As back-up; the House of Common ‘Select committees’ (introduced in 1979 with 16 committees in all in the Commons) have a role of supporting the scrutiny role of parliament. Their main work involves producing inquiries on specific issues and publishing reports for the House to consider, to which the government then issues a response, though the committees have no power to insist that their reports are debated or acted upon. In the end, their ability to control the executive is very limited, since they lack the time, funding, resources and people to apply effective pressure. They cannot force ministers and civil servants to testify or to answer specific questions (there had been countless times where the departments had failed to cooperate properly). Nevertheless the committees have often produced damning reports in recent years, particularly in the areas of health, social security and the environment. As an example of a recent report (30 November 2011); the Public Accounts Committee’s 59th report stated that the Department has failed to deliver any armoured vehicles from its core programmes despite spending £1.1 billion since 1998.
The House of Lords are limited by law and by convention. They cannot reject government bills that were announced in their election manifesto; in any event they can, however, delay legislative proposals only for up to a year (according to the 1949 Parliament Act), after which time bills automatically become law, regardless of the Lords objections. Moreover, the Lords neither have the power to amend (change) or delay financial bills. Then again, the Lords have a key role in examining the Commons legislations, spending around 700 hours each year to the task, and offering some 8500 amendments. Most are accepted by the government, though this is becoming less true as the relationship between the two houses has disintegrated due to the House of Lords Act of 1999; which has left the two chambers unable to agree. The Lords have, for example, defied the government on the Constitutional Reform Bill (abolishing the office of the Lord Chancellor and creating a new Supreme Court, 2004) and the Terrorism Bills of 2005 and 2006. In most other cases, the Lords have eventually accepted legislations, but usually after having forced the government to (think again and) amend it. In a recent debate (led by the Archbishop of Canterbury on the 9th December 2011) the Lords discussed the issue of the position of Christians in the Middle-East as to being more ‘vulnerable’ than they had been for centuries. The debate still continues and is being looked into by the Government.
Nonetheless, the Lords have been obstructive in two areas – criminal justice and foxhunting. The government was defeated on five separate occasions on the Criminal Justice Bill until they finally abandoned proposals to limit rights to a jury trial back in December 2003. Bills to ban foxhunting in England and Wales were passed in the House of Commons every year since 1997, and have been rejected on every occasion by the Lords. In October 2003 the Lords voted to restore hunting under licence but in November, the Commons rejected the proposed contract by delaying any action until 2004, and then voting for an immediate ban. When the Lords once more rejected the bill, the previous Speaker for the House of Commons, Michael Martin, requested the Parliament Act (1949) to end the quarrel between the two houses. Foxhunting therefore was banned from February 2005. Nowadays, it is extremely rare for the Lords to reject a Commons Bill.
The power of the executive has been growing for well over a century. The party whips play a critical part in enforcing loyalty, hence the Disraeli observation- “Damn your principles, stick to your party!” remains a very clear message to the voting behaviour of MPs, and especially those on the Government’s side. Then again, over the last 25 years parliament has become more professional, with the removal of ‘part-time’ MPs, the introduction of specialist committees, and the increase in support staff. The Commons is now more critical of the government, backbenchers rebel more often and more efficiently and the Lords are far more willing to amend or delay the Commons legislation. This way, the House of Lords may be seen as a ‘thorn’ in the government’s side, but it lacks authority and power, which means the government can stop their attempts of being ‘obstructive’. There is no doubt that the Lords have become stronger and more stubborn than they used to be, but, in the end, they will always have to kneel down to the authority of the government and its majority in the House of Commons.
Additionally, our prime minister hires and fires cabinet ministers and directs, presents and co-ordinates the work of the government. He has the power to decide when to hold the next election (within the five-year term), demonstrating his power over his political opponents. The cabinet ministers, which the prime minister hand picks; co-ordinate the government business, including the legislative programme and constitutional issues. They must give formal approval to policy decisions, and bring authority and legitimacy to the business of government, not the Legislature. As a national leader, it is the prime minister’s job to represent the country in international relations and enjoy extensive prerogative power in international negotiations and crises, not the Legislature. As we have seen above, executive power has grown considerably over the recent years, victories for Parliament are relatively rare but the government always has its way in the end.
Overall, I believe to a certain extent that Parliament doesn’t control the executive power. Our current government has a comfortable majority and so can dominate MPs through control and discipline in general. The party whips control the standing legislative committees to a large extent, so the ‘amending’ function of the Commons is weak. MPs also have insufficient time and support to be able to blame the government effectively. Not to mention that ministers are also free to avoid intrusive questioning. I say that power lies with those who have the ability to set the agenda. Therefore the executive is acting like the legislature in that it controls what is / is not discussed in Parliament, and ultimately the outcome. Therefore, I propose that decisions are made by decision-makers, i.e. those with the authority to say yay or nay. In this case, power would lie with the Executive, not the Parliament.
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