual freedom in a society where a large section was alienated. He did not justify the Revolutionaries themselves as they tried to do this armed with an understanding of freedom that was self-destructive.
References
Beiser, F.C., The Cambridge companion to Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 256
Shklar, J.N., Freedom and Independence, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.69
Taylor, C., Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p.373
Pelzynkski Z. A., Hegel’s Political Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.54
Ritter, J., Hegel and the French Revolution: essays on the Philosophy of right, London, Cambridge, 1982
Spencer, L., Hegel for beginners, Trumpington, Icon Books, 1996
Beiser, F.C., The Cambridge companion to Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 256
Shklar, J.N., Freedom and Independence, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.69
Taylor, C., Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p.373
Taylor, C., Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p.373
Taylor, C op. cit. p. 375
Pelzynkski Z. A., Hegel’s Political Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.54
Pelzynkski, Z. op. cit. p. 545
Pelzynkski Z. A., Hegel’s Political Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p.55
