The commissioners are surrounded there personal team of 6-8 senior advisors, the so called cabinets. The influence of the cabinets is a contegious issue. The directorates often see them as an obstacle of communication between the department and the commissioner. Cabinets are also accused of being of the same nationality as the commissioner.
The administrative arm of the Commission consists of the permanent and the temporary staff. The permanent staff is about 15,000 people in size. They are nationals of the Member states who get on a closed list of appointees to the Commission through the concours. This competitive exam however is just a first step. To get appointment often depends just as much on who they know. There is another practice of filling in permanent posts, known as parachutage. There is an age limit of 32 years to get appointment in the Commission. Senior staff with temporary appointment however can get permanent posts via closed examinations. These practices can cause a lot of tension.
Within the Commission there are also informal network of natinalities, which can influence senior appointments. An anthropological research of he Commission also showed the cultural differences in identifying invalidity, alcocholism or corruption.
The Commissin is highly dependent on external expertise as well. This is provided by temporary appointments and the complicated system of committees surrounding the Commission, known as comitology. These committees are very heterogenous and contribute to the complication of decision making mechanisms.
In the case of the European Commission we can identify two "constituencies", the Member states and the citizens. This causes an internal conflict, as the two interests often do not coincide.
In the European Commission there are traits of intergovernmentalism. Both the commissioners and the staff articulates national interests at Community level. Commissioners are independent, but they are nominated by their governments and they can be re-nominated. The staff is coming from a particular administrative, political, educational background of a member state, which is by definition oriented at national interests.
III. Questions of legitimacy in the Euroean Commission One of the most important political and legal problem of the European Union is the so called democratic deficit. This symtom undermines the legitimacy of the EU. The lack of legitimacy in the EU is caused by the economic nature of the Union. Efficiency was emphasized in contrast to democracy.
The European Commission itself suffers from this lack of legitimacy. The European Commission tries to gain legitimacy by strengthening its accountability towards the European Parliament. The two institutions are the supranational bodies in the Union. However their relationship is not harmonic at all.
The relationship between the EP and the Commission is laid down in the Treaty of the European Union. It outlines a system of rather weak accountability of the Commission towards the Parliament. However, it seems that the seeds of a classical executive-assembly type relationship can be found in the treaty of Rome. (Art 189-201 EC)
There is also a network of informal cooperation between the two institutions, through different channels.
The Parliament has little role to play in the appointment of commissioners. Before the Maastricht Treaty. According to this only had the power of voting of the Commission as a body. The Amsterdam treaty gave further powers to the EP. It now has the authority to vote on the president of the Commission before the apointment of the individual commissioners.
The Commission’s problems of the lack of legitimacy also derive from its lack of transparency. Besides the complicated nature of decision making in the Commission, there is also a culture of secrecy. The importance of transparency and openness was reaffirmed.
IV. The president of the European Commission The fourth chapter deals with the role of the president in the european Commission. If we look at the different presidents of the commission we see the different approach they took.
It is possible to differentiate between proactive presidents and presidents with more cautious, technocratic approach. Proactive presidents like walter Hallstein or Jacques Delors aimed at transforming the Commission into a powerful, highly prestigious political body. They wanted to strengthen the political power of the institution and act as a real executive. This ambitious approach frustrated the Member States, and generally they appointed a weaker president to the Commission after a strong one.
Strong presidents were also very successful at providing both political and organizational leadership to the Commission. They managed that notwithstanding the fact, that their position was hardly more than first among equals and the Treaties provided no real power to the president over his commissioners.
Jacques Santer was chosen to be the president after the decade of Delors, who was said to be the most influential president of the commssion in the history of the European Union. Santer was assumed to be chosen for his relative weakness (or at least that is how he was viewed by the public) and this approach determined his period. He did not manage in providing authority and charismatic leadership to his team.
V. The corruption scandal In the absence of strong leadership mismanagment and corruption flourished within the Commission. The first allegations started in December 1998 after the report of the Court of Auditors.
One of the auditors in the commission also made a report for the Green Party which was made public. This report criticized the commissioners with incompetence and unwillingness to deal efficiently with fraud and corruption. The EP held a hearing of santer, but he refused to sack any of his commissiners. The arrogance of some commissioners, particularly that of Edith Cresson also further angered the assembly.
They held a motion of censure according to Art. 201 of the EC Treaty, which empowered the Parliament to make the commission to resign en bloc. The motion, which requieres absolute majority and 2/3 of the cast votes was unsuccessful. However in 14 January 1999 the Parliament set up a committee of independent experts to investigate the allegations of nepotism and mismanagement inside the Commission.
The First Report established the extent of the responsibility of the Commissioners as a body for such irregularities. The Committee found evidence of nepotism in thte case of Edith Cresson. They also found the Commission as a body responsible in the case of several projacts such as ECHO or TOURISM for launching programs without the necessary resources and thus creating opportunity for corruption.
After the damning report the commission resigned as a body on 16 March 1999.
The Committee made a second report in which it called for the creation of an efficient monitoring for projects. It suggested to simplify procedures. The Committee emphasised the need for new codes of conduct. It also called for the cooperation of Member States to create the legal context to fight corruption efficiently at the Union level.
VI. The commission of Romano Prodi Romano Prodi was chosen to be the president who leads out the Commission of what the media refferred to as the biggest institutional crisis of the EU.
The Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened the position of the president by giving the EP the right to vote for the president nominee in advance of appointing the whole Commission. It gives further legitimacy to the president.
The president got further authority by the right to rearrange portfolios and by having to accept the nominees of the Member States for commissioners. Santer also made all his commissioners agree that they will resign if he requests it.
VII. The consequences of the corruption crisis The consequence of the crisis is that the commission has to reform itself. It has to oblige itself to fundamental values such as transparency, openness and responsibility to regain its legitimacy and the confidence of thte public.
If the commission manages to bring about fundamental changes it has a chance to strengthen the legitimacy and the influence of the institution and create real political leadership to the EU. If it fails doing so, the institutional balance will go towards giving more power to the Council. The EU will become more intergovernmental than supranational system. This process can set back the further deepening of integration.
- Could the UN be a world government?
Written by:
“The vision of a unified world, freed from the anarchy of tribalistic strife among organised fragments of the human race and possessed of a government able to disperse justice and maintain order among all men, had long captured the prophetic imagination of a philosophers and poets.”
Yes, the UN can be a world government although it is my opinion that it would be very improbable it would happen at least in the near future for a variety of reasons. They include the fact that many if not most of the states making up the UN would not be willing to hand over their sovereignty to a world body, according to realists. It is a well-known fact that the overwhelming majority of states would put what they regard as the welfare of their own nation above everything else, the interests of a world state included . Also, the sheer complexity of uniting over 200 countries would prove to be an enormous task. For example, it would prove difficult dividing the power between all the states in the world. There is the question of whether to divide the power between GDP or populations as was done in the European Union. On the other hand, idealists believe there are many positive aspects to uniting the world politically. Global issues such as war, poverty, human rights and the environment can be dealt with more efficiency. With a united world, the poorest parts of the world can be helped by richer member states. All these points will be discussed in further detail throughout this essay.
The idealist in us looks for a major shift in state behaviour away from sovereign selfishness and toward cooperation in an international system structured to prevent aggression and promote economic growth . In order for the public to accept the legitimacy of the UN as a world government, people would have to renounce nationalistic arrogance and ideological intolerance, in order to help them to fit into the ‘world picture’ instead of just a ‘national picture.’ We would need to create a sense of people belonging to a much wider picture and optimistically; states would realize that it is to their national interest to join a world government. After states join this world government body, comes the hard part, making it work. Universal values are essential for this world government to work. It is a fact that states that join up to the UN must uphold some basic universal values such as human rights and non-aggression. However, universal values are just the start. In order for world government to work we need to agree on more issues. The UN has been the instrument for converting common interests into common policies . If the UN were to grow into a common world government, it ultimately would need to create international laws that would have the legitimacy of all the people of the world. At first, these laws would be simple, something most states would agree on, the problem comes when these laws become more controversial.
We can look at the European Union for some guidance and inspiration. After all, it is the most advanced form of regional political structure in the world. It is my strong belief that a world government would have to work fundamentally like the European Union, of course, at a much bigger and complicated level. Like Brussels is the capital of the EU, a world capital would be assigned, chances are it would be New York (because it currently is the main headquarters of the UN). The capital of the world government would hold central power and accordingly distribute power to the member states as a type of federation. How much power the central authority would keep and how much it would distribute to member states is difficult to say but one thing is for sure, the state as we know it will have significantly less sovereignty. Why a federal system not a unitary system of world government, one may ask. The reason why is because a federal system will maintain a certain degree of diversity within a pattern of unity. This diversity would be enough so states do not lose the ability to control ‘local’ affairs as well as maintaining ‘local’ culture and traditions. The make-up of the bureaucracy of this world government is as follows. The General Assembly would probably be ‘upgraded’ into a world parliament, with the elected president or Prime Minister of each state representing that state in the parliament. Like the European Commission, there would likely be a World Commission, serving as the executive branch of the World Government. The Security Council would almost certainly, in my opinion, remain although the make-up of the council would certainly change (the ‘big five’ might lose their veto power). Almost certainly there would be a World Court of Justice, with its laws processing supreme sovereignty over state or regional courts just like European law is sovereign to state law in EU states.
Once this world government is implemented, in theory, wars would eventually ‘die out’. According to Emery Reves, author of the book The Anatomy of Peace, wars between groups of men forming social unites always take place when these units-tribes, dynasties, churches, cities, and nations-exercise unrestricted sovereignty. Wars between these social units cease the moment sovereign power is transferred from them to a larger unit like a world government . In another words, as soon as a state loses the means of waging war, war can be controlled and even eliminated by a larger state body. One example to support this theory is the fact that since the European Community and later the European Union were formed in 1957, no EU state has waged war on another EU state. If a world government were defined as a set of effective means for preventing disorder, then this is clearly what the world requires .
On the other hand, realists believe a world government is merely a dream, at least in the near future. They disagree with Reves in that government has never served as a magic wand to banish problems of disorder in any human society . It is sheer nonsense to assert that law has always succeeded in producing peace. As Quincy Wright points out, deaths resultant from military action were more numerous within the governed United States than the in the anarchical continent of Europe during the century preceding World War I . There is also the question of sovereignty. The capacity of the UN to develop into a form of world government is severely limited by the fact that it is essentially a creature of its members. It can do no more than its member states, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council . As stated before, most states would be unwilling to hand over their sovereignty (whatever is left) to a larger supranational body such a world government. The realist in us, recognizes that the characteristics of state, their inherent self-seeking and self-judging behaviour are woven pretty deeply into their fabric . After all, many states, just in the past 100 years, fought (many are still fighting) for their independence and they are not just going to give it away easily. Just in Africa, independence was achieved for most states in the 1950s and 60s. The people in these states finally get their sovereignty and it is unlikely they will get it away in the near future. There is also the question of how to divide the power in the world government. If the world parliament is divided according to GDP, the US and Western countries (including Japan) would inevitably benefit tremendously. However, if power were to be divided according to population (as it is in the EU), China and India (two developing countries) would have an enormous amount of power and the richer countries would inevitably not benefit.
All in all, in theory, the UN can be a world government. Although, as I have outlined throughout this essay, it is my strong belief that most states would not want to sacrifice their sovereignty (at least whatever is left of it) in order to unite into a single global government. There is also a noteworthy absence of a common underlying culture to support a global international society which cuts across al the major cultures and civilizations . Although the idea of a world government may not work just yet, it should be not be discarded as useless theory. If it were to work in the future it would bring many positive changes to mankind. It would be, for instance, a democratic regime, dealing fairly and impartially with all states, respecting its constitutional limitations and sticking closely to its business of keeping the world safe from war . Who knows, maybe one-day states will psychologically put their differences aside to form a world government. Dreams do eventually come true but like everything in life, one requires patience.
- Bibliography
- Baylis, John., Smith, Steven. 2nd edition., The Globalisation of World Politics., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- Claude, Inis, JR., fourth edition., Swords Into Plowshares., (Virginia: Random House, 1984).
- Heywood, Andrew, ed., Politics., (London: Palgrave, 1997).
- Roskin, Michael., Berry, Nicholas., IR: The New World of International Relations., (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990).
