If the state is not a voluntary organisation, how can one be under any obligation to obey its commands?

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Q1 If the state is not a voluntary organisation, how can one be under any obligation to obey its commands?

This is a question about justifying the state. What D. D. Raphael calls “ the grounds of political obligation. If the state can be justified somehow then so can the commands it makes, whether it is voluntary or not. This would be a state built on individual consent; obligation to the commands of the state would flow from that consent. This essay will discuss the possibility of justifying of the state through the idea of a social contract.

The state when it creates a law draws a line one cannot cross without consequences. For clarity I am talking about a serious law, specifically one that obviously has a moral base, the law against murder for example. An individualist might say ‘I have no intention of crossing that line anyway because I believe it would be morally wrong to do so’. The law in his case may as well not exist. Just by not breaking a law it can appear as though he supports it. When what he might agree with is what the law defends/upholds /represents, and that is the moral principle behind it. This is one reason why some people appear to uphold the law when in fact all they may be doing is following a personal moral code. or simply agreeing with the basic rational belief shared by most people that ‘murder is wrong or (maybe) tax for the NHS is good’ for example. I suggest this analogy can be applied when questioning many commands of the state.

When I obey the state by paying taxes, I may not be doing so because I am obligated too by law but for other reasons including moral ones. Socialists (as do many others) might argue that they are happy to pay more tax in return for a wider societal benefit that includes all, i.e. as in the National Health Service. Therefore a socialist might argue that she paid her National Insurance not because the law obligates her too, but because it ‘fits her moral attitudes and outlook anyway’. The fact that she has no legal right to refuse to pay becomes relevant in this case only if she actually doesn’t.

The above argument is Lockean to the extent that it “appeal[s] to the idea of individual consent.” It is also in part my own view, which is (I think) essentially individualist in nature, though not libertarian. The relevance of my own view to this essay is that when thinking about this question, I realised that I had no idea what my own moral position was regarding some of the most crucial problems and contradictions of political philosophy.  Many of these questions require (I think) a moral stance in order to be able to make sense of them. This may seem like a non-academic approach as if I am personalising or reducing this essay to subjective notions, however the questions and issues of political philosophy are in large part moral questions and issues that therefore have as a basis, personal moral opinions.

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Locke’s view according to Wolff is that obligations to the institutions of the state “must be justified in terms of the will, choices or decisions of those over whom they have authority.” Justification of the institutions of the state that enforce obligation then is reliant on the idea that personal autonomy is of premier value. Will Kymlicka defines this as the belief that the individual is ‘morally prior’ to the community. One objection to this is the communitarian argument that the individual is not ‘morally prior’ to the community instead individuals are a ‘product of the community.’ There are other objectors ...

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