The concern of this essay is the position of the 'Republic of Cyprus'[1], the neighbouring states of Turkey and Greece and other states with interests, historically or otherwise, linked to the island, including the UK and the USA.

   The key problem facing Cyprus, in a very simplified form, is one of ‘minorities’. The Cypriot Greek leadership claim their desire is for a unified Cyprus, yet the Cypriot Turks feel the Greek population has no claim to land settled by Turks in the sixteenth century and wish to protect the Turk minority on the island.

   High-level diplomacy, between heads’ of states or leaders, often takes place in times of crisis. One form of this often used is ‘telephone diplomacy’. The crucial aspects that this allows is the immediacy of its effects and the knowledge that messages get received. In 1974, on the day of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, many calls were made between the relevant parties. James Callaghan, the Prime Minister at the time, speaks of a ‘day of mad activity’, in which calls were made to the Turkish President, the Greek foreign minister, the French foreign minister and in particular US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. These, and calls between others, must have had some effect on the securing of cease-fire only three days afterwards. Such swift action would surely have been made impossible without the existence of direct, high-level diplomacy.

   The lobbying of foreign governments may not at first seem a form of diplomacy, neither does the use of media on the population of a foreign country, it seems more like propaganda. Yet both these play the important diplomatic roles, using the definition given earlier, of influencing a foreign government policy towards the situation. This approach is known as ‘public diplomacy’, and both the Greek and Turkish sides have used this in attempts to win support. For example, Greek-American organisations have had influence on US foreign policy. In the Clinton administration, one policy advisor was George Stephanopoulos, who many have seen as key in influencing the foreign policy regarding Greece or Greek interests. The Cypriot Turk side has also used public diplomacy to its advantage. The ‘Friends of Turkish Cypriots’ is a cross-parliamentary group in the British House of Commons. Although the UK, like all countries except Turkey, does not recognise the TRNC and has no official ties with it, this group has met many times with Cypriot Turk leaders, including Raul Denktat. This has given them the ability to present their views to the foreign office or express them in parliament. Also, other groups act to lobby governments, such as the Turkish Cypriot Network, set up in the UK in 1995. It lists among its aims and activities that it “lobbies parliamentarians and local and national politicians…in order to promote the just cause of the Turkish Cypriots...and the recognition of the TRNC”

   The role of the European Union is very crucial to the Cyprus situation. Greece is a member of the EU and Cyprus has applied for membership in the next stage of enlargement. Turkey, also, has had its aims at EU membership ‘acknowledged’ at the EU summit in 1999 at Helsinki. When Cyprus applied for membership, the government was made up of only Cypriot Greek representatives. The Cypriot Turk leadership protested that this application did not represent the views of what they saw as the independent TRNC, and therefore should not apply to the ‘north’. The TRNC and the Turkish government have reiterated this point on many occasions. At the European summit at Helsinki in 1999, it was agreed that Cyprus would go through the process of accession to the EU, however a settlement of the dispute would be beneficial, it would not be a precondition of joining. This has affected the diplomatic approach used by the Cypriot Greek and Greek governments. The European Union, as a part of its founding principles, promotes certain ‘freedoms’, notably in this instance, those of movement, settlement and the right to own property. These ‘three freedoms’ have often been core points made by the Cypriot Greeks in bi-lateral negotiations with the Cypriot Turks, in 1977 and 1979, because theoretically they would allow Cypriot Greek to return to the north, thus stripping the Cypriot Turk majority in that area. By stressing these points, the Cypriot Greek diplomats are appealing to the E.U’s own very nature. By using this approach the Cypriot Greek government are casting the Turkish side as being contradictory to the founding principles of the E.U, which may act to promote support for the Cypriot Greek position within other member states. Turkey and the Cypriot Turk leadership have also appealed to the ‘founding principles’ of the EU in its diplomatic efforts. Although not officially recognised, realistically the TRNC governs the north part of Cyprus. This has allowed them to cite reference to ‘self-determination’, one of both the EU’s and UN’s founding principles, for the Cypriot Turks as a basis for their autonomy, through press releases and Turkish representations to the EU and UN

   Cyprus’ membership of the EU prior to a political settlement would place Turkey in the very difficult position of militarily occupying a member state. This has caused Turkey to maximise its influence in halting, or a least slowing, Cyprus’ negotiation for membership. This has been expressed in many ways. ‘Threats’ made by Turkey include the annexation of the ‘TRNC’ if Cyprus’ accession to the EU goes forward, although this particular course of action has been withdrawn. 

   Since the 11th September 2001, there has been what George W. Bush claims, a ‘War on Terrorism’. The role of Turkey in this new era cannot be understated. Turkey is in a unique position as a NATO ally, potential EU member and the only country of its kind to have an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Its geographical location also provides access to states of Iraq, Iran and other of what many call ‘rogue states’ or even, obtusely ‘Axis of Evil’. To ensure the ‘War on Terrorism’ is not perceived as a ‘War on Islam’, a threat very possible and feared by the ‘western’ leaders, Turkey’s support has been invaluable. This has given Turkey a unique opportunity to use its influence with the US to gather more support for the recognition of the TRNC. Although there is no evidence of ‘bargaining’ of support for recognition, the increased importance of Turkey to the USA no doubt will provide more avenues for diplomatic approaches. Although this itself could not realistically be defined as diplomacy, the diplomatic advantages it brings make it important to the situation

   The aim of this essay was to examine the ‘diplomatic approaches’ used by the two sides of the ‘Cyprus Question’ and their respective ‘mother’ countries. Given the unconventional situation of Cyprus, this has been done by examining the more unusual or informal methods of diplomacy. For example, even the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which has been far more violent and threatening to world security, is not as unconventional as that in Cyprus. Although not an autonomous state, the Palestinian authority is largely recognised and has been given support to govern over certain territories, unlike the TRNC. This essay has seen how ‘crisis diplomacy’ was used in 1974 to secure a relatively swift cease-fire following the Turkish invasion, showing clearly that diplomacy is not confined to embassies and conferences, but direct high-level communications often provide a simpler and more effective means of diplomacy. Also, the examination of the ‘public diplomacy’ of lobbying foreign governments and influencing foreign policy has shown how both the Cypriot Greek and Cypriot Turk sides have effectively used such means. This has involved both informal ‘pressure groups’ such as the ‘Turkish Cypriot Network’ which can lobby, as well as having influence within governments or parliaments, such as the ‘Friends of Turkish Cypriots’ in the UK, or as some have claimed, George Stephanopoulos. Issues regarding EU enlargement have dominated much of the recent speculation of Cyprus. This essay has shown how all parties have used diplomatic approaches through the EU, such as summits, to influence the policy of the EU, by both appealing to such founding principles as ‘the freedoms of movement, settlement and property’ and ‘self-determination’. Also, the possible use of veto to block defence arrangements between the EU and NATO has no doubt influenced policy of many states. Also the Cypriot Greek led government of Cyprus’ application for EU membership itself put pressure on the Cypriot Turk side, as this essay has explained, the Turkish forces would become officially foreign forces in occupation. Finally, this essay has seen how the ‘War on Terrorism’ has possibly extended the avenues open to Turkey to win support. This essay did eschew the direct negotiations between the Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek sides on the grounds that they did not act ‘to win support’. Although this remains accurate, the context of these negotiations does act in this sense, as the two sides’ claim being more receptive to the negotiations. Other factors omitted from this essay, for various reasons, include the role of the UN as mediator and the economic embargo placed on the ‘TRNC’ by Cyprus and the EU at large. Given all these factors, this essay has found that although the situation allows for little formal, conventional diplomatic efforts, other forms of diplomacy have played key roles and these cannot be ignored. A solution to the conflict requires support of many ‘outside’ interests, including the EU, UN and NATO most obviously, and the key participants of this dispute have used many diplomatic approaches to gain advantage for their position.

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