The Rising Challenge: The Background of the ESDP
After the Cold War, regarding the European Union, we see a clear tendency towards further integration in security and defense policies as a result of the goals defined in the founding treaty of the European Union, Maastricht. However, it was only in 1999 Cologne European Council meeting where the “European Security and Defense Policy” initiative was put under the second pillar of the Union, known as “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)”, with the goal of strengthening the European institutionalization. In Washington Summit NATO, officially comply with the ESDP policies of EU. Up to this point, the bargain between two sides of the Atlantic was rather challenging. The shift from identity to policy will be further elaborated in this study. The term “policy” was chosen by European Union members simply because the dynamics of the Europeanization required a stronger term than “identity”, in order to first clarify the separation from NATO and U.S. (sovereignty) and then to underline the determination for a better cooperation among the European Union nations (solidarity).
The modern efforts go back to 1940s. The creation of Western Union (WU) in 1948, the Pléven plan in 1950 and later the refusal of European Defense Community by the French parliament in 1954 and the creation of the Western European Union instead of WU were the first events in the history of modern European defense area. The early efforts to create a European military organization were stuck between two issues: one was the desire to move the integration forward and the second was the recognition of the indispensable U.S. commitment in Europe. These two issues were mainly compatible during the Cold War, although we see challenges regarding the roles of the existing powers within the system in De Gaulle’s France (direct challenge) and Brandt’s Germany (indirect challenge). However, none of these efforts challenged the U.S. existence in the continent.
Through the end of the Cold War, changes can be observed in the behaviors of European Community members for common foreign and defense arrangements. European Political Cooperation (EPC), launched informally in 1970 was formally enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is utilized by the provisions of Title V of the Treaty on European Union (1991). However, member states' joint action, as seen in the Balkans, under Title V did not work as satisfactorily as they might have hoped. Through time, CFSP becomes the main forum for foreign policy discussions, common declarations and decisions that helps to develop the understanding of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This forum has developed many policies regarding the common policy issues, but it acted comparatively slowly to come up with an agreed common security and defense policy. The problem was laying in depth. As Peterson mentioned in his book A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?, lack of common identity, common interests and in a lesser degree existence of weak institutions were the three handicaps that Europe must have overcome.
European security architecture was in the hands of two different approaches: Europeanist and Atlanticist. During these debates the U.S., as the leader of the Atlanticist group, promoted NATO’s assets as the only institutions that can create the transatlantic link, hence the stability of the relations. The most critical subject between the parties was the operational role of the Western European Union (WEU). In broader terms, the problem was to find the best institution to lead European Security architecture since both NATO and WEU were claiming to carry out soft military roles such as peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. But unlike WEU, NATO had built up an integrated military structure during the Cold War. 1991 Maastricht treaty set the foundations of the European Security and Defense Policy (The term is identity in the original text. It becomes policy in Amsterdam treaty of 1997) as a goal and in Taylor’s expression “a firmer bases” with the objectives, methods and priorities that the treaty developed.
ESDP will contribute to the trend of further integration of Europe by many aspects: it will lay the foundation of a functioning European foreign policy; it will create an alternative insurance for EU members against NATO such as having a military force with its autonomous power; it will provide a good foundation and weight for decision-making on the issues concerning the burden-sharing of transatlantic relations including the use of NATO; it will provide motivation for the modernization of European military and strengthening and consolidation of European defense industry, it will help indirectly the enlargement process in the Central Europe, as of more solidified Europe creating a center of attraction; it will also help the European governments in convincing its citizens on use of military force where it is found necessary as a common European policy.
Transformation of the U.S. Hegemonic Project in Europe
The U.S. was the main supporter of the efforts for the creation of a common European security and defense policy from the end of the Second World War. This is because, historically, the U.S. has always welcomed the integration of Europe, since the 1940s, which would supposedly decrease the possibility of future conflicts among European nations, i.e. German aggression, create a well designed and better equipped Europe against Soviet threat and also reduce the burden of U.S. in her military efforts. However, changing conditions of the post-Cold War era challenged the place and role of U.S. as a hegemonic power in these efforts, which would in practice mean the possibility of being removed (decoupling) from the leadership position to a more partner position in the security issues of Europe that was given to Washington in order to be in charge of the central direction of the cold war. Some theorists on the post-cold war era such as Zielenko calling for the creation of a new regime to provide incentives for European states in order to collectively assure their security (on their own) have mainly failed. Formulations without U.S. existence, that will also disable it’s commitments to remain engaged in European affairs, reach out to Central Europe and be able to be part of shaping Russia’s future, could not hold onto reality.
In this transformation the U.S. utilized NATO in order to create same basic objectives to strengthen the transatlantic security and political relations. The U.S. also sees the fact that ESDP if strategically tailored can contribute to these objectives. On the other hand, some European states, led by France, will not easily give in to the demands of the U.S. especially those regarding the EU’s own defense and security concerns. According to these countries, Headline Goal Task Force can be given a broader role, rather than a limited role, which NATO as a whole is not, engaged.
These tendencies (tendency of EU to solidify its structure and tendency of the US to increase or keep the initiative in the defense and security matters of Europe as a hegemonic power) are not marrying well. U.S. politics were designed between two significant necessities: creating a well functioning defense mechanism for EU and maintaining the crucial role of NATO. In order to achieve both objectives, U.S. focused on the common issues, which needed further negotiations. For example, prioritization of the institutions based on acceptable norms, risk sharing and the issue of division of labor, combination of the planning structures effectively, regulation on the defense spending and capabilities on both side of the Atlantic, policies regarding the issues of interoperability, defense cooperation and crisis management as well as establishing common standards from the political approaches of both sides are the main areas that are either stemmed from or the result of these two tendencies.
NATO, meanwhile, has taken several steps such as accepting new members, Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was created in 1994 to increase the cooperation between NATO and countries of central and east Europe, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, later becoming NATO-Russia Council (2002), Charter with Ukraine and new relations with the Western European Union (WEU). At the Oslo Meeting in 1992, NATO left open the possibility of expanding its role in collective security operations. On the other hand, the European Union first took the issue of creation of capacities to conduct a common foreign policy at Maastricht in 1991. However, considering the size, functionality and effect of NATO in the beginning of the post-cold war era, as Glaser discussed, it provided the best option for security of Europe despite the developments at Maastricht. However, by time, NATO and EU started to have increasing effect on each other and their relations reached to some fundamental questions such as the nature of security in 21st century Europe and the role to be played by the U.S. in the security issues of Europe and connectedly transatlantic relations that may lead to either separation or linking of some of the practices and processes.
The relationship between NATO and EU in the defense area is called by NATO and many American policy-makers as European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), whereas by the EU it is referred to as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The U.S. insists on the word “identity” because of their expectations to keep Europe within Washington’s influence. The term ESDI was first introduced in Maastricht Treaty in 1991. This term is still preferred by NATO since it reflects the capabilities and the identity that EU must obtain. On the other hand, EU starting with Helsinki European Council (1999) preferred to use the term (Common) European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). According to Hunter, there are three main differences between these two terms: first the term policy is stronger than the term identity. Secondly, the term Common European Security and Defense Policy is chosen to create a common understanding around the term Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Finally, the “E” in ESDI represents all the European members of NATO whereas “E” in ESDP only represents the members of EU. According to some American policymakers ESDP might do little so it will not achieve the objective of a useful cooperative partner of NATO and furthermore it will consume the European resources by causing duplication. Another concern was that it will do too much at the expense of NATO’s primacy, which might result in the development of an anti-American stance that may in the long run cause a decline in US influence in Europe. In order to analyze the dilemma, we should take a further look at the historical continuity and turning points regarding the security and defense policy of Europe.
NATO’s Berlin and Brussels (1996) Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meetings
NATO’s Brussels summit meeting (1994) is the first institutional step towards the repositioning of the U.S. in Europe after the Cold War. The EU members recognized NATO’s primacy. According to Summit decisions, NATO would have the initiative to call the other European multinational forces to duty. Two years later, in Berlin and Brussels (1996 Defense Ministerial Meetings), this position was confirmed, despite France’s objections. The U.S. put her drawback into the final statement. NATO assets would be available to WEU, which enabled it as a militarily effective organization for the first time, however this distribution should not impair NATO’s capacity to act and it should not create two NATOs.
1996 meetings came to life through two initiatives. The first one was NATO’s 1994 initiative, which decided that NATO would stand ready to make its collective assets for alliance available. The second initiative came from the U.S. presidency, which was promoting the common foreign and security policy of Europe. The main decisions taken with the Berlin declaration and confirmed with Brussels meeting were as follows:
- The identity of European Security and Defense Identity should be built within NATO, which would enable the European Allies to make more coherent and effective contribution to the activities of NATO.
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EU would make operations through WEU. In the operations, WEU would be able to utilize NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force providing that NATO’s capacity would not be impaired. Appropriate planning would also permit militarily coherent and effective forces that would be capable of making operations under political control and strategic direction of WEU.
- NATO members like Turkey and Norway could participate in WEU-led operations if they want to.
Meetings paved the way for the WEU-led operations, created “separable but not separate” ESDI within NATO, allowed ESDI to take the initiative in Combined Joint Task Force and finally permitted all the European members of NATO to take part in the WEU-led operations. There was also an agreement that NATO would remain the main body for common security objectives and consultations. As a summary, NATO’s primacy and the role played by The United States were recognized in post-cold war era European security. Another emphasis was to a single multinational command structure in order to have the unity of the command. Obviously, there was no need for two NATOs and anything that has the potential of impairing the capability of NATO was addressed in these meetings. The United States also accepted that some of the non-combat forces of the U.S. military can be made available to WEU since NATO has limited institutions (transportation, intelligence and communication) other than individual commitments of the states and these capabilities are mainly US possessions. However, according to Kamp, the problem was much more complicated than using the necessary operational assets. A significant step towards a military posture was ‘barely linked to the political realities’, which was obviously seen in the Yugoslavian case.
These meetings could seal the deal between U.S. and EU members; however there were certain reservations on U.S. side, which would result in increasing involvement of the U.S. in the former Soviet bloc: According to the U.S. officials, with the agreements, NATO was committing herself for the defense of WEU members, which could put NATO under risk. Moreover, some non-NATO members, i.e. Austria, Finland and Sweden, were gaining the initiative through WEU by “informally” joining NATO. This commitment also enforced U.S. to speed up its open door policy for the non-NATO but EU member candidate countries, i.e. Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland in 1990s, to join NATO. NATO’s first enlargement was highly linked with this discrepancy. U.S. through NATO created the ground for the process of enlargement, which in political terms means the adaptation of the Eastern Europe into the western world. This process, however, contributed to the U.S. interests in many ways. It reduced the U.S. share of NATO's budget and the costs of its Balkan operations. Moreover, despite the unwillingness of the U.S. in the beginning, the enlargement process legitimized the U.S. existence in the Balkans and combined the interests of the U.S and Russia, such as their military existence and increase in their business potential, in the same pot. This was a typical rapprochement policy for both sides so that they will keep their interests in the highest possible point in former Yugoslavia.
There were also European opponents of Berlin agreement, with the leadership of France. In addition to a desire for autonomous action capability, France was promoting a more balanced the structure of the European Command, which at the moment consists of American generals. Another concern was the U.S. veto power (through North Atlantic Council) over the release of NATO assets for WEU-led operations. France, for many analysts, was seeking for a leadership role together with Germany within Europe. Despite all these criticisms, France would prefer to stay on the table and join NATO’s military wing in 1996.
Amsterdam EU Summit (1997) and St.Malo Summit (1998)
At the 1997 Amsterdam EU summit, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was promoted in order to give the Union a more effective role in international arena. Lessons taken from the Yugoslavia crisis were effectively put into the policies of the EU in order to have a more coordinated member state reaction to any potential crisis situation. The issues that were highlighted in the treaty were mainly to develop common strategies, to increase the decision-making procedures, to regulate a High Representative for the CFSP, to implement a functioning policy planning capability and early warning unit, to incorporate the “Petersberg Tasks” into the EU Treaty and to create resources in order to finance CFSP spending. Establishment of a new post of High Representative for the CFSP was aimed at strengthening the cohesion of the EU regarding its external representation.
The conflicts in the Balkans have deeply marked the transatlantic relations since the contrast between American power and Europe’s inability to resolve the conflict was obvious and need for improvement in the imbalance between the reality of Europe as an economic power and its potential as a political actor was inevitable. Moreover, the conflicts and Europe’s lack of ability to assert its own power provided a feasible environment for the allocation of U.S. forces in the Balkans as the extension of its hegemonic project, which even caused disturbance in traditional British policies. These thoughts set the grounds for the St.Malo agreement between the United Kingdom and France.
A year after Amsterdam Summit, in December 4, 1998, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and French President, Jacques Chirac, met at St.Malo. This was a significant meeting because the agenda was ESDI and the British government was shifting from its official position of keeping itself distant from a common security and defense policy of EU. St.Malo was asking the member states of EU to speed up the process of implementation of a common defense policy. On the other hand, a reference to NATO being the “foundation of collective defense of its members” was pointed out, which was implicitly marking the primacy of NATO one more time. Many decisions taken in this meeting were simply restatement of Berlin and Brussels meeting, but there were two key differences: the phrase autonomous action was used for the first time as “the Union was going to have autonomous action capacity where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” According to Haine, the usage of the term “capacity for autonomous action” was a compromise between London’s approach to Europe as much as French yielding to Atlantic legitimacy. Europe was becoming a way to exert power whereas the Alliance was the designated framework for it. Another key difference was, related with the autonomous action capacity; the EU would need appropriate structure and assets of its own.
U.S. Response to the Challenge and Washington Summit (1999)
The U.S. showed a quick and effective response to the St.Malo summit. The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made it clear that the U.S. supports the ESDI within the alliance; however, it was rejecting the ideas of “autonomous action” that would be implemented by the EU, “discrimination” against non-EU members, mainly Turkey, and “duplication” that the creation of similar units that NATO possessed would cause. From this point on, Turkey would vehemently reject the idea of being discriminated, which would also support the U.S. standing against autonomous action capacity. Another important issue emerging from St.Malo for the U.S. policymakers was pushing further on the future capabilities of NATO. The issue of out-of-area was given serious consideration. The Balkans was the key region for the policy-making units, but NATO could extend to regions beyond. The issue of interoperability becomes another important item in the agenda for NATO since the different levels of technologies (such as communication) that were implemented in Bosnia showed the difficulty of the coordinated action. This concern was mainly voiced by the U.S. in order to increase the chance of a successful joint military operation and the credibility of NATO as a prime actor.
NATO allies also took a step forward in Washington Summit of 1999 to develop a better relationship with ESDI, by stating that “NATO will make the necessary adjustment for the ready access of EU”. U.S. was accepting the reality of “autonomous action where the alliance as a whole was not engaged’. The Summit finally “completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness.”
This new bargain was reaffirming NATO’s primacy in order to maintain the leadership of the U.S. by avoiding unnecessary duplication that could become a challenge to U.S. existence by time. The idea of separable but not separate forces, where NATO as a whole is not engaged was restated in the final communiqué. As a bargain, NATO was for the first time accepting the autonomous action, which would provide EU more space in the creation of ESDP. This would contribute to the process of further integration by increasing the cooperation between Germany and France, providing respect for Britain in the Union and giving the Europeans more of a say in security decisions of Europe. NATO and the EU were going to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU. However, U.S. showed its deepest concerns regarding the usage of autonomous action, prospective European military capability outside of alliance, lack of resources of the European states for more commitment in capability building, the unfair conditions for non EU NATO members, raising challenge of EU in transatlantic relations and duplication of the efforts. These concerns can be seen as further efforts to consolidate the U.S. positioning in Europe as the extension of its hegemony project
Afterwards
The German presidency worked very hard to transform the bilateral relationship between Britain and France, which was established in St.Malo, into a reality of Europe. A shift from identity to policy and a need for the EU to play a significant role in the international arena were stressed in the next meeting. Cologne European Council of June 1999 marked an important step for the development of a common security and defense policy, even though the leaders refrained from making a formal decision. The members agreed on the issue that in the event of a crisis situation, the EU council would be the main decision-making body. Alternatives such as developing the autonomy of WEU, an exclusive focus on ESDI within NATO or the establishment of a fourth pillar within EU were not accepted.
Kosovo crisis, however, in the first months of 1999, also showed the U.S. dominance in the military capability. The European dependency to the U.S. forces was another fact for the European leaders to note. This was especially the case when the escalation of the conflict repeatedly requested for the Europeans to work together, especially in conflict management. Following the crisis, Helsinki was a significant step for ESDP institution building for EU. The Presidency Report gave a spectrum of provisions that would set important aspects of the security and defense policy of EU. Another important step was the Headline Goals (also known as Rapid Reaction Force) initiative that was prepared by Blair and Chirac. Its deadline was set to 2003 and its goal was to have the full capacity of implementing the Petersberg Tasks, including humanitarian tasks, rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and also operation capability including peace-making in crisis management. Parallel with Headline Goals, the EU also established command and support (intelligence, transportation, control) units, most of which were to come from the United States under the 1996 Berlin agreement. The Helsinki summit also put a lot of emphasis on the issue of civilian crisis management, which was going to be incorporated within ESDP and would have the capacity of the police force, strengthening the rule of law, civil protection and civil administration.
Even though, the subject of the concern as the U.S. and NATO was not mentioned, this new approach concerned many US policy makers. Not only the stress for the need for a military capability but also the creation of the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee (with military staff) and a secretary general was more than the U.S. would absorb since for most (especially the U.S. congress members) it was raising the questions of whether EU was creating an institution that will compete with NATO. Although the analysis that was done in that period shows that Rapid Reaction Force (with 60000 troops) was only a supplementary force that can contribute to NATO’s tasks concerning non-Article V tasks that are then restricted to crisis management. For U.S., the division of labor was not clear enough. For example the idea of handing over an operation to NATO that was started by Rapid Reaction Force of EU, if the circumstances of the operation necessitate such an action, was a question mark. Regarding the coherence of the NATO members and the position of Turkey was another concern since it wasn’t well defined up to what level Turkey would be consulted or even engaged. The EU Commission responded to US’ concerns underlining the fact that EU-led operations would only be possible where “NATO as a whole is not engaged”. Commission also emphasized that the Force would be used as a response to international crisis and the creation of this force will by no means cause any duplication of efforts.
In after-Helsinki period we see intense negotiations between the EU and NATO. NATO’s concerns were the fear that ESDP will create competition. ESDP structures that political will of the EU may not prefer to use interoperable with NATO and finally the idea of duplication since the creation of autonomous institutions may result. U.S. continued to voice its concerns that may have further indications on its role. Military and economic culture is what was created with the diplomats and officials through WEU and NATO and according to the U.S.; this created a buffer institution out of the EU and will slowly wipe down this culture. Arm’s length points out the fact that until Helsinki EU and NATO did not have to cooperate to any extent. Helsinki made it essential that these two institutions cooperate and coordinate. European Caucus is related with the EU’s decision-making process. How will the EU make decisions, since it is also represented in NATO? The fourth issue was defense production and trade. The U.S. saw the impending threat to their defense industry since the creation of ESDP would definitely contribute to the solidarity of the European defense industry. Finally, according to the U.S. policymakers, the issue of crisis management was more problematic than it seemed. NATO did not yet have a policy on crisis management. The Council of NATO was not an independent body but a collection of representatives of the governments.
Analyzing the issues that were pushed by the U.S., we can see that none of them would be likely to create a significant obstacle in the hegemony of the U.S. in Europe. For scholars like Cameron, both institutions together with the others (UN, EAPC, OSCE, G-8) contribute distinctively and usefully to the overall security in Europe as being two important actors in the Western world. The U.S. concerns were more focused on practical issues which were believed to create duplications and decrease cooperation and the U.S. involvement, rather than to question its existence. However, there is a good possibility of harmony when considering the latest achievements. A good example would be the EU’s crisis management efforts. The EU’s Rapid Reaction Force that was designed to be used in crisis situations could not possibly necessitate a handover, which has always been brought to the table by U.S. policy makers. Moreover the coordination between the EU and NATO in the 2001 Macedonia crisis was a good response to the critics of coordination and cooperation between these two institutions as well as the issue of switching the control of the crisis, which was not seen as a considerable option.
The Santa Maria de Feira summit of European Council (2000) solidified the Helsinki decisions that were taken a year ago. A lot of emphasis was put on coordination and cooperation with NATO, such as the EU objectives being in line with NATO’s defense capabilities initiative (DCI). NATO, in response was used comprehensibly as a platform to bridge the gap between the U.S. concerns, with the help of the other non EU NATO members such as Turkey, and the EU policies. For example, as a response, to the 3 D’s (de-linking, duplication and discrimination) of the U.S., NATO’s some EU members promoted the 3 I’s: Improvement in European defense capability, Indivisibility of transatlantic security and Inclusiveness of all allies. However, the U.S. stance where it was set in Berlin meeting and Washington decisions has never changed in origin, despite the tendency towards further integration in the European Security and Defense Policy. These efforts mainly have been the borders and elements of the U.S. redefinition of European Security for the last few years.
3. Conclusion
The end of Cold War brought deeper questions into the surface such as the place of the U.S. in new Europe, together with the former Soviet bloc. In theory, Western Europeans integrated economically and politically through Single European Act and founding treaty of European Union. For many, the Cold War alignment stemmed from German aggression, which was put down with the hegemonic project of both superpowers, needed to be transformed into institutional integration of the EU organizations. However, the U.S. enforced its role through the established institutions by adjusting them into the new conditions. Assuming the leadership of the Western world in the Cold War period, U.S. pursued the policy of transforming its hegemonic architecture, by making the redefinitions of the new security dimensions of Europe mostly through NATO.
Massive American military power, growing pressure for global dominance among American elites, willingness of some of the former Soviet bloc members and the parallel policies of some NATO members and their utilization through American policies were some of the main proponents of the prolonged American Hegemony efforts in Europe. For the hegemony, the U.S. deepened its relations with Russia, increased its efforts for the democratization and institutionalization of the former Soviet bloc, became the guarantor of further integration towards Russia, and utilized its military assets for Europe’s security problems. For the U.S. policy makers, European Union would play the role of a vigorous ally and a strategic partner, by obtaining its own strong mind (political unity) and capacity to act (burden sharing), however usage of this capacity was desired through alliance system (prevention of the duplication). It was in 1994 Brussels summit when the U.S. for the first time takes serious steps towards repositioning itself in Europe by welcoming European Security and Defense initiative. NATO’s Berlin-Brussels agreement in 1996 was significant in terms of the NATO’s and mostly U.S. stance regarding this initiative. According to U.S. officials, ESDI should have been built within NATO in order to avoid duplication. NATO was also guaranteeing the use of its assets in WEU-led operations.
On the other hand, some EU members, led by France resisted to this redefinition process. However, the U.S. existence as a silent guarantor of Europe’s internal stability for further enlargement hence the lack of the U.S. hostility was still desired. European Union as an independent actor, with the role of an independent partner, was highlighted by the resistance. The gap between the U.S. and the EU in terms of military capability, coordination of efforts and assets, which were clearly observed in the events in Balkans, turned this resistance into more applicable policies. Unity in defense and security issues was desirable by the EU members since more politically involved EU needed a well-functioning tool that it could use as freely as possible. However deepening in terms of enlargement makes these statements impractical by time. EU’s involvement in Kosovo showed the inefficiency of EU forces and the discrepancy between both sides of Atlantic. St.Malo was a turning point in a sense that, long-term U.S. ally Britain was taking a step towards Europeanist view by jointly declaring with France that autonomous action capacity was required by EU.
After this shift, we see concentrated U.S. efforts in order to “set common ground” in terms of defense and security. Washington summit is crucial regarding these efforts. U.S. dedicates itself for a better relationship with ESDI (later ESDP). This new bargain in Washington was reaffirming NATO’s primacy by stressing the notion of separable but not separate forces, where NATO as a whole is not engaged. As a bargain, NATO was for the first time accepting the autonomous action, which would provide EU more space in the creation of ESDP. This would contribute to the process of further integration by increasing the cooperation between Germany and France, providing more saying for Britain in the Union and giving the Europeans more of a space in security decisions of Europe. However, U.S. defined soft areas as of the usage of autonomous action, prospective European military capability outside of alliance, lack of resources of the European states for more commitment in capability building, the unfair conditions for non EU NATO members, raising challenge of EU in transatlantic relations and duplication of the efforts. These areas would later on provide the zones of negotiations regarding American role in the new Europe.
The negotiations are still continuing. One of the tendencies in the negotiation process is the increasing autonomy in European Security and Defense policies and institutions. NATO’s primary role concerning article V missions of collective self-defense provides the legal framework for its existence in Europe. Through defining the ‘political role’ of NATO for the new security challenges, the U.S. confirmed its role as a permanent European power of the early 21st century. Efforts for the reunification of Germany in NATO, modernized command structure for the new threat perception such as failing states and terrorism, increased bilateral relations such as Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic partnership initiatives, strategic partnership with Russia and relations with Ukraine and finally NATO’s two operations in Europe in the last decade solidified this authentication while serving to the U.S. interests in the long run.
The European Security is convoluted with NATO, together with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. Today’s formulation consists of NATO as the primary institution for the collective self-defense of the EU, despite the increasing autonomous nature of ESDP through new institutions such as European Defense Agency (EDA). ESDP will contribute to the trend of further integration of Europe by many aspects. What the U.S. thrive to do now is to establish a more harmonized ESDP that do not conflict with NATO’s existence and goals as much as possible. However, at least for the near future, the U.S. existence and its role in the new security architecture have obtained a stable place through negotiations and the developments of the last decade.
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Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10-11 1999
Zielonka Jan, Europe’s Security: A Great Confusion, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol.67, No.1 (Jan.,1991)
The foundations for EU usage of NATO assets were reconciled in Berlin (1996). Three years later a comprehensive set of package on the usage of NATO assets was agreed. This process was known as Berlin Plus. Berlin Plus agreement is described as follows in NATO documents: “Berlin Plus agreement is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and EU, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit. It is comprised of the following major parts: a. NATO - EU Security Agreement, b. Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO), c. Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO, d. Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities, e. Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe) and European Command Options for NATO, f. EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities, g. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements. All parts are tied together through the so-called "Framework Agreement", dated 17 Mar 03. Since that day, the "Berlin plus" package has been in effect and serves as the foundation for practical work between EU and NATO.”
Kaiser Karl, Reforming NATO, Foreign Policy, No.103 (Summer, 1996), page 130.
Baylis John and Smith Steve, The Globalization of World Politics, New York: Oxford University Press (2005), page 100.
Calleo David P., Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU, World Policy Journal, Volume XX, No 3 (Fall 2003), page 3.
Art Robert J., Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.111, No.1 (Spring, 1996), pp.4-5.
Peterson John and Sjursen Helen, A Common Foreign Policy For Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, New York: Routledge (2001), page 10.
Gulnur Aybet, A European Security Architecture after the Cold War, Questions of Legitimacy, London: Macmillan Press Ltd. (2000), page 220.
Trever Taylor, West European Security and Defense Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944- ), Vol.70, No.1, (Jan., 1994), pp. 7-9.
Zielonka Jan, Europe’s Security: A Great Confusion, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol.67, No.1 (Jan.,1991), page 135.
At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, EU member states set themselves a military capability target known as the Headline Goal. It called for EU member states to be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg Tasks. The Petersberg Tasks presently include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10-11 1999.
Gulnur Aybet, ibid, page 201.
Glaser Charles L., Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp.19-23.
Deniel N Nelson, Review of A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? By Peterson and Sjursen, The Journal of Politics, Vol.63, No.1 (Feb.2001), page 356.
Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy-NATO’s Companion or Competitor?, RAND Europe-National Research Defense Institute (2002), pp.3-4.
NATO Handbook, The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), NATO Publications, updated in 10 Oct. 2002, Chapter 4.
Kamp Karl-Heinz, European Security Outside of Europe, European Security and International Institutions after the Cold War, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (1995), page 107.
The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Progress under the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU official web page (, accession date:7.12.2005)
Haine Jean-Yves, ESDP: An Overview, Institute for Security Studies, European Union (2004), page 3.
Washington Summit Communique, NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)64, April 24, 1999.
Cameron Fraser, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Past, Present and Future, England: Sheffield Academic Press (1999), page 79.
Article V gives NATO the legal framework for collective self-defense in case of armed attack. Article V is as follows: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”
Cameron Fraser, ibid., page 71.
McInnes Colin, Security and Strategy in the New Europe, Britain: Chapman and Hall Inc. (1992), page 15.