The Foreign Policy of Great Britain in relationship to the European Union.
The Foreign Policy of Great Britain in relationship to the European Union.
B.A. (Hons) European Studies 2nd Year
ES 202 - The Foreign Policies of the Main EU States : Assignment
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the British policy vis-à-vis the European Union; first of all by looking at how the British Government itself looks at its country's participation in this community and related aspects like monetary union and the organization of a common defense. Also this paper will look at Britain's position in regards to the Union's present major internal debates, namely enlargement to the Central-East of Europe and to the Mediterranean and the necessary institutional reforms.
Historical Background
Before looking at the present position it is important to keep in mind the historical background. The British Government today, led by Tony Blair's Labour Party explains to the British citizens that their country without Europe will be weak. Yet the same party, fifty-five years ago was completely opposed to British participation.
The first elections after World War II were, perhaps surprisingly, not won by the pro-Europeanist and British leader during the War, Winston Churchill, but by the Labour Party led by Clement Attlee, which obtained a 146-seat majority in a seat of 640 deputies. There were several reasons that alienated the British Government away from the plans for some sort of European integration.
First of all, Britain still possessed a whole Empire and thus entrance in another Community could have been anomalous. Secondly, in the first fifteen years after the War Britain committed itself in many worldwide commitments of anti-Communist Defense pacts, like the Treaty of Brussels (WEU), NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact and CENTO.
Thirdly there were the special relations between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The US had fought two world wars on Britain's side. Also, GB's economic survival in the early post-war years was dependent on American funds, the Marshall Aid being a typical example.1
This situation was to persist until the Sixties, when Britain finally came to apply for membership. In the 1960s Britain applied twice to join the Community. However French leader Charles de Gaulle, maybe fearing American interference as Britain went in, vetoed British accession. However in 1969, after De Gaulle's resignation, the Labour Government applied again. Negotiations were completed by the following Conservative Government, and in 1973 Britain joined the Community.
However the story does not stop here. Britain has been frequently accused of 'braking' the pace of the integration process. The failure of the British to embrace the ideals of European Union has continually led to differences with other Member states. Thatcher's relationship with the Community was characterized by these differences.
The unpopularity of the EC with much of the electorate for much of the time has influenced the approach of statesmen (and women), who are also politicians who have to win elections.
Britain was the only Member state ever to present to the population a referendum to leave the Community, which was, however, rejected. The strong sense of national identity has made it difficult for Britain's representatives in the Council to put the interests of Europe before those of GB were a clash occurs. Thus Britain has long been considered as, at least, an awkward partner.2
The present GB position
After the Conservative era in Britain, the 1996 victory of the Labour Party was crucial for British-European relations. The Conservative mentality on Europe was based on Thatcher's theory of a family of nations. Britain was thus quite reluctant about the whole project, but could never leave the Union. Thus the only thing it could do was to halt progress as much as possible. Britain remained on the outskirts of the Union.
However, with the Labour victory in 1996, the whole argument to follow is 'Britain's future is and will be as a leading partner in Europe', pronounced in Warsaw by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair.
The British Government not only explains why should his state support the Union, but also tries to excuse the difficult EU-GB relationship in the past. According to the Prime Minister this relationship has been so due to gross misjudgments, hesitation, alienation, incomprehension'3. Post-war Britain looked at the EU as a method to keep France and Germany from going back to war with each other. Britain's initial role therefore was that of a benign friend encouraging the former enemies to work together. Then Britain got alarmed with the rapid progress the Community was doing. At each stage, Britain thought that the Six's plans could not happen and held back. For the other Member States, admits Britain today, the reasons of history, proximity and democracy were compelling enough. For the British Governments of the time they were not.
The fact that Britain was not really desired at certain points is also acknowledged today. Charles de Gaulle had no hate towards the British, the victors in World War II, but he mistrusted American intentions and saw Britain as both a 'Trojan Horse for the US and a brake on the necessary strengthening of Europe.'4
From a European perspective, Britain is seen as a key partner. The country has a powerful economy, an obvious role in defense and foreign policy and internally is known for its stability. The relationship with the United States is not just a British asset but is, potentially, a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and the US.
From the British perspective, as Europe grows stronger and enlarges, there would be something truly strange and self-denying about standing apart from the key strategic alliance on its doorstep. Leaving Britain out is today considered by the Government as going against the country's national interest.
Three and a half million British jobs depend on Britain's membership of the EU. Over 50% of the trade is with Europe. British firms daily sell GBP320 million of goods and services into the European single market. Some 50,000 new British jobs were created last year alone from inward investment due to ...
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From the British perspective, as Europe grows stronger and enlarges, there would be something truly strange and self-denying about standing apart from the key strategic alliance on its doorstep. Leaving Britain out is today considered by the Government as going against the country's national interest.
Three and a half million British jobs depend on Britain's membership of the EU. Over 50% of the trade is with Europe. British firms daily sell GBP320 million of goods and services into the European single market. Some 50,000 new British jobs were created last year alone from inward investment due to EU membership. Meanwhile 70% of the cost of the BSE disaster was paid for by the EU. Britain's poor regions get more from the European Social Fund than any other Member State. The UK sells more to the EU than the US. More than 30% of inward investment into the EU comes to Britain, creating 800,000 jobs. Almost two-thirds of Scottish exports go to other countries in the EU. The UK exports more than four times as much to the EU as to the US. British people made almost three times as many foreign trips to EU countries in 1997 as they did to the rest of the world. Wales has received nearly Euro 2 billion in EU funding to help to combat the problems of unemployment and low pay.5
The first aim is now to look at how Britain looks at the European Union as a whole. Then the next point is to identify the British position regarding the main concerns of the Union today. Britain wants to be in Europe, but in which Europe ?
The New Europe. Widening or deepening ?
The most important challenge for Europe is to wake up to the new reality. Europe is widening and deepening simultaneously. There will be more states in the future, trying to do more. The difficulty comes with the view of Europe as a superstate : Britain does not want a Europe simply dominated by supranational institutions. Actually people fear this. The direct control of the state has always been feared by the Brits. Thus control from Brussels would be a nightmare. Britain insists that nations should defend their diverse cultures and identities. Europe should be a Europe of free, independent, sovereign nations who choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit of both their own interests and the common good, achieving more together, than any nation can achieve alone. Thus the EU should remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the supranational. Such a Europe can in its economic and political strength, be a superpower but not a superstate.6
But most importantly, Britain does not think that the present Union is moving towards a superstate, even though strong voices of dissent about this statement are being presently aired in Britain. Secretary of State Robin Cook has insisted that this is true not just because European leaders have said they do not want one, but because national identities in all European countries are simply too strong. There will be no superstate because the British people would not accept it and neither would people from other member states or those from the candidate countries.7
The role of the institutions
The European Council
This Council, bringing together all the Heads of Government, should set the agenda of the Union. It already does this (e.g. Luxembourg summit on jobs, Lisbon summit on economic reform) but Britain proposes that this should be done in a far more organized and structured way.
The President of the Commission is a member of the European Council, and would play his full part in drawing up the agenda. He would then bring a proposal for Heads of Government to debate, modify and endorse. The Commission's independence as guardian of the treaty would be unchanged. And the Commission would still bring forward additional proposals where its role as guardian of those treaties so required. But the European Council would serve to give a clear political direction, a program and a timetable by which all the institutions would be guided.
The Presidency
Here Britain again comes out with some radical changes. According to the British Government, the Union should be open to reforming the way individual Councils work, perhaps through team presidencies that give the leadership of the Council greater continuity and weight; greater use of elected chairs of Councils and their working groups; When Europe is more than 25 members, a country will hold the Presidency only every 12 or 13 years. This does not make sense for the British. They instead propose two or three countries together, perhaps with a mix of large and small states. For the future it is proposed that there be a better way of overseeing and monitoring the Union's program than the three monthly European Councils.8
Commission, Council of Ministers and Parliament.
Given the diversity and complexity of the EU, its Constitution, like the British Constitution, will continue to be found in a number of different treaties, laws and precedents. It is perhaps easier for the British than for others to recognize that a constitutional debate must not necessarily end with a single, legally binding document called a Constitution for an entity as dynamic as the EU.9
What the British Government thinks is both desirable and realistic is to draw up a statement of the principles according to which it is decided what is best done at the European level and what should be done at the national level, a kind of charter of competences. This would allow countries too, to define clearly what is then done at a regional level. This Statement of Principles would be a political, not a legal document. It could therefore be much simpler and more accessible to Europe's citizens.10
An important British proposal is that the time has now come to involve representatives of national parliaments more on such matters, by creating a second chamber of the European Parliament. This was proposed in Blair's speech in Warsaw and explained during the IGC. However this proposal does not seem to have been taken seriously by the other members. A second chamber's most important function would be to review the EU's work, in the light of this agreed Statement of Principles. It would not get involved in the day-to-day negotiation of legislation - that is properly the role of the existing European Parliament. Rather, its task would be to help implement the agreed statement of principles; Britain believes that in that way power is devolved downwards. This would be political review by a body of democratically elected politicians. Such a second chamber could also help provide democratic oversight at a European level of the common foreign and security policy. 11
Efficient decision making, even with these changes, will be harder in an enlarged European Union. The British pre-Nice position was that a Commission of up to 30 members will be workable. However at Nice it accepted that up to 2005 the current Commission is unchanged except for one for every applicant country let in; then from 2006 one Commissioner per country up to a maximum of 27 from its present 20.12 Another review would then have to take place in 2010, where a reduction of the Commission's number seems to have to take place.
Reweighting votes in the Council had also become a democratic imperative. The agreement reached in the Nice summit increases the weight of Britain's vote. It raises the threshold for QMV up, when the EU will be 27 members, to over 74 per cent of votes. It adds two further tests to which Britain agrees. Any proposal must have at least a majority of states on side, as well as crossing the 74 per cent threshold. And a new population threshold at 62 per cent of the EU is also introduced.13 So the three biggest countries will continue, even as the EU enlarges, will be able to block together.
We can compare British votes in Council with three states to find out the increased voting power it got in Nice. Britain had roughly three times the votes of Denmark and now has four times the votes of Denmark. Britain had two and a half times the votes of Sweden, it now has three times the votes of Sweden. Britain had twice the votes of Belgium, it now has two and a half times the votes of Belgium. Moreover it has achieved that reweighting in favour of the larger members of the European Union whilst holding parity among the four larger members of the Union. This is the first time since Britain joined the European Union that it has secured an increase in its vote. Ever since it joined the European Union Britain's share of the vote has declined with every further increase through enlargement. Nice's decision means a big jump in its relative share of the vote and it will mean that when enlargement is completed and all 27 countries have entered the European Union, far from Britain's share having gone down, it will maintain as constant its present share of the vote among 15. According to the Secretary of State, Robin Cook, this was a very good outcome for Britain and provides for a stronger Britain in that wider Europe.14
All the British aims have been satisfied at the Nice summit.15 Unanimity was maintained or QMV was adopted in all areas that Britain considered as necessary.
Of the articles that move to QMV, just 11 are appointments or changes in rules of procedure. One of these is very important to Britain: the nomination of the Commission President: It is essential that in an EU of 27 or 30, one small state cannot block the right appointment. Nine deal with freedom of movement where Britain has an absolute right to decide whether to take part or not, thanks to the protocol it secured at Amsterdam.16 The remaining are primarily about the efficiency of economic management and the single market, where majority voting is in this country's national interest: financial management of the EU budget, industrial policy, and trade in services. All that means new markets for British financial services and the jobs and prosperity that go with it. And within these articles, the Union has kept unanimity where Britain needs it: unanimity in respect of harmonization in anti-discrimination measures, unanimity for passports, unanimity for anything to do with taxation and social security.
There were areas where it would not have been in British interests to agree to any Qualified Majority Voting, in particular for taxation and social security. Any proposal in Nice to remove these from veto would definitely have been vetoed by GB. As the British Government had undertook to the House, these matters will now remain subject to unanimity. In the field of justice and home affairs, the special protocol agreed at Amsterdam continues, to mean that Britain can decide where to join in cooperation in its national interest, for example, in dealing with problems of asylum.17
Enlargement
'Enlarging the EU is an historic opportunity, both for the EU and its new members. It will fulfil the challenge set a decade ago when the Iron Curtain was brought down - to create a prosperous and peaceful Europe'.18
The present British Labour Government does not doubt the benefits that enlargement will bring to the post-Cold War Europe and the Balkans, the main benefit being the creation a market of half a billion consumers.
Great Britain's view is that Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders. Without enlargement, the political consensus behind economic and political reform in the weaker transition countries may falter.
Prime Minister Tony Blair is hoping that there should be a breakthrough on enlargement under the Swedish Presidency. Britain wants to see new member states participating in the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 (something which has not been definitely agreed in Nice) and having a seat at the table in the next Intergovernmental Conference.19
Great Britain has no problem with greater flexibility or groups of Member States going forward together. But that must not lead to a hard core; a Europe in which some Member States create their own set of shared policies and institutions from which others are in practice excluded. Such groups must at every stage be open to others who wish to join. In particular, new members should not be invited to come into the European Union and then consign them to second-class membership. This goes against the French position. President Jacques Chirac, during a speech at the German Parliament, had called for a 'pioneer group' of core EU Member States20. The British Government has always resisted the idea of a two-speed Europe, since it sees it as a recipe for the marginalisation of Britain.21
The last part of this paper is dedicated to specific areas of the European Union. While obviously there are many areas worthy to discuss, due to the importance given to them by the British, I will tackle here two of the most presently controversial subjects: defense/foreign policy and monetary union.
Defense and Foreign Policy
This is a very hot issue in Britain, owing to the fact that this nation, considering itself a great power wants certain autonomy in undertaking certain engagements. Secondly the relationship with the United States is always being kept in mind.
Regarding foreign policy decisions at a European level, Britain again took a defensive stance. The continuing development of EPC to the point where it has been transformed into the CFSP led to a decisive point of choice between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. This has pushed Britain into a more conservative camp.22 The state has not yet accepted the concept of collective foreign policy making and insists that intergovernmentalism is kept within CFSP. On the other hand many other states, like Germany, have accept that work their cannot improve without the introduction of more Community methods. As Freedman suggests, Britain needs to ask itself whether European cooperation is merely to be preferred when other things are equal or whether it is really a high priority in all circumstances.23
The field of foreign policy was also discussed in Nice. The common strategies of the Union will continue to be set by unanimity. Any cooperation between groups of member states has to be consistent with a prior agreement reached by all and is therefore subject to the national veto if necessary. These enhanced cooperation agreements will not apply to defense, another key British objective.24
When it comes to defense, as in foreign policy, Britain underlines the importance of intergovernmentalism, but also, keeping in mind the intimate relationship with the US, it defends NATO supremacy.
In Nice Britain has repeated its position (i) that European defense would operate only when NATO chooses not to be engaged; (ii) that it be limited to peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management tasks; and (iii)-as agreed in Nice, 'the commitment of national assets to any EU led operation will be based on sovereign national decisions'.25 Collective defense will remain the responsibility of NATO. So here too, Britain's essential national interest has been protected.
Monetary Union
While clearly making pro-Euro statements, the British Government has not yet committed itself in favour of joining the Euro zone. However in a recent conference Blair described it as 'madness' to shut the door on the option of joining a single currency in future, depriving Britain of joining even if it was in her clear interests to do so.
In October 1997 British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown issued a statement indicating that Britain supports EMU but will not join it during the term of the current government. Brown and Blair argue that the British economy is not sufficiently convergent with those of continental Europe for Britain to join in the near future, and that much greater convergence will be required before Britain is ready to enter EMU.
Opinion polls currently show a majority of British voters want to keep the pound: the most recent Guardian/ICM poll shows pro-joiners at 30% and the anti-Euros at 57%, (women more anti than men), and some polls are worse.26 But the anti-Euro forces are losing ground. The Conservative call for a renegotiation of the EU's governing treaties has been branded as code for a total withdrawal from the EU. The Referendum Party led by the late Sir James Goldsmith fell apart when the billionaire financier Euro-MP died in 1998. As for the UK Independence Party, which astonishingly won three seats in the June European elections, have held a vote of no-confidence in their leader.27
Yet presently the Conservative Party's 'Save the Pound' movement is gaining quite some backing especially from people arguing against the Euro simply on traditional arguments only. The British Government has promised a referendum regarding monetary union but it is highly probable that it will instruct the citizens to vote in favour of accession in the Euro zone.
Europe Minister Keith Vaz recently said 'There are obvious potential advantages in a successful single currency. That's why we are in favour, in principle, of joining a successful single currency - but clear that if we are to do so, the five economic tests set out by the Chancellor must first be met'.28
The tests are these:
* whether the UK has achieved sustainable convergence with the Euro-zone economies;
* whether there is sufficient flexibility to cope with economic change;
* whether joining would create better conditions for business to make long term decisions to invest in the UK;
* the impact membership would have on our financial services industry; and
* ultimately whether joining would be good for employment.
With fresh elections coming next Spring in Britain it is likely that the referendum will be held following the elections in case of a Labour victory.
Conclusion
Britain's role, participation and even presence is the EU is something very uncertain. A change in Government could lead to a complete change of perspective. The British Empire is still in the minds of some British: that thought is completely out of line with the Europeanists' dreams. Thus a new analysis of British foreign policy regarding the EU following the next elections could easily be quite different....
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Bibliography
Books
Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, 2nd ed., Longman, London/New York, 1995.
Stephen George, An Awkward Partner, Britain in the European Community, 3rd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1998.
Christopher Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, Routledge, London/New York 1996.
Websites
All speeches and press conferences made by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook and the FCO Minister for Europe, Keith Vaz, are on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website: http://www.fco.gov.uk
Magazines
European Report, European Information Service, October 16, 1999.
http://www.eis.be/eis-en/index.htm
New Statesman
http://www.newstatesman.co.uk
The articles from these magazines used in this paper were found on : http://www.findarticles.com
Newspapers
The Malta Independent on Sunday
The Financial Times
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Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, 2nd ed., Longman, London/New York, 1995, p 20-23.
2 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner, Britain in the European Community, 3rd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1998, p 41.
3 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, speaking to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw, 6th October 2000.
4 Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, 2nd ed., Longman, London/New York, 1995, p 125.
5 'EMU: Blair's Pro-Europe campaign inches towards singles currency', European Report, European Information Service, October 16, 1999.
6 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, speaking to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw, 6th October 2000.
7 Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, The Financial Times, 13th November 2000.
8 The Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, speaking to the 'Europe 2010 Seminar' at the Centre for European Reform, Social Market Foundation, London, 13th November 2000.
9 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, speaking to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw, 6th October 2000.
0 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
2 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, making a statement to The House of Commons, London, 11th December 2000.
3 'Main points of the Nice Treaty', The Malta Independent on Sunday, 17th December 2000, p 5.
4 Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, speaking during a Press Conference in Nice, 10th December 2000.
5 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, making a statement to The House of Commons, London, 11th December 2000.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary speaking in Dublin, November 1997.
9 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, speaking to the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw, 6th October 2000.
20 IGC: Prodi, Blair, Aznar and Benelux set out Euro-visions, New Statesmen, 4th October 2000.
21 Ibid.
22 Christopher Hill, In: Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, Routledge, London/New York 1996, p 85.
23 Lawrence Freedman as quoted by Christopher Hill, In: Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, Routledge, London/New York 1996, p 86.
24 The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, making a statement to The House of Commons, London, 11th December 2000.
25 Ibid.
26 'EMU: Blair's Pro-Europe campaign inches towards singles currency', European Report, October 16, 1999.
27 Ibid.
28 Keith Vaz, FCO Minister for Europe, speaking to the Swindon Chamber of Commerce, 3rd November 2000.
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