The relationship between censorship and student publications by specifically drawing on the Rabelais case

It should be noted that Anarchist theory extended from non-violent writers and political leaders like Tolstoy, Thoreau and Ghandi to Proudhon (property is theft)… the Anarcho-Syndicalists whose creed was that unions should become militant organizations dedicated to the destruction of capitalism and the state.

All this may be in one sense politics, but the Constitutional freedom of political communication assumes - indeed exists to support, foster and protect - representative democracy and the rule of law. The advocacy of law breaking falls outside this protection and is antithetical to it. 

However, the argument brought forward by his Honour is severely flawed. The knowledge needed to draw political comparisons from the works of Tolstoy, Thoreau and Ghandi lies in the mere fact that the writings of these revolutionaries were not refused classification, but available to the public for debate and reflection. In this instance, measuring competing interests on the basis of political ideologies in power would easily translate into banning all commonly dissenting student publications. The classic role of student publications in discussing socio-political affairs beyond the bounds of moral and legal civility is one which indeed supports, fosters and protects the system of representative democracy.

This lends itself to another critical failure in determining classification of student publications. In refusing classification of Rabelais, the Review Board directly addressed the legal aspect of ‘inciting crime’, compromising the publication’s implied rights to political communication. It did so by appraising the article in isolation from other writings of political nature, published in the same edition. Setting aside possible constitutional questions, the approach in reviewing student publications does not distinguish between student and mainstream media. If a student press is to function as the dutiful outlet of alternative and challenging thought in society, then such definition should allow for exceptional free speech privileges.

To give further reference to the limited interpretation of the role of student publications in Australia, there is a high probability that the article in question would have been permissible to publish in other countries, particularly the United States. Not only does the existence of a U.S. Bill of Rights expressly protect the rights of individuals to free speech, but an implicit rule applied by U.S. courts entitles student journalists to the highest level of First Amendment protection to sustain the traditional libertarian function of student publications.  The rule that student publications enjoy freestanding exemptions of restrictions underlying the First Amendment emanates from legislation based in the state of California, which expressly duplicates First Amendment rights to college and university students.  

One can hardly ignore the advantageous effects of a similar law being implemented in Australia. Like the United States, it is widely maintained that student publications in Australia should remain wide-open free speech zones, where every form of speech is permitted and censorship controls are turned off. However, the recent introduction of the Voluntary Student Unionism bill before parliament has additionally threatened the agenda of student publications. Although the bill, which traces back to 1974, sets out to render universal student unionism voluntary, it could potentially be the first law that directly undermines students’ right to free speech by defunding Australia’s student press. The Western Australian (WA) VSU model, which came into force in 1997, has cut funds directed to all student publications in the state, while other student advocacy bodies were lost completely. 

In conclusion, although Australia has a robust commitment to freedom of speech, on a practical level, this commitment is too often regulated by prevailing moral and legal protocols. As evidenced by the legal implications brought forward by the Rabelais case, there remains little conscious acknowledgement of the significant function of student media in challenging dominant viewpoints. Given the undoubted importance of the court in interpreting political communication, the process in determining such can only be rendered valid and objective if the historical and philosophical principles underpinning student media are taken into consideration.

The burden here is not only on the narrowed definition of ‘political communication’, but the lack of an accountable and tolerant classification system. Similarly, the Rabelais case reawakens the time-worn argument of implementing an express free speech right in Australia. Given that student publications are dedicated to political dissent and civil disobedience, and thus vulnerable to legal ramifications, it would arguably seem fair to grant student media the privilege of special free speech rights, over and above all the general speech rights Australians enjoy. A law similar to that of the United States would allow society to recognize the doctrine of academic freedom and protect and maintain the free market of ideas in a representative democracy. As Parsons once said: ‘The creative writer should enjoy a latitude greater than would be of proper to the journalist and newspaper published who deal with fact.”

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