Were the Russian Presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 democratic?
Introduction
The process of democratisation is central in assessing how Russia is modernising after the fall of the communist regime. Elections are pivotal to how democratic a state is, yet elections had been held in Russia during Stalin’s reign and beyond. However, these were not democratic in the true sense; with only one candidate, clearly they were not competitive. As Dahl observed, ‘the development of a political system that allows for opposition, rivalry, or competition between a government and its opposition is an important aspect of democratization’ (Dahl, 1971, p1). In my essay I shall be assessing events of the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections and analysing how democratic these elections were. Huntington cited in Hughes’ study asserted elections to be ‘the essence of democracy, a vehicle of democratisation as well as the goal’ (Hughes, 2000, p28).
1996 Election
In the 1996 election there were a variety of candidates competing for the presidency, as Dahl stipulates is essential for democracy. Candidates needed one million signatures of support, with not more than 7% of signatures from one region. This safeguard short listed an original line-up of 78 applicants down to eleven. Corruption had not been eliminated and the ‘Central Electoral Commission rejected the registration of six on the grounds some signatures had been forged’ (White et al., 1997a, p246). The hue of dishonesty is not one that assists democracy, however exposing such practices does suggest some independence and a desire for rectitude. Gorbachev’s 1980’s policy of glasnost was designed to decentralise and deregulate the press, and end censorship. A free media and alternative sources of information are deemed by Dahl as necessary for a democracy (Dahl, 1971, p3). There can be no arguments that the media enjoyed its liberty, and as observed by White, ‘these rights were entrenched in the new constitution of December 1993: they could not be amended without a complicated procedure involving a constitutional conference and a referendum’ (White, 1997b, p435). There was a veneer of democracy, however this can be disputed.
Yeltsin’s campaign to ensure his presidency for a second term in 1996 took on a negative twist. The main rival to Yeltsin’s retention of power was Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian communist party. Whilst campaigning and advertising is not illegal in a democracy, Yeltsin used adverse tactics to tarnish his opponent by ‘arguing that a vote for Zyuganov would bring back the nightmare of Stalinism, playing on people’s fears’ (Bowker, 2000, p15). The night before the first vote, ‘the state channel showed the film Burnt in the Sky set during the worst of Stalin’s purges’ (White, 1997a, p259) to discredit the communist rivals. Control of the media was a key tool for Yeltsin, and he was able to use it for his advantages, to the disadvantage of others. Yeltsin’s considerable influence over the media also aided this, and Yeltsin gained 53% of prime time coverage between May and July, three times the amount of Zyuganov and five times all the other candidates combined. The print media spread attention across a range of candidates, but Yeltsin received more coverage, which was more favourable (White, 1997a, p251-2). The press was not independent, and the state owned channel did not broadcast about other candidates, which overtly illustrates Yeltsin’s advantages and manipulation. He was stretching his role as President to the maximum, and the prerogatives he realised were exploited. Yeltsin’s electoral campaign was supposed to be limited to $3 million by electoral law, however this was exceeded to perhaps levels of $500 million. Yeltsin as leader of an embryonic capitalist Russia was funded by a ‘small number of Russian multimillionaires who feared their new properties and lifestyle would be forfeit in the event of a communist victory’ (White, 1997a, p250). As premier of Russia, Yeltsin chose to stretch his ability to use prerogatives and there was the possibility Yeltsin wanted to postpone the election. Being able to choose when an election can take place is a power that can be used to have an election at a time when it benefits the leader. Whilst this is not undemocratic, it is an unfair advantage that Yeltsin held. In the instance that elections had been cancelled, it would have been a clear sign that democracy wasn’t working. Yavlinsky is quoted as saying ‘When you hear talk of postponing elections in Russia, that can mean postponing them for centuries’ (White, 1997a, p244). Returning to a previous point, the signature forging episode does exemplify that undemocratic practices were occurring. The 1996 presidential elections were certainly on the path of democracy, however they were unfair and unbalanced in respect to the advantages that Yeltsin had in being the President. As observed by Stephen White, ‘media observers saw the Yeltsin campaign as not living up to West European standards of fairness’ (White, 1997a, p267).
