Establishment EFTA
When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed in the 1950's, Britain did not join due to political and economic reasons. First, the supranational characteristic of the Community did not appeal to the British elite and electorate. Second, European affairs were seen as irrelevant to the British public. Third, the consensus emerged that membership in the Community could weaken Britain's strong trading links to its Commonwealth countries. In the late forties and early fifties British standards of living, British income per head, and strength of British economy had seemed greatly superior to those of most of the Continent.
While Britain was prepared to make some sacrifices in the immediate post-war period
(introducing bread rationing after the war to help feed the defeated nations)
There seamed very little to gain from economic integration with nations suffering
Such economic difficulties, apart from their social problems and political instability.
Finally, the argument arose that membership could jeopardize Britain's political ties to the Unites States. Therefore, the United Kingdom decided to opt out and instead create a European free trade area that would serve as a competing force to the European Economic Community. In 1959, Britain and seven other countries created the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). EFTA has been established as a counterweigh to the EEC. The EFTA treaty provided only for the elimination of tariffs on industrial products among member nations. It did not extend to agricultural products, nor did it provide a common external tariff, and members could withdraw at any time. Thus the EFTA was a much weaker union than the Common Market.
Decision on Britain joining EEC: reasons
Britain came late to the European Communities.
When the negotiations began in 1950 that led to creation of ECSC, forerunner of the present EC, the British Labour government of Clement Attlee was invited to participate, but declined. As a consequence of this refusal to become founder member, the British found them self’s outside a highly successful economic grouping which, as their own economic problems grew and their independent influence in the world declined, it proved impossible to ignore.
In 1961, with the EEC’s apparent economic success, the United Kingdom changed its view and began negotiations toward EEC membership.
However, the realization emerged that remaining outside of the EC would lead to economic and political isolation, and Britain would have little influence in Europe. As a result, the Conservative Macmillan government lodged an application to join the EEC in August 1961
Several factors had contributed towards revision of Conservative party thinking on Europe. The first reason was that while EFTA may have been living up to it’s limited expectations , it had done little to counter the growing importance of EEC .
This was true not just of the d developments that had occurred within the EEC and the prospects of further progress in the near future, but also as a relationship between the EEC and individual EFTA states.
Members of EFTA such as - Austria and Switzerland a swell as Britain it self- were still trading more with the EEC then with their EFTA associates. As the EEC seamed likely to move on rapidly towards a full custom union., Britain felt it imperative to safeguard its important trade with the Community. If this were lost by remaining outside the external tariffs wall that the EEC might construct, it could not be compensated through EFTA.
The second factor was the continuing assessment by the British government of its diminished role and waning influence in world politics , in particular with regard to United States and Commonwealth. As the Commonwealth expand in number with decolonization, it had become clearer that Britain , while still dominating trade with most of its ex-colonies, could not retain the same exclusive treading advantages as before.
By the late 1960s, links between Great Britain and the Commonwealth had been considerably weakened. During the period of world-wide trade expansion British exports to Commonwealth countries sank from £1.26 billion to £1.19 billion, and the share of Commonwealth exports fell from 47 to well under 40 per cent in terms of overall British exports. During the same period British exports to the EEC rose from £468 million to £762 millions. British exports to western Europe where already higher then exports to Commonwealth countries.
A further motive which pushed the Conservatives towards considering EEC membership was worry about Britain’s economic performance.
In the 1950s the Western European economics had experienced a sustained period of economic growth. Though the British economy did grow in the 1950s, with a performance superior to the interwar years, it persistently lagged behind that of its major competitors. But the progress of EEC countries was very impressive . By contrast , Britain was at the foot of growth league table. Entry to the EEC was seen as a way of changing the economic agenda. It would be the industrial competition from within the EEC that would reduce problems such as overmanning and low productivity.
The final factor was the development of EEC it self. The development served notice not only the EEC was proceeding towards becoming a viable economic unit, but also that it was serious and confident about its long tern ambitions.
Britain’s political influence and its economic fortunes would be reduced if it stayed outside the EEC.
The later that Britain took the plunge to join the more difficult it would be to obtain satisfactory terms, and harder the problems of adjustment to membership.
The first application was submitted with certain terms by the British government. During the first accession negotiations in 1961, the Conservative-led British Government had laid down a number of conditions, since it wanted to preserve Britain’s privileged economic and monetary relations with the Commonwealth countries. Labour politicians were equally concerned at the prospect of throwing away the achievements of the Commonwealth for a Europe that was, in their view, largely capitalist. There were also many who feared that they would see the price of Commonwealth imports soar because of the disappearance of the imperial preference system. Senior British politicians were also careful to reassure their partners in the Dominions, who were very worried that they would find themselves henceforth relegated to the second rank of British concerns.
The major conditions that surfaced were the safeguarding of the Commonwealth, guarantees of British agriculture, EFTA and the length of the transition period before membership. Negotiations commenced, but were then vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle.
In January 1963, French president vetoed British membership, mainly because of the United Kingdom’s close ties to the United States.
Second application
In 1967 Britain under the new leadership of the Labour government applied once again but the French repudiated negotiations on grounds that the United Kingdom was not really committed to Europe and that the EEC's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was incompatible with Britain's relations with the Commonwealth.
With the British entry to the EEC blocked , EFTA experienced something of a renaissance. Its members agreed on new sped up schedule for further tariffs reductions in order to allow their industries to plan ahead more effectively. By the end of 1966 EFTA had it industrial free trade area. However there was no intentions to synchronise their external tariffs and reduce the barriers between the member states. While this was beneficial for the trade , it did little to tackle the problem of EEC and its much greater market. As the EEC proceeded with its program, the economic division within Western Europe remained as broad as ever.
Almost inevitably Britain returned to Europe in 1967 this second application was under a Labour government. Between 1965 and 1967 pronouncements by Labour spokesman on the need to come to some kind of arrangement with the EEC were strongly reminiscent of those issued by Conservatives between the failure of their free trade are proposal at the end of 1958 and 1961 decision to seek entry to EEC. It was the need to maintain Britain’s political influence and to secure its economic prosperity drove the government to apply again for the EEC membership.
Accordingly, British negotiators took a more flexible line and, this time, laid down fewer conditions to be met by their future European partners. The decision of the United Kingdom to accede to the European Economic Community (EEC) was taken on both economic and political grounds. The British were well aware that, having virtually abandoned the imperial dimension of their foreign policy, it could no longer stand isolated from the Community which was, in contrast, becoming more and more assertive on the international scene. It was also increasingly difficult to reconcile the UK’s privileged relationship with the United States with its closer involvement in European affairs. At the same time, the constant economic growth of the Six made the EEC more attractive day by day. For its part, France was now more favourable to British accession to the EEC since it was looking for some way of balancing German power in Europe by relying on British support.
Despite radical changes in the conception and operation of the EEC since the first rounds of applications that had been occasioned by the 1965 crisis, nothing had occurred that would persuade the French president to change his mind.
Negotiations with Great Britain, interrupted in December 1967 following the second French veto, resumed officially on 30 June 1970 in Luxembourg in the wake of the Hague Summit, which, in December 1969, had associated the strengthening of the Community with its enlargement. Parallel diplomatic discussions were conducted with Denmark, Ireland and Norway, whose economies remained closely connected to the British market, particularly under the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Nevertheless, the negotiations took place in conditions very different from those of 1961 and 1967. Since then, the Community had actually consolidated its position, common policies had proved their worth, and the establishment of the common market had entered its final phase. The entire body of Community legislation, which would have to be accepted by the applicant countries, was therefore much more extensive than it had been in 1961.
The second Veto confirmed that as long as de Gaulle remained the helm of French politics, Britain’s entry was imposable. It appeared that de Gaulle feared that French hegemony in the EEC would be threatened by the British entry. The situation changed with the shift of government in France and British accession negotiations emerged successful. The UK finally joined the EC on January 1, 1973.
Third application
Rresignation of in 1969, for reasons of home affairs, opened up a possibility of British accession. Immediately upon de Gaulle’s resignation from French presidency in 1969, the Action Committee, which by then included members from all political parties, launched a new campaign for British entry. Any reconsideration of Britain’s application had to await to the summit meeting at The Hague. Negotiations did not begun until mid-1970, with Britain being represented by a new Conservative government, victors in the 1970 elections. The main phase of negotiations took one year to complete. The situation changed with the shift of government in France and British accession negotiations emerged successful.
The most hotly debated issues were the United Kingdom’s financial contribution to Community resources and its participation in the common agricultural policy (CAP). These problems, which were closely linked, were never properly clarified. As a result, the Thatcher Government would return to them in the late 1980s. By contrast, a definitive solution was found for the other stumbling blocks, namely West Indian sugar and New Zealand butter. During the summer of 1971, Edward Heath’s Government pursued an intensive propaganda campaign in Britain in favor of accession to the common market. On 7 July 1971, the Government published The United Kingdom and the European Communities, a White Paper which reviewed the advantages of British accession to the EEC on a point-by-point basis.
On 22 January 1972, in Brussels, Great Britain signed the Treaty of Accession. Following ratification by the respective parliaments, Great Britain, together with Ireland and Denmark, joined the European Community on 1 January 1973.
Conclusion
Britain's entry into the EC began a long period of conflict that would emerge between the original "Six" and British preferences. Circumstances after accession became more strained due to the changes in the international political economy of the 1970's. The oil crisis in 1973 brought a period of inflation and low economic growth to the EC Member States and Britain, causing the latter to question its membership in the EEC. The British membership issue divided almost every political party and pressure groups in the country except for the British business community, which saw Britain's commercial destiny vested in the EEC. In Britain's first ever referendum in June 1975 the government posed the question whether the UK should stay in the European Community. The British electorate confirmed the British membership in the EEC with a 67 percent approval rate, with a 64 percent turn out rate.
Even country as confident about it’s economy as Britain couldn’t deny that it can allow it self to stay behind the progress of integrated 6th, who sheared free market.
It’s just another proof for me that idea of European Free market is a source of benefits and way to development.
Bibliography:
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George S., An Awkward Partner, Britain in European Community, Oxford University press, 1998,
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Greanwood S., Britain and European cooperation since 1945, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1992
- Kaiser W., Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans, Macmillan Press ltd, 1996, chapter 5
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Urwin D., The Community of Europe, Longman, New York, 1991
S. George, An Awkward Partner, Britain in European Community, Oxford University press, 1998, chapter 1
D. Urwin, The Community of Europe, Longman, New York, 1991, chapter 9
W. Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans, Macmillan Press ltd, 1996, chapter 5
D. Urwin, The Community of Europe, Longman, New York, 1991, chapter 9
S. Greanwood, Britain and European cooperation since 1945, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1992, chapter 7
D. Urwin, The Community of Europe, Longman, New York, 1991, chapter 9
D. Urwin, The Community of Europe, , Longman, New York, 1991, chapter 9
http://www.library.pitt.edu
D. Urwin, The Community of Europe, Longman, New York, 1991, chapter 10
http://www.library.pitt.edu