- History of the Conflict and the EU’s intervention
The present Cyprus conflict began in 1963. It has passed through many phases, but always defying solution. Essentially the Greek Cypriot majority believes it has a right to a major voice in the government of the island. In their return, the Turkish Cypriots demand the right to govern themselves, or join with the Greek Cypriots in an equal partnership state. Each community, or people, has a long established stake in the island, though many Greek Cypriots have considered the island to be an essential part of the Hellenic world. In the past, under the Ottomans, and later under British rule, Greek and Turkish Cypriots got along together well enough, though they rarely inter-married, and they lived in seperate villages, or parts of villages, over most of the island.
The whole process of conflict between the two publics of the island began in 1963, when the Greek Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios, proposed changes to the constitution, effectively abrogating power-sharing with the Turks. This move erupted the inter-communal violence. The following year, in 1964, power sharing crumbled; a new government was formed without Turkish Cypriots. As a result of the ongoing clashes, a UN peacekeeping force established.
Ten years later, in 1974, the military junta in Greece backed the July coup against Makarios. Militants advocating union with Greece overthrew him. Five days after the coup, the Turkish troops landed in northern Cyprus and occupied a third of the island.
The EU (it was the European Economic Community then) played no significant part in the politics of Cyprus before and after 1974. Cyprus was not then a prospective member of the EEC, nor was it the significant economic regional player in the Eastern Mediterrenean that it subsequently became. At that stage Cyprus had not seriously contemplated membership of the club of Europe; indeed it was not even a twinkle in the eyes of the leading players in the European concept.
After the bloody days of war between the two communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed in principle that Cyprus should be a bicommunal federal republic. This was soon after followed by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash’s declaring a breakaway state in northern Cyprus in 1983, which is only recognised by Turkey.
Reunification talks started in 2002, but the June deadline passed without result. In March 11, 2003 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the end of efforts to reunite island and withdrawal of peace envoy.
The Republic of Cyprus signed accession treaty with the EU in April 16, 2003 and the following year, January, the Turkish Cypriot enclave’s new coalition government won vote of confidence, setting stage for a renewed push to end the island’s division.
Later that year, the US pledged $400m and Britain $37m to help rebuild a reunited Cyprus if both communities vote to approve a UN peace plan. However, in 24 April 2004, the plan was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the reunification referendum and it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots.
- Cold War Times
During Cold War, the island had a significant place due to the strategic calculations with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern regions. The island was also important to not to allow the Soviet Union to have an influence on the issue that might jeopardize the interests of NATO and the USA. It was crucial to keep the resolution process within the NATO framework so that the two strategically important states of the Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey, would not be fallen into a division on the Cyprus issue that would endanger those interests of the West.
If we look at the EU’s position on the Cyprus issue during the Cold War years, we see that its role was rather insignificant, as it was not yet speaking with one voice in the international arena, and, an important party on the issue, the United Kingdom, who is also one of the guaranteur powers on the island, had a tendency towards the US policies in its actions about the issue, rather than being the speaker of the European Community.
Another important fact about the Cold War era was that, then, Turkey’s relative importance in proportion to that of Greece was more visible as NATO was representing the spirit of the western international community during the Cold War more than the EU. As long as Turkey felt the support of NATO, for whom Turkey’s commitment to the Western camp was vital, it did not feel sidelined or entered into a hot war with Greece, a situation which was totally against the interests of the Alliance in the region.
Cypriot politics has been deeply affected by the relationship between Turkey and Greece in European security organizations. NATO was a forum for reconciling their conflicts of interest. Turkey was the more influential of the two in the NATO context because of the size of its army and its geographical position. Being a full member of the EU, Greece would look for a force answerable to the WEU.
The close relations of the United States with Turkey on the one hand and the comparatively poor ones with Greece added to the Greek government’s sense of insecurity in the face of an enemy that was militarily three times stronger than Greece.
Greece threathened to veto Maastricht Treaty if its status in the WEU will not be the same as other EU members. Turkey’s response was to assert primacy to NATO while trying to improve its status in the WEU by offering to participate in planning exercises. The Republic of Cyprus offered 50 men as its contribution to the European peace making force which was decided to be established in the Helsinki Conclusions. What was significant of these attempts of preparation of combat units was that the progress made towards a capacity for taking decisions without relying on American leadership. The Europeanization of the NATO has been accompanied by the growth in informal links between the headquarters of the EU, WEU and NATO in Brussels.
- Post-Cold War and the EU
After the Cold War, the EU comes to the stage this time being one of the main actors, whose attitudes have significantly affected the negotiation process. There are ofcourse several reasons for the EU’s increased interest on the issue.
First, in order to become an international actor, the EU is required to have a strong capability in the common foreign security and defence policy. Therefore, Cyprus was a good avenue to repair its tarnished image and to legitimize its own security model in the core Europe as well as the projection of it in the peripheries.
The second reason was the simple outcome of the two countries’, both Turkey’s and Cyprus’ aspirations to become an EU member, which made it inevitable for the EU to get involved in the conflict.
Especially after gaining candidacy, the Greek Cypriot Administration’s efforts to bring the issue to the EU circles was really effective in the sense that they could enjoy a more priveleged status which enabled them to have more diplomatic gains. In fact, the EU membership was the best choice for the Greek Cypriots to reach their aims, and as they became a member country before Turkey, it was to their own interests to seek for a solution on the grounds of the EU. Another significant factor was the presence of Greece giving full support to the membership of the Greek Cypriot Administration, which successfuly utilized the Turkey’s application to satisfy the Greek claims over the island.
As the EU started to appear more and more on the stage, one might expect that the USA would stand against it, however, it has been the opposite. The USA, especially after the Cold War, had the belief that the best solution to get rid of this long-lasting conflict was the membership of Turkey to the EU, as a last step towards its incorporation to the western international community, and with the idea that as both Cyprus and Turkey wanted to become an EU member, there was nothing wrong with the EU’s interference in the issue. Perhaps we may say that the US wanted to share the burden of such a critical political issue with the EU.
- The transformation process of EU’s stance
When studying the change in the EU’s attitudes over the Cyprus issue, we may divide the process into three periods:
1 - First period (1989-1994): We have seen before in this paper that during the Cold War the EU’s place in the Cyprus dispute was insignificant. Infact, it may be fair to say that many European Union member states have not been too eager to take Cyprus up into the Union. The island’s conflict poses a number of difficult questions about the territorial boundaries of the EU law and the acquis communautaire, and also about the Union being drawn into a conflict. The application for accession by the Greek Cypriot administration to the European Communities dates back to 1990. In 1993, the European Commission judged positively the feasibility of the accession of Cyprus to the EC but initially suggested that the question of the division of the island was to be resolved first. It was felt at that stage that in the absence of a prior settlement, the application of Community law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms could not be guaranteed on the whole of the island. Also, accession without settlement would lead to inequality. Although one part of the island would experience a beneficial economic effect, the economic disparity of the two parts would increase. Therefore, after the end of Cold War, what we come accross in the relevant EU documents is that, the settlement of the Cyprus dispute stands as a precondition for both Turkey’s and Cyprus’ accession to the Union. The Commission report recommends that once the eventual resolution of the dispute is reached, it would be much more easier for the island to become a member country.
2 - Second period (1994-1999): In this period we see that the tone of the EU becomes more pro-Greek. The European Council initially agreed with the Commission that accession talks should be postponed. However, in February 1995, it changed its attitude and resolved that negotiations could begin six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. This change of heart was brought about by the Greek threat to veto EU enlargment towards Eastern Europe if Cyprus was not taken on board first. From then on, the European Council envisaged the speedy accession of the whole island, and started to press the inclusion of representatives of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiations in order to bring it about. This offer was not taken up by the latter, who could envisage participating in the negotiations only as the representatives of the TRNC, and who even had difficulty assuming that the Greek Cypriot side could legitimately claim to represent any part of the island at all. In spite of this the EU, in March 1998, opened accession negotiations with the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus.
3 - Third period (since 1999): This period has significant importance for Turkey, as it starts with the Helsinki summit meeting in December 1999. In this summit, the EU made an official confirmation that the membership of the Greek Cypriots as the representative of the whole island would not be contingent to any prior accomodation with the Turkish Cypriots. This was actually the achievement of Greece, who agreed to lift its veto on the candidacy of Turkey on condition that the above mentioned pre-condition is put aside for the Greek Cypriots. Another important development in the following year was the EU Commission document which required Turkey to contribute to the attempts of a settlement on the grounds of UN, being the first official paper to demonstrate the obligation of Turkey to facilitate any possible solution on the Cyprus dispute. The European Council of Copenhagen decided that, in the absence of a settlement, the application of the acquis to the northern part of the island would be suspended. Meanwhile, the Council invited the Commission, in consultation with the government of Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union. The programme has been launched in June 2003. The results of the negotiations on all 31 chapters of the acquis were incorporated into the Accession Treaty. The Commission delivered its opinion on 19 February and submitted the Treaty to the European Parliament which gave its assent on 9 April, it was signed in Athens on 16 April 2003.Cyprus ratified the Treaty in July 2003 and became a Member State on 1 May 2004.
The Helsinki European Council, held on 10-11th December 1999, took key decisions on the enlargement of the EU. The summit made progress in preparing to accept new member states, among them Turkey, whose candidacy was the subject of a special decision by the EC. EU leaders also agreed on the development of the Union's crisis management capacity within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The acceptance of Turkey as a candidate for membership came after it was rejected two years ago in the Luxemburg Summit. Turkey has been asked to improve its human rights record and abolish the death penalty (which was a critical issue for that timebeing as Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the terrorist organization was caught early that year and who was expected to be sentenced to death penalty by a great majority of the Turkish public), as well as take its disputes with Greece, over Cyprus and contested islands in the Aegean, to the International Court of Justice. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit commented, "There might be details we find hard to accept," prompting the dispatch of a diplomatic delegation to Ankara led by Javier Solana for the EU.
However, there were two important developments prior to the summit that paved the way for the above mentioned circumstances to take place in the Helsinki Conferences. First was the Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in February 1999 in Greece, which put the country in an awkward position. Turkey could have brought the issue in front of the international community and could have had a legitimate reason to claim that Greece is cooperating with the terrorist groups, however, it did not choose to do so. Instead, after the devastating earthquake of August 1999 in the northwestern region of the country, which had caused the death of more than 30000 lives, Turkey was in a vulnerable situation so it held the helping hand of Greece which sent aid missioneries for the rescue operations. Now that there was a friendship athmosphere between the two countries, Greece agreed to lift its veto on granting a candidacy status to Turkey in the December summit of the same year in Helsinki, but under the two following conditions:
- Greek Administration of Cyprus will be given the right to become a member without the precondition of a settlement in the island
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To go the International Court of Justice for the Aegean disputes
Whether these decisions taken in the Helsinki Summit are just to put Turkey off with vague promises or not, as it is written in some of the literature on this issue, will be clear only after the fulfillment of the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU with the membership agreement.
- Positions of the Related Countries with regard to the Security Perspective of Turkey’s Candidacy and the EU’s Enlargement
After the September 11 attacks, Turkey’s determination to join the EU has increased due to the problems it has faced in its relations with the US within the context of Iraq crisis. Considering itself as an indispensible ally for ages, Turkey was dissapointed with the USA’s reaction which put her into an difficult position with regard to its decision to open its airbases for the war planes or not. Infact, Turkish National Assembly’s decisive manner of rejection, despite being praised in the domestic and EU circles, was not really welcomed by the American authorities.
What brought Turkey closer to the EU in the beginning of the new millenium was the election of a pro-EU oriented single party government in the year 2002. The Justice and Development Party government gave priority to the necessary amendments to comply with the EU legislation, and, at the same time they tried to seek for a resolution in Cyprus by encouraging the TRNC to accept the Annan Plan. Indeed, Turkey had finally understood that the way to becoming a member was passing from the settlement of this longlasting dispute. At that time, getting a date was the main concern of the Turkish government, today, as the issue has not been solved yet, it continues to stand as a major obstacle in front of Turkey before it is entitled to membership.
From the security point of view, it would not be wrong to say that the EU’s stance regarding the issue has affected the negotiation process which further led to the intensification of the ‘securitisation’ in and around the island. Moreover, the EU contributed to the economic misery of the Turkish Cypriots by prohibiting the entry of their goods into the European market. Still, however, what is more important than the economic development for the Turkish Cypriots is the provision of political and societal security, and, they see the Turkish troops in the island as the only means to provide this. On the other hand, there are several vital reasons for Turkey’s holding on to the issue tightly, as it is important for Turkey to not to lose its role of being the strategic outpost of the European Union against the Greek Cypriots, apart from the geopolitical value of the island. A ‘Greek Cyprus’ would directly threathen Turkey’s security and vital interests, especially along Turkey’s Mediterrranean coastline. This area will become even more important once the pipelines from the Caspian Basin to Ceyhan materialize.
Another critical issue in this perspective is that, there might be many negative consequences of the membership of a divided Cyprus into the EU as long as a solution, which would satifsy all the engaged parties, is not reached. The most likely scenario would be that the addition of the Greek Cypriots to the anti-Turkish bloc would lessen the chance of Turkey for the future EU membership. Actually, the sign of this can already be seen in the initial period of the negotiations, the concession on Cyprus is put forward on the table for Turkey in order to attain the pass to move further with the talks. A second undesirable consequence might be that, devoid of membership prospects in the EU, feeling discouraged and sidelined, Turkey might step-back from its efforts to join the club, and may find itself in an identity crisis, which is already a boiling issue in the domestic politics.
It is certainly a great advantage for the Greeks that they are already a part of the European Union, and the successful Greek governments have functionalized this advantegeous position over the Cyprus issue to achieve their best interests. Because of the unanimity principle, Greeks had utilized their veto power on the issue of the enlargement to the CEECs, and, only after the EU’s approval of the initiation of Cyprus’ accession talks and then the unconditional accession of the Greek Cypriots, Greece gave a positive signal to the enlargement into the CEESs. However, there is also another scenario for the Greece upon the issue of Turkey’s accession to the EU, that is, in case that Turkey is attached to the EU with full membership, Greece would not need to spend as much as it currently does on military, which is at the moment the highest per capita in Europe.
- The European Union’s position
It is also to the least interest of the European Union to have a Turkish-Greek military confrontation in the Aegean. In such a case the whole enlargement process would experience a setback in the face of insecurity producing character of the EU accession process. The EU has a lot to gain from a Turco-Greek settlement that would follow a reconciliation in Cyprus. EU’s regional security interests lies in the settlement rather than estrangement of Turkey from the EU orbit. In fact, it is important to keep in mind that, though there has taken place a strong determination among the EU members in order to construct supranational mechanisms to achieve common foreign, security and defence policies, member states are still jealous of their sovereign rights in these areas. Therefore, before urging Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots for any resolution that would take away the sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots, the EU should discuss the feasibility of such an offer, which is made to the two communities whose points of divergencies outnumber the points of similarities. But, having put its signature under various EU documents that have somehow established a link between its own membership and that of the island, Turkey has to find a midway that would not put its security interests in the region under risk while also accomodating the EU legislation that requires certain liabilities for membership. Rather than seeking to tackle specific Turkish issues such as human rights or the Cyprus question on a singular basis, the EU should try to formulate a cohesive and strategic approach in its relationship with Turkey by looking at the complete picture.
CONCLUSION
The parties involved in Cyprus are either a part of, or have special relations with the EU and and can appreciate and support a European initiative on Cyprus. The EU, which has repeatedly expressed its concern over the lack of settlement on the island, is now in a unique position to play a role in bringing about permanent peace and stability on the Mediterranean island and the region.
The best solution for the Cyprus dispute would be to negotiate on the grounds of the Annan Plan which reflected that the security in Europe in general and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular would be more easily realized by Turkey’s true presence in the western international community by its EU membership.
It is not only the wish of the two nations but also the will of the international community to end the dispute in the island which has been a home for various ancient civilizations and today the home of two nations differing in their language, religion and nationality, however sharing the same identity of being a Cypriot above all.
Although there are many factors which need to be resolved, and, with the addition of the EU into the process now more states involved in the issue to obtain a settlement, it is highly dependent on the decisiveness and efforts of the both nations to achieve a peaceful and fair settlement acceptable to both Cypriot communities through negotiations and appeal to all sides to refrain from all actions which might jeopardize efforts for a settlement.
Rather than using the Cyprus dispute to underline Turkey’s non-European security identity and to oppose its membership, the everlasting resolution of the Cyprus dispute on the basis of Annan Plan might accelarate Turkey’s admission to EU by contributing to coming closer to the Union in terms of the organizing principles of security in Europe.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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‘Living in Disharmony’, accessed on 29.03.2006
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Dodd,Clement; Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After, (Eothan Press,UK: 2003), p.1
Green, Pauline & Collins, Ray; Embracing Cyprus: The Path to Unity in the New Europe, Chapter 1 [A strategy developed:unity plus membership], (I.B.Tauris, London&NewYork: 2003), p.1
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Oğuzlu, Tarık; op.cit., p.260.
Mirbagheri, Farid; Cyprus and International Peacemaking, (Hurst&Co., London: 1998), pp.139-141
Brewin, Christopher; The European Union and Cyprus, (Eothan Press, Cambridgeshire:2000), p.236.
Oğuzlu, Tarık; op.cit., p.261.
Diez,Thomas; The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict, (Manchester University Press: 2002), p.3
Prof.Dr. Gökçekuş, Hüseyin; International Symposium on the Cyprus Issue: Past , Present and the Vision for the Future, Article by Prof.Dr. Nanette NEUWAHL, ‘The European Union and Cyprus’, (Neareast University Pres, Lefkoşa: 2001), pp.275-288
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Manisalı, Erol; Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs, (Gündoğan Yayınları,İSTANBUL:2002), pp.133-139.
Şimşir, Bilal N.; AB, AKP ve KIBRIS, (Bilgi Yayınevi,ANKARA:2003), pp.35-44.
Oğuzlu, Tarık; op.cit., p.264.
Dodd,Clement; CYPRUS: The Need for New Perspectives, (Eothan Press:1999), p.247
Joseph, Joseph.S; Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics – From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union – (Macmillan Press:GBR, 1997) p.126.