What do You Think are the Main Obstacles to a Coherent Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)?

Student: 2003079040

Introduction

Since a 1954 plan for a European Defence Community (although not realised in reality), a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) has been ‘a European ambition’ for five decades. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) provides the first ‘legal basis’ for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which including the plan of ‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence’ (Article J.4). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) added the WEU’s ‘Petersberg Tasks’ into the Maastricht Treaty. Following the spurring of external crises such as the Kosovo conflict, in June 1999, the Cologne European Council declared the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy, as a part of CFSP. The Helsinki European Council, in December 1999, suggested the ‘Headline Goals’ of ESDP and decided to ‘develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises’ (see “Presidency Conclusions” of the Helsinki Summit). Following the Nice Treaty (2002), new structures in the military and political areas has been established, and the co-operation in the area of CFSP/ESDP has been enhanced. However, the development of a coherent CESDP still has a long way to go. This essay discusses current challenges to CESDP. The first part analyses the EU’ institutional structure and decision-making process, which impede the development of a coherent CESDP. Then we have a look at the EU’s military capability. The relationship between the ESDP and Nato/US is discussed in the third part. Finally a conclusion is provided.

Institutional Structure and Decision-making Process

The first obstacle is resulting in the three pillar structure of the EU. Since the Maastricht Treaty in establishing the CFSP, the structure of the CFSP and then ESDP belongs to an intergovernmental pillar, which means that national sovereignty is still dominating in the field of CFSP/CSDP. Therefore there arise difficulties for the effectiveness and impact of EU policies.

CFSP, and then ESDP, is driven by intergovernmental cooperation and has not adopted the qualified majority voting (QMV) in decision-making in the area of defence. Thus it means that the European Council’s unanimous agreement to military and defence engagement is still central in the decision-making. It reflects ‘the contradictions between the ambitions of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move beyond and intergovernmental framework in doing so’ (Hill, 1996:5). In another words, the main obstacle to the development of a ‘military Europe’ is still from the national sovereignty of member states as decisions and implementations of CFSP/ESDP depends more on the political will of member states than on the EU level. This makes ESDP more difficult. There are divergent positions of member states regarding the security and defence issues. For example, the war in Iraq has opposed the tension between ‘interventionist’ states and ‘abstentionist’ states. There is regional disparity in military strength and power which leads to different attitudes in military affairs. In addition, the divergent visions within the EU about the balance between providing resources for conflict prevention and for crisis action also make the decision-making and policy implementation more difficult. For some ‘neutral countries’, they are reluctant with ‘peace-enforcement/peace-making’ operations in the ‘Headline Goal’, and prefer to put resources on crisis prevention measures and the role of the EU police force. This has been reflected during the Swedish Presidency of first six months in 2001, when a number of decisions on programmes focused on conflict prevention. For those who prefer a closer linkage between the civilian and military aspects, they call for more resources preparing for crisis management activities. That means there lacks the agreed objective and strategy which is essential for a coherent security and defence policy. Furthermore, there is still no an agreement within the EU on ‘a fundamental justification’ for the ESDP (Smith, 2003). The function and feature of ESDP is divergent according to member states: for the UK, it should be ‘a support arm for NATO’; for France, ‘an independent EU force’; and for Germany and Sweden, ‘solely as a peacekeeping/humanitarian force’ (Smith, 2003). These different visions of the ESDP have been revealed in the issue of Macedonia when the UK and France were willing to lead by the EU force and Germany preferred to let Nato lead or ‘hold back’.

This is a preview of the whole essay

Moreover, this form of decision-making process creates intense competition between the Commission and the Council in policies of security and defence in terms of ‘decision-making rules, external representation, financing, democratic oversight, and legal “gaps” and compliance’ (Smith, 2001). The division of responsibilities among the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament makes the security policy less transparent, democratic and coherent. Historically, the Commission has played a ‘primary role in shaping EU foreign policy, through its economic, aid and accession/enlargement policies and it has a vast amount of resources at its disposal’ (Bono, 2002: 37). Although measures regarding to cooperation in CFSP across the pillars have been included in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, in fact, the tension of competition between the Commission and the Council makes the co-ordination difficult. Taking the example of the creation of a policing presence for Bosnia, we can see the weakness of the current structure. At present, the Council has the power to remit operational matters, while the Commission has the power of establishment and training. In another words, the Bosnian issue reflects the ‘civil-military’ relations between the Commission and the ESDP structure: the former controls most of the ‘civilian capabilities’, whereas the latter controls the ‘military capabilities’. In addition, according to the Amsterdam Treaty, the function of the High Representatives to be integrated in the Commission and have ‘a special status tailored to the needs of security and defence’ also reflects an intensified ‘struggle for power between bureaucratic structures’ (Bono, 2002: 38). As Chris Patten has argued, ‘the separation between the first and second pillars was impossible to maintain in the longer run’ (Patten, 2000: 18) for a coherent Europe. In spite of the appointment of Solana as the High Representative and some new interim structures created, the reality is that ‘the Commission still maintains most of the resources for implementing foreign policy decisions’ (Bono, 2002: 38).

Finally, in foreign policy decision-making process, the role of some big member states as an informal group is remarkable. Four member states – France, the UK, Germany and Italy – with the USA, namely the ‘quint’ or ‘directoire’, appear important impacts on EU’s foreign policy decision-making procedure. Some issues were negotiated among this group outside the EU framework before decision-making in the Council. The ‘quint’ is likely ‘a leadership group in the EU decision-making process that takes decisions affecting the interests of other EU member states and this without their participation: on some occasions the final EU decision seems to reflect the outcome of the discussion made within this directoire’ (Gregout, 2002:332). It meets frequently and informally on many sensitive affairs such as the Kosovo crisis and Macedonia crisis. It is external to the CFSP/ESDP decision-making process, but almost all issues of CFSP/ESDP may be impacted directly by it. Therefore there arises a query by other member states about the role and position of the Council and the rest of member states in decision-making structure on foreign affairs ‘if the bulk of decisions is determined outside the EU framework’ (Gregout, 2002: 338). Although some argument points out that the quint has a number of positive elements to the EU’s foreign policies, for example, it leads to the decision more effective and easier. However, it has potential dangers regarding the cohesion within the EU as ‘it was resented by those who felt they were being excluded’ (Nuttall, 2000: 13). The significance of the impact from the ‘quint’ makes the decision-making process, which is based on the participation of 15 member states, less democratic and unfair. For example, ‘the Netherlands is particularly against the ‘quint’: its slogan at the Council meetings is know to be “no taxation without participation”: it should be able to decide on a policy that it is paying for’ (Gregout, 2002: 338). Furthermore, the US, as an outside member of the EU, is involved in EU’s foreign policy decision-making process via quint. It is obvious that the ‘quint’ makes the independence from the US more difficult. Therefore, the formation of the ‘quint’ is dangerous to ‘the image of CFSP as a unitary policy’ because ‘the notion that bilateral, let alone trilateral, relations are an intrinsic feature of the system smacks of heresy’ (Wallace, 1984: 156).

In the future, as there will be an enlarging Europe, the obstacle from the institution and decision making is likely to be more serious. New entrants as well as old ones are also sensitive about their national sovereignty in the defence area and will make the future decision-making process more complicated. An agreement on the ESDP will be more difficult to achieve. Therefore, it can be argued that the success of security and defence policy requires a more integrated planning process and structure in the EU.

European Military Capability

It is obvious that the creation of a European military capability is essential to a common European defence system. In December 1998, a meeting between the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the French President Jaques Chirac in St. Malo declared the significance of a European military capability. The declaration said that:

‘The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to Nato’ (quoted in Deighton, 2002).

The ‘Headline Goal’ announced in December 1999 has designed the object of European military force, which is critical to the capability of the EU to carry out the ‘Petersberg tasks’ of ‘humanitarian and rescue missions’, ‘peacekeeping’, and tasks of ‘combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’. Furthermore, a ‘politico-military structure’ has been established by creating a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. ‘These bodies were to work in conjunction with their NATO counterparts, developing modalities for the full consultation, co-operation and transparency between the EU and NATO’ (Ginsberg, 2003).

However, as has been identified by the EU itself, there is still a long way to go to supply the gap in its capabilities. According to Ginsberg, the ‘shortfalls’ in European military capability include ‘command and control, air and sea lift, intelligence, precision guided airplanes, electronic warfare, logistics, combat support units, precision guided munitions, communications equipment and headquarters, suppression of enemy air defense, and combat search and rescue’ (Ginsberg, 2003). These gaps will constraint the EU to undertake the autonomous mission. As predicted by the RAND Corporation, in order to meet those capability shortfalls, the EU members will need to spend $24 to $56 billion, thus it suggests that the ESDP will not be fully operational until 2007.

The budgets on defence may be an important measure for the EU’s military capabilities. In 2001, defence-spending by the 15 member states has declined from 178 billion dollar to 147 billion dollar. The Solana Paper calls for more resources for defence. Although member states have started restructuring their forces, it is difficult for individual nations to meet the huge expenditure on defences. Therefore, some suggest that it is necessary to develop a ‘planning and budgetary system’ or ‘European Defence Budget’ at the European level (Garden, 2003). However, the concern of member states about the national sovereignty in the defence field makes this approach politically impracticable.

Another problem of EU capabilities in defence is related to the procurement of European military equipment. National defence industries remain ‘protected, subsidized, and unable to enjoy economies of scale and profitability’ (Ginsberg, 2003). As a result, this impedes the reform of European defence. For example, due to the individual construction in member states, there arises the problem of inefficiency: ‘Europe is over-provided with shipyards, defence manufacturers and national defence companies’ (Ginsberg, 2003). Therefore, in order to prompt a competitive and efficient European defence industrial base, the EU needs to remove the barriers for competition in the defence sector and reduce duplication and costs via encouraging ‘more standardization, cross-border mergers, role specialization, and EU-wide defense procurement’ (Ginsberg, 2003). Without a set of common standards, the fifteen defence forces of the EU member states will continue to function as separate national contributions in missions and lack the interoperability and sustainability. Put in another way, a ‘single European entity’ acting in the defence research and operation area would be more benefit than dividing the resources among individual states. Unfortunately, there is the same problem as that in defence budgets: the lack of the political will from the nation states.

In general, an independent European military capability is important for EU to realize the CESDP. However, there is still a wide range of challenges for cooperation and integration in the defence capability field.

Relationship with Nato/US

In the short term, the Union lacks both ‘the military capacity and the political will to create a security and defence profile that is independent from Nato’ (Deighton, 2002:731). Nato still has more advantages in organisation and equipment for operational actions, comparing with the EU’s own force. The Nice Treaty declares the relationship between the EU and Nato: it strengthens the significance of transatlantic links and assures the position of Nato as the collective defence system according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Thus the treaty pointed out that the position of the ESDP is not to ‘supplant’ Nato but contribute to the transatlantic relationship. In fact, as argued by Smith, ‘the ESDP is likely to be operational only in situations where NATO (i.e., the U.S.) clearly refuses to participate’ (Smith, 2003). On 14 March 2003 ‘Berlin plus’ was finally agreed by the EU and Nato, indicating that the EU will be able to access to Nato assets, planning, and capabilities. However, the crisis over Iraq implies that the interests between the EU and the US ‘will not always converge’. If where arises divergent interests between the EU and Nato/US, many believe that the EU will ‘require its own framework for cooperation’ (Pecksa and Mason, 2003). Moreover, even if the EU and the US are able to cooperate through Nato on some issues in the future, the EU will still ‘need ESDP to complement its CFSP’ (Pecksa and Mason, 2003). However, as has mentioned before, the attitude to the relationship between the ESDP and Nato/US is divergent within the EU.

Despite of the different standpoint in the relationship between Nato/US, another problem affect the position of the ESDP is the enlargement of the ESDP and Nato and their membership. In 1999, three new members, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined Nato. In addition, Nato is preparing for accepting other seven countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Aside Bulgaria and Romania, which are expected to join the EU in 2007, other above countries will also join the EU in this year. Missiroli argues that this process of ‘double enlargement’ to both Nato and the EU will ‘bring strategic advantage but functional loss’ (Deighton, 2002). The overlapping memberships in two organisations have a potential to make practice and decision-making less manageable. As some non-Nato EU members, like Finland and Sweden, are considering the membership of Nato, the duplication problem in Nato and the ESDP is likely to become more serious. Another problem is the relationship between Russia and the ESDP/Nato. The historical relationship between Nato and Russia has been changed. From Putin’s acknowledgement that ‘if Nato takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organisation … we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion, if we are to feel invoved in such processes’ (quoted in Deighton, 2002), it is obvious that Putin has changed his thinking about Nato enlargement. Although Russia is also interested in a ‘politically autonomous ESDP’, a trend and process of ‘“Nato-ization” of military security operations in an enlarging Europe could mean that the ESDP becomes a dead issue for the Union’ (Deighton, 2002). This leads to a debate of whether the ESDP has an existing space in the future. Unless the ESDP and Nato design a precise functional division, the duplication in terms of membership and tasks may make one of them disappear over time. Yost argues that the future ‘alliance’ of Nato relies on the United States: ‘without a continuing US engagement, Nato will have no credibility, cohesion, or future’ (Yost, 1998). At present, Nato is still a main provider of territorial defence for the member states. Moreover, if the military assets of the EU is still dependant on Nato, the ‘“Nato-ization” of ESDP could mean the greater penetration of the EU by the US/Nato’ (Deighton, 2002).

Behind the relationship of the ESDP and Nato is the important role of the US power in security and defence affairs. As a superpower in the world stage, its policies regarding security and defence may have a significant impact on the strategy of the EU’s CESDP. Its own military ability has been proved powerful since it decided to ‘make only a fragmentary use of Nato after the events of 11 September’ (Deighton, 2002). Considering the close relationship between the US and the UK, the position of the UK in the ESDP is ambiguous. As pointed out by Dinan, ‘experience with CFSP so far suggests that in moments of stress, the United States will go back to its old friends for help rather than wait for the EU process to produce a response and that this tendency will irritate euroland’s smaller members and the Commission’ (Dinan, 1999). At the EU level, the commission has acknowledged the special relationship between the EU and the US, as it claimed: ‘the US is a major partner and the comprehensive relationship is particularly close on a range of issues stretching from trade and politics to foreign policy and security’ (Commission, 2000:6).

Therefore, an independent CESDP from Nato and/or the US seems still remote. In addition, as Nato has showed its powerful role in terms of ‘mission expansion, enlargement, and cooperating with key non-EU states (Turkey, Russia)’ (Smith, 2003) in recent years, the problem of dealing with the relationship with Nato/US is likely to be more critical to a further coherent CESDP.

Conclusion

‘The creation of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) has been called Europe’s military revolution’ (Andreani, 2001). However, the construction of a CESDP is slow and difficult. The first ESDP missions have been taken up by the EU in Bosnia and Macedonia in 2003, indicating a progress in the integration of security and defence policies. But there are still some obstacles and challenges to a coherent CESDP for the EU. The first is the tension of national sovereignty of national member states under the second pillar (intergovernmental pillar) of the EU structure, which makes any agreement in the area of security and defence under the bargaining among the 15 (or more in the future) member states. In addition, the current institutional arrangement about the role and responsibility of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament also impede to make the ESDP democratic, transparent and coherent. Secondly, there is also a lack of the political will and military capability to create a wide range of security and defence profile which is independent of Nato. Finally, in the term of the US role of the Atlantic Alliance or Nato, the EU is confronting how to reconcile a ‘strategic and political Union’ with a long-term alliance of Nato/US.

Bibliography

Bono, G. (2002) Nice Summit and Hot Issues, retrieved on 11, Mar. 2004 from

http://www.europeansecurity.net

Commission of the European Union (2000) The European Union and the World, Brussels: CEC

Deighton, A. (2002) ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no.4, November 2002, pp.719-741

Dinan, D. (1999) Ever Closer Union: an Introduction to European Integration, Macmillan

Duff, A., Pinder, J. and Pryce, R. (eds.) (1994) Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union, Routledge: London

Forster, A. and Wallace, W. (2000) ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press: Oxford

Garden, T. (2003) Whither ESDP: Trends and Challenges, retrieved on 10, Mar. 2004 from

http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/2003/031013rand.html

Ginsberg, R.H. (2003) ‘European Security and Defense Policy: The State of Play’ European Union Studies Association, vol.16, no.1, 2003

Gregout, C. (2002) ‘The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.40, no.2, June 2002, pp.331-344

Hill, C. (ed.) (1996) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, Routledge: London

Homan (2001) Current Development of the European Security and Defence Policy retrieved on 10, Mar. 2004 from

http://www.edc.spb.ru/conf2001/Homan.htmle

Howarth, J. (2003) ‘ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?’ Cooperation and Conflict, vol.38, no.3, pp.235-254

Missiroli, I. (2003) ‘EU Enlargement and the CFSP/CESDP’, Journal of European Integration, vol.25, no.1, pp.1-16

Nuttall, S. (2000) European Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press: Oxford

Patten, C. (2000) ‘Projecting Stability’, The World Today, vol.56, no.7, July 2000, pp.17-19

Penksa, S.E. and Mason,W.L. (2003) ‘EU Security Cooperation and the Transatlantic Relationship’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol.38, no.3, pp.255-280

Smith, M.E. (2001) ‘The Quest for Coherence: Institutional Dilemmas of External Action from Maastricht to Amsterdam’, Stone Sweet, A., Sandholtz, W. and Fligstein, N. (ed.) The Institutionalisation of Europe, Oxford University Press: Oxford

Smith, M.E. (2003) ‘Institutional Moments, Policy Performance, and the Future of EU Security/Defense Policy’, European Union Studies Association, vol.16, no.1, 2003

Wallace, H. (1984) ‘Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral Negotiations in the European Community’, Moran, R. and Bray, C. (eds.) Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany, Aldershot: Gower

Yost, D.S. (1998) NATO Transformed: the Alliance’s New Role in International Security, United States Institution of Peace Press: Washington, D.C.

See Bono, G. (2002) Nice Summit and Hot Issues (pp.37-38)

Gregout (2002) The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process

See Ginsberg (2003) European Security and Defense Policy: The State of Play

See Homan (2001) Current Development of the European Security and Defence Policy