Article 47 in Section III of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates:
"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present convention by any changes introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole part of the occupied territory."
With the construction of the barrier, Israel will be clearly breaking the law. The article mentioned above clearly states that the occupying power shall not introduce any changes that will affect the people living on the occupied territory. By building a fence, however, the social or economic lives of the Palestinians will be affected tremendously. What is more important is that the construction of the wall might in the long run weaken the claim of the Palestinians to the occupied land. In addition, the article makes it very clear that the partial or complete annexation of the occupied territory is not allowed. With the construction of the barrier, Israel is clearly taking de facto possession of the Palestinian land, which was occupied during the 1967 war. The only legal way of erecting a fence is therefore the "minimalist" route which would follow the "Green Line," accurately.
Israel's Reasons for Constructing a Barrier:
Israel states that the main reason for building the fence is in order to protect its citizens from further terrorist attacks. According to a statement by Major General Uzi Dayan, who heads the Public Council for a Security Fence, approximately 900 Israelis have been killed and 6000 injured in the past years of violence. He stresses that the construction of a security barrier will limit the number of terrorist attacks drastically and that examples of already completed walls show this. According to Dayan the fence in the Gaza has been able to prevent 100 percent of terrorist infiltration and that the completed phase A of the West Bank Fence has also been successful.The fence along the Lebanese border has also been highly effective in preventing infiltration of terrorists, Steinberg argues. Besides protecting Israel from the infiltration of terrorists, the fence will also prove effective in terminating illegal Palestinian immigration. However, the protection of Israel from terrorists is not the only reason for the construction of the fence: but there are a few others. Another reason which also reflects a sense of protection is the concept of "demographic threat" that many Israelis are concerned with. Dayan points out that by 2020, 15 million people, of which the Jews will only constitute 45 percent, will be living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. He concludes that this might result in the loss of the Jewish identity as well as the democratic nature of its state; and that a border must therefore be established in order for Israel to maintain its identity. Furthermore, asserts Steinberg, a barrier would enable Israel to establish a "clear political boundary within which the Israeli government would have full sovereign control." The preservation of a Jewish state is highly important for most Jews because it reflects the essence of the Zionist movement.
Also a motive that is considered is the fact that the erection of a fence might lead to the "disengagement" of both sides, which might increase the possibility for the creation of a Palestinian state. Israelis do not believe that the construction of the fence might hinder the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state; but on the contrary, the wall is seen as an important instrument by many to end the violence, and around 70 percent of the Israeli public is in favor of the construction of the barrier. In considering the effect the wall might have on the Palestinians, Minister Matan Vilnai states that the wall might "make life more difficult for the Palestinians, but that terror is the root of the problem."
Impact of the Barrier on the Palestinian Economy and Society:
While the Israeli economy is strongly rooted with access to foreign markets, the Palestinian economy is highly dependent and vulnerable. Unfortunately, the construction of a wall around Israel will not contribute to the improvement of the situation but rather worsen it. Israel is the primary market absorbing Palestinian exports, whether it is labor or goods. According to Gershon Baskin, the Palestinians exported 250 million dollars worth of goods to Israel in 1996, while the salaries paid to Palestinian labor, working in Israel, accounted for 405 million dollars in the same year. Figures like these show the dependency of the Palestinian economy on Israel. Israel is the main recipient of Palestinian goods and labor and the separation of both nations through a wall could have destructive effects on the Palestinian economy. Baskin further claims that the possibility of entering other markets, besides Israel is very difficult. Exporting goods abroad is tied into the creation of markets in the own economy; however, Palestine does not have a very big market to offer in order to attract investors. It is a vicious cycle that if it will be overcome at all, will take years. Israel is therefore still the most important trade partner of Palestine. Besides absorbing Palestine's good, Israel also acts as an intermediary between the Palestinian market and the European one. An Example that shows this is the Floriculture where Israel plays the forwarder. In addition, the access to the Arab market is not sufficient to support the Palestinian economy. But this is not the only problem that Palestine will have to face. According to the article "Israel's Security Barrier: A Safety Measure or Land Grab", the first phase of the wall already built, encloses two percent of the West Bank's entire land area on the Israeli side. This includes a lot of the Palestinian most fertile agricultural land, as well as principal water resources. In a village called Raps Atiya, south of Qalqilia, the barrier has already cut off the village from 9000 dunums of the citrus groves, cucumber fields and flowers that have represented Ras Atiya's livelihood for the past 150 years. Agriculture has become an important aspect of the Palestinian economy and the impact of the wall on this sector of the economy, will have drastic consequences. In fact, 70 percent of the households affected by phase A of the wall, rely on agriculture as their main source of income, claims Peter Lagerquist. Through the construction of the barrier a number of Palestinian peasants have been separated from their lands, which are now only accessible through different checkpoints established in the barrier. Another village affected by the phase A of the wall is Dayr al-Ghusan, which has been cut off from much of its land and markets in the villages of Nazlat Issa and Baq'a al Sharqiya, which are now on the Israeli side of the barrier. In the near future with the further construction of the barrier Dayr-al-Ghusan will also lose access to public services and markets in nearby Tulkarm, asserts Peter Lagerquist. Effects like these are problematic and will have a very negative impact on the Palestinian economy.
The Barrier planned by the Israeli state does also have a number of social implications that need to be considered. Needless to say what affects the economy alone will have on the lives of millions of Palestinians, who will probably live in poverty once the barrier is completed. According to Gershon Baskin "the walls and fences will increase Palestinian suffering, and poverty and unemployment will grow." In addition, the Palestinian's freedom of movement will be affected by the construction of a wall within the West Bank; not only will it be more difficult for Palestinians to enter Israel, but the movement inside the Palestinian territories will be impeded. Not only this, but what is even worse is that a number of Palestinian villages will be enclosed by the barrier and separated from their Palestinian homelands. Israeli Minister of Local Government, Saeb Erekat confirms that approximately 40,000 citizens in 11 Palestinian villages, like Rumannah, Joroushiyye, Baqa, al-Sharqiyye, Aneen and Nazlat Issa, will be on the "Israeli" side of the wall after it is completed. The villages will be cut off from close Palestinian communities, both in the West Bank and across the "Green Line". Since the barrier will run through the main Palestinian Urban centers, it will "ghettoize and distort much of the West Bank's civic space and alienate much of its linking infrastructure", states Peter Lagerquist. Qalqiliya governorate, for instance, will be divided into different parts and isolated from its urban center. Other regions such as Ramallah, Bethlehem will be affected similarly. The social impact of the wall can already be felt in parts where its construction has been accomplished. An article in The Economist, states that thousands of Palestinians have already lost access to the schools, hospitals, government services and universities situated in the urban centers of Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and Nablus. The effects of the wall on the Palestinian economy and society are devastating, and can already be felt in parts where the barrier is concluded.
Effect of the Barrier on the Peace Process:
When one looks at the problems that the fence has already created the hope for peace becomes very vague. Unlike the belief of many Israelis, the completion of the barrier will have a number of negative effects on the lives of the Palestinians and will therefore definitely contribute to the worsening of the situation, instead of solving it. This negative impact that the barrier has on the Palestinian livelihood might radicalize even more Palestinians. Baskin argues that the fence will add to the Palestinian suffering and will lead to the frustration of Palestinian militants unable to enter Israel and that they might gain more Palestinian public support. He also believes that the fence will give the Palestinians a feeling of imprisonment and that it will destroy their hope of ever getting back their homeland. This, in relation with their economic problems will radicalize many Palestinians and will make peace even more impossible. Daniel Seidemann, a lawyer and Jerusalem civic activist also fears that the construction of the fence will threaten the situation in Jerusalem and lead to the radicalization of Palestinian residents. He states that East Jerusalem has been generally quiet during the Intifada and that the fence will bring "people there to the side with terror." The erection of the wall will clearly undermine the peace process and is therefore very dangerous. That the fence will "disengage" both sides and consequently lead to a peaceful solution is highly unlikely and the construction of the barrier should therefore be considered again.
The erection of a barrier by the Israelis is in essence a good idea; and as already constructed sites have shown security will definitely be achieved. However, the problem is the route that this fence is planned to take. With the enclosure of the occupied Palestinian territory the fence is going to undermine the livelihood of most Palestinians. Besides being a humanitarian question, the fence will also contribute to the frustration and radicalization of many Palestinians and will therefore hinder the peace process. Unfortunately, little has been done by the International community to prevent the construction of the barrier in occupied territories; even though its erection is illegal. Phase A of the fence has already been completed and what is to follow is only a matter of time.
Endnotes
The Green Line is the 1949 armistice demarcation line that was in place until the outbreak of the 1967 war
The Economist, 28
Bibliography
Baskin, Gershon, and Sharon Rosenberg. "The New Walls and Fences: Consequences for Israel and Palestine." CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project. June 2003: 20. Academic Search Elite. EBSCO. American U. in Cairo Lib. 22 April 2004 <http://epnet.com>.
Dayan, Uzi. "In Defense of a Fence." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 19 Dec 2002. 24 April 2004 <http://www.ciaonet.org>.
"Fourth Geneva Convention." 12 August 1949.
"Israel's Security Barrier: A Safety Measure or a Land Grab?" The Economist 11 Oct 2003: 26-28.
Lagerquist, Peter. "Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel's 'Separation Wall'." Journal of Palestine Studies. 2004. 22 April 2004 <http://www.ciaonet.org>.
Steinberg, Gerald M. "Unilateral Separation as Roadmap Insurance." Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. August 2003. 24 April 2004 <http://www.ciaonet.org>.
Vilnai, Matan. "A Fence for the Foreseeable Future: Security and Political Implications." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 19 July 2002. 24 April 2004 <http://www.ciaonet.org>.