Euro-sceptics would say that a democratic deficit certainly exists around the Commission, as they are, a collective of faceless bureaucrats, making key decisions, without proper scrutiny from outside agencies. This maybe true of the Commission when it was in its infancy, however since the resignation of the Commission in March 1999, there has been a growth of European Parliament’s role in the appointment process. Since the 1998 Amsterdam treaty, the Parliament has been given the mandate to vote on the Commission as a collective, thus this in turn gives the President of the Commission a much greater legislative mandate as they have been elected by each member state. Therefore there has certainly been a reduction in democratic deficit in this area, as the Parliament has an increasing tendency to hold the Commission to account. In theory the Parliament can, on a vote of 66%, sack the entire Commission though it cannot as of yet sack individuals. The parliament can also issue censure motions on the Commission, for example in 1999, a censure was presented over the commissions budget mishandling and cronyism and though the parliament was unable to muster the 2/3rds majority vote to sack the commission, the very fact that the censure debate took place is probably more important than the final result. As it showed the Parliament was prepared to flex its newfound political muscles and as a direct result, the Santer Commission was forced to resign and a new Commission was appointed.
Thus it would seem that though the Commission is made up of officials who aren’t directly accountable to the people of Europe, there are certain new reforms that have limited the democratic deficit by giving new powers to the European Parliament, which is elected by the people. Thereby ensuring that the Commission really is acting in the best interests of the EU. Thus in conclusion the Commission has much less power then its detractors often suggest, it is not a decision-making body, and its powers are being reduced as those of the other EU institutions grow.
The European Parliament was at one time the main cause for concern over democratic deficit in the EU, however changes to the treaties have resulted in those powers growing significantly in recent years. The EP is the only directly elected institution in the EU system but had relatively few powers over how law and policy is made. It has many of the trappings of a conventional legislature but lacks three critical powers: it cannot introduce laws, enact laws or raise revenues. It can suggest that the Commission propose a new law or policy and it can amend laws as they go through the Commission and the Council of Ministers. It can also delay and even reject proposals, but the Commission still holds the power of initiation and the Council the power of decision-making. In short the EP is a junior member in the EU decision-making system, and it is for this reason why the issue of democratic deficit has arisen.
Most of the EP’s handicaps can be traced back to the unwillingness of the member states to give up their power over decision-making in the Council of Ministers, and to the emphasis placed in the Treaty of Rome on Parliament’s “advisory” and “supervisory” powers. Thus in essence member nations are only willing to integrate to a point, they are fundamentally selfish, and thus this has led to an intergovernmental style in the Parliament, even though it is the most democratic of all the EU institutions and thus this is where the deficit has occurred. Parliament has also had a credibility problem, although how many national parliaments don’t? Few EU citizens know what it does, or have the same kind of psychological ties to the EP as they have to their national legislatures.
Despite its handicaps the EP has managed to use arguments about democratic accountability to win added responsibilities and to be taken more seriously. The legislative powers of the EP were once very modest, but changes to the treaties have resulted in those powers growing significantly in recent years. The Treaty of Rome provided the EP with a “consultation procedure” whereby it was able to offer a non-binding opinion to the Council of Ministers before a new law in a selected area was adopted. The Council can then ask the Commission to amend the draft but they are under no obligation. The Single European Act 1986, introduced a “cooperation procedure”, whereby the EP gained a second reading for certain laws being considered by the Council, notably aspects of economic and monetary policy. Subsequently, Maastricht introduced a “codecision procedure”, under which parliament was given the right to a third reading on selected laws, notably those relating to the single market and the environment, and hence shared powers with the Council in these areas. Maastricht also extended Parliament’s power over foreign policy issues by obliging the presidency of the European Council to consult with EP on the development of a common foreign and security policy. Finally, under the “assent procedure”, the EP has equal power with the Council over decisions on the admittance of new EU members, on giving other countries associate status and on the EU’s international agreements. Thus with this introduction of codecision, the one time relatively weak EP, has now received powers that have helped to reduce the democratic deficit.
The EP also has powers over the budget, where it holds joint powers with the Council of Ministers to fix the EU budget. It can ask for changes to the budget, ask for new appropriations for areas not covered and can even with a 2/3rds majority, reject the budget. Finally the EP also has powers over other institutions and thus is the main area where the deficit has really been reduced. The EP can take the Council or the Commission to the European Court of Justice over alleged infringements of the treaties, and to approve the appointment of the president and commissioners. It can, by a 2/3rds majority, pose a very disruptive threat to the Commission, by having the ability to sack the entire college of commissioners through a vote of censure.
Therefore in recent times it has become less of a body that merely reacts to the Commission proposals and Council votes, and has increasingly launched its own initiatives and forced the other institutions to pay more attention to its opinions. The EP has won a greater right to amend laws and check the activities of the other institutions, and it has acted as the conscience of the EU and as the guardian of its democratic ideals. Thus it has a critical role in building bridges between EU citizens and EU institutions, and is one of the main reasons why democratic deficit has been reduced in recent times.
Adam Sivner
