Is Consociational Democracy Undemocratic?

Although consociational school has argued that the idea of grand coalition is democratic, for it gives all the major segments of a society the right to influence policy outcomes, the next part will present a strong case against this claim by referring to a number of democracies across Western Europe. First, Lijphart uses the seven-member national executive, Federal Council in Switzerland representing the three major parties; Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Free Democrats as an example to a grand coalition. These parties together with the Swiss People’s Party share the seven executive positions proportionately. Furthermore, the linguistic groups are also represented in rough proportion to their sizes. However, the fact that these political leaders representing their parties in the Federal Council “may not always be those nominated by the parties” is against the ‘rule by people’ principle that is at the heart of democracy. Thus, it is appropriate to ask if people are really free to choose who governs them and similarly, whether the electoral process in consociational democracy is just a formality that covers the elitist nature of the government?

Furthermore, in consociational democracies’ parties do not function as a direct channel between the voters and the decision-making grand coalitions through accountability. In contrast to the majoritarian democracies, the voters can not reward or punish the political parties and their leaders in the subsequent elections according to how they perform in bringing about the policies they promised to deliver before the elections. The reason for this is because the decisions are taken collectively by bargaining and negotiations which change the original policies that are promised by particular parties. For example, in Switzerland, the fact that parties may vote against the proposals put forward by the Federal Council makes this governmental body even less accountable to the voters as they can not punish or reward anyone with their votes. This is a clear example to how grand coalitions bring about undemocratic results, as accountability is a crucial part of the definition of democracy.

Moreover, consociational democracy is not democratic because while consociational settings undoubtedly further a consensus style of decision making, they rely too much on the behaviour of the elites and do not necessarily make actors to comply with the principles of democracy.  Since most theorists of consociational democracy stress the voluntaristic character of a reasonable discourse by these political leaders, a constructive theory of the state needs to question why presumably rational actors, who “take actions not for their own sake, but only insofar as they secure desired typically private ends”, would take the trouble to engage in constructive negotiation and bargaining. Potential participants know that politics is about “who gets what, when, how” and that “different policy choices will have different distributive consequences, and they know that there is no preexisting rule that would neutralize unequal allocations of costs and benefits”. In addition, the necessity to include the preferences of other actors and reach unanimous consent can also be achieved by bargaining techniques such as log-rolling, pork-barreling, or buying-off groups; furthermore, bargaining is a purely strategic, voting-centric mode of decision making which falls short from the communicative ideal of democracy.

Next, the emphasis that consociational theory places on deferential attitudes toward elites and the secretive nature of elite decision making seem to be at odds with normative democratic theory. Certain critics have even referred to consociational democracy as "consociational oligarchy" or "elite conspiracy" . Many of these critics dislike the lack of openness and lack of opposition in consociational democracies. This elitist character of the consociational democracies decrease the level of legitimacy of the decision process.  Hence, Barry argues that although an‘amicable agreement’ among the elite can be reached, these binding collective decisions may be taken on very small popular majorities. For example, in Switzerland, a constitutional amendment was promoted by Schwarzenbach to limit the number of foreigners in any given canton (except Geneva) to 10 percent of the population, and it was opposed by all the formal institutions of power. However, the proposal was carried when in a national referendum, only 46per cent turnout(over 74 per cent of the electorate) voted yes on it.  For example, party elites’ decision to create a university in the Aargau canton inspite of a 48 per cent of the Swiss population in opposition is another clear example of undemocratic political decision-making.

Moreover, according to Lijphart’s consociational democracy theory, a minority veto must exist, allowing elites of each group to challenge decisions detrimental to their particular groups. Thus, this consociational device aims to protect minorities from a tyrannical majority by providing their representatives setting out a mechanism of checks and balances. In Belgium, the 1970 constitutional reforms introduced a minority veto on non-constitutional matters for the purpose of protecting the French-speaking minority against the Dutch-speaking majority. Also the bicameral legislatures both in Switzerland and Belgium aim to give special representation to the minorities by giving both houses equal power

Yet, very often this principle is exploited by the minorities and causes deadlocks in governments; thus, the level of effectiveness, which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy, decreases. As Sartori says, “to admit the minority veto as a major and normal means of limiting power is to admit a shuddering principle”, and he adds that minority veto power increases the divisions and divisiveness.

The third aspect of Lijphart’s consociational democracy theory is the principle of proportionality which aims to provide a fair distribution of power. Furthermore, it provides for the equal representation and participation of all segmental groups. In plural societies, which are divided along many cleavages, Proportional Representation system guarantees representation to minorities too and give them an opportunity to shape policies at both the national and segmental level. More specifically, this principle suggests that proportionality must be the standard principle of political representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation of public funds.

 Although this may be regarded as democratic, there are problems related to it because as Sartori says, the extreme form of PR recommended by Lijphart, which includes proporz, quota-type allocations and duplications across the civil service and in public funding heightens divisiveness. And a further sign of this is seen in the fragmentation of the party system. Both Swiss and Belgium party systems are further evidence to this fragmented nature of the political market. Sartori sums up this situtation by saying that dispersal of power across several minority parties adds profusion and confusion to the political system, and the result is ineffective and unstable government which runs counter to the fundamental principles of democracy. Moreover, although elections may be democratic and based on proportional representation at the national level, it is not the case in most cases at the subculture level regarding the election of the leaders. Therefore, it is open to debate to what extent those party elites represent their groups.

The fourth characteristic of consociational democracies is that each segmental group must be allowed to run its own internal affairs reflecting power dispersal to various levels of government. Although Lijphart’s consociational theory of democracy does not require federalism, it is seen as a promising method for implementing consociationalism as suggested by the Swiss example. In Belgium, too, Lijphart suggests, non-territorial federalism arrangement transformed it from a unitary state into a “communal state”. Although Tocqueville famously defended this as highly democratic, it is ambigious when one looks at the issue of overrepresentation of minorities in the context of Swiss federation where two representatives are elected to the Council of States regardless of the size of their cantons. As a result of this, minorities have a greater say in the government which violates the equal representation of people principle. Moreover, The Dutch state which allocates considerable authority on the basis of functions, has seen a decline in consociationalism over the last decade. And depillarization has decreased the level of representation of the different subcultures, causing it to be less democratic.

Furthermore, over the last decades, already few in number, consociational democracies have either withered away or become weaker with the general trend of disillusionment with politics and secularization.” Therefore, consociational democracy runs counter to Held’s description of  a successful theory of democracy which must offer “an account both of the changing meaning of democracy within the global order and of the impact of the global order on the development of democratic associations” And some of the former consociational democracies have turned away to more majoritarian solutions which did not result in inter subcultural conflicts as predicted by the consociationalists. For example, Andeweg explains this case in Netherlands by saying that this weakening in consociationalism

“deprived the parties of members and loyal supporters, but it also freed the parties from subcultural obligation, and made them into independent political actors at last. Because the parties are weak, they have not evoked the kind of anti-party sentiment and political cynicism that we see elsewhere, at least not to the same degree. The parties’ weaknesses also allowed relatively easy access to new competitors, that were assimilated before they could become a threat to the politics of accommodation”

A number of social scientists; moreover, assert that consociational devices increase friction in plural societies, because many socioeconomic problems are ignored to avoid intersectarian conflicts. The depoliticization of serious problems renders the decision-making apparatus virtually immobile--an important problem that even Lijphart addresses. When serious policy problems are ignored and therefore unresolved by the bureaucratic machinery, citizens desiring changes or reforms become increasingly frustrated, resulting in protests and in some cases violence. Representing a parallel line of criticism, political scientists have emphasized that power-sharing devices have not consistently yielded peace and stable democracy, and that the connection between consociational democracy and stability has not been sufficiently demonstrated. All one has to do is glance at the list of consociational failures (Lebanon, Cyprus, Nigeria) to see that consociational devices cannot always prevent intercommunal conflict, especially in the developing world.

Consequently, this essay has argued that the theory of consociatioanl democracy has not been successful in bringing about a democratic system of government. The evidence from across Western Europe has shown that consociatonal democracies are characterized by a lack of legitimacy in the policy-making process, low level of stability, low level of representativeness, and therefore; on the basis of the definition presented in the introduction part they should not be considered democratic. And the fact that recently, there has been a clear decrease in the number of consociational democracies around the world further points to the inappropriateness of the theory for the twenty first century politics.

 

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