What were the most important factors in the rise of the modern state?

“Everywhere the development of the modern state is initiated through the action of the prince. He paves the way for the expropriation of the autonomous and 'private' bearers of executive power who stand beside him, of those who in their own right possess the means of administration, warfare, and financial organization, as well as politically usable goods of all sorts” (Weber, 1999, p. 82)

This is one view on the significance of the economic developments during this period and indeed there are opposing views but it’s evident that the modern state proved to be effective in not only organising this new wealth but also redistributing resources, resulting in a great increase in economic activity.

Another argument for the cause of the rise of the modern state refers to warfare and the advances in military technology that occur from the 14th century onwards. New weapons such as gunpowder and the long bow meant that standing armies were more important than knights in defending territory. These technological developments put kings in an advantageous position as they were much more capable of raising large armies than the local feudal vassals. Kings also had the ability to build the forts and tools necessary in order to defend themselves against other standing armies. Furthermore, the growing class of merchant capitalists were seeking protection and stability so that they could continue to do business and were thus willing to pay the state (the king) in taxes in order to ensure their safety. This gave the kings an advantage against rival political organisations, as they were able to extract more revenue. In order to effectively collect these revenues, the state then proceeded to establish bureaucracies, which in turn led to the expansion of these states. As states grew, so too did their ambitious tendencies and they set about building empires which required them to build bigger armies for warfare, which of course required them to extract more revenue, which in turn made them more ambitious (and so on and so forth). Charles Tilly explains this cycle of war in a simple yet profound analysis where he essentially claims that war makes states and states make war (Tilly, 1985, pp. 170-186). It must be noted however, that developments in warfare were not solely responsible for the rise of the sovereign territorial state; in fact, the state still had to contend with rival forms of political authority as late as the 18th century – the nobility still maintained a strong influence, taking up many of the prominent administrative positions and military roles. In addition to a persistent aristocracy, other forms of political organisation like city leagues, city-states and universal empires were all strong alternatives that threatened the consolidation of the sovereign territorial state.

Hendrik Spruyt looks at the reasons why the sovereign territorial state was able to triumph over these alternative vessels of political authority in his book The Sovereign Territorial State and Its Competitors. One of the examples he uses for his analysis is the Hansa (The Hanseatic League), which was an alliance of merchants spanning across Northern Europe, comprising of around 200 cities. They were a force to be reckoned with from the 14th to the 16th century and a driver of economic progress with armed forces and a legal framework. The Hansa were eventually overpowered by it’s rivals which came in the form of territorial states and Spruyt equates this to various factors but he essentially argues that the sovereign territorial state prevailed because it was better at centralising jurisdiction and authority and thus in a better position to prevent free riding and gradually rationalise their economies. This in turn increased their capacity for warfare giving them an advantage over the Hansa who had no internal hierarchy or clear territorial boundaries. He also argues that political and social elites within sovereign states preferred to have similar forms of political organisation in their environment, this led to a form of mutual empowerment as it became evident that sovereign rulers could more credibly commit the members of their organisation within a specified territory. He concludes his main argument by saying that these aforementioned conditions led to a form of mimicry amongst different actors which eventually led to the displacement of alternative types of political authority like the Hansa (Spruyt, 1994, pp. 527-557). Spruyt presents a very interesting case here, however, clearly a realist argument, it fails to account for the success of the sovereign territorial state in that it doesn’t recognise the fact that a state system had already started to develop in late medieval and early modern Europe.

Religion in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe was one of the largest, if not the largest obstacle standing in the way of state formation. The Reformation lead to decades of war between the Protestant and Catholic Church, Spain and the Dutch were fighting a war that went on for over 80 years and essentially, political transformation was impossible to achieve with a continent so crippled by religious struggle that even the idea of internationally recognised sovereign authority was hopeless. The Thirty Years War between 1618-1648 ended with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, which was a number of peace treaties signed by key parties including the Holy Roman Emperor, the Kingdoms of France, Spain and other major figures. This treaty, also referred to as The Peace of Westphalia was a crucial moment in the history and development of the modern state system – not in the sense that it miraculously brought and end to war in Europe, as we know there is much more of that to follow - what’s key is that the signatories of the treaty were agreeing that secular leaders, not religious authorities were the only sovereign power in any given territory. For the first time, states were formally agreeing to keep out of each other’s internal affairs and for the first time, the sovereign territorial state was internationally recognised as the legitimate source of political authority. The extent to which The Peace of Westphalia brought about any real progress towards the development of the modern state system has been the cause of much debate. This argument is illustrated between two thinkers: Stephen Krasner and Paul Hirst in a work by Hirst entitled The International Origins of National Sovereignty. Hirst attempts to counter Krasner’s argument, which is that the Peace of Westphalia was not a founding moment in the history of the development of the modern state. For Krasner, the Peace of Westphalia was merely a moment when religious disputes were settled, not political. He further justifies this by arguing that even after the signing of the treaties, there continued a period of turmoil for many years, with the Holy Roman Empire surviving until 1806. Essentially for Krasner, Westphalia was just reinforcing what had already been agreed upon at the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which attempted to establish a structure where a territory has the same religion as the monarch. Hirst’s counter argument fully recognises that the peace treaties did not result in the instant birth of the sovereign territorial state but he proposes that it was a turning point in that it reduced the religious conflicts which had until then prevented states from being able to take control of their territories. He states that Westphalia begins a process of mutual recognition between states with non-intervention being crucial in allowing states to finally consolidate their power, moving away from endless religious conflict and towards sovereign political authority (Hirst 1997 pp. 265-287).

The Peace of Westphalia may have been a key turning point but just as is the case with the aforementioned factors, this event alone cannot fully account for modern state consolidation. In order to comprehend the rise of the sovereign territorial state system, one must first recognise that it was not something that was created, in fact it was an evolutionary change caused by a variety of different factors that developed and occurred over a long period of time. We’ve seen how key actors towards the end of The Middle Ages formed alliances in response to the rise of a money economy, alliances which increasingly began to undermine feudalism, thus bringing states as step closer to having the financial capacity to establish sovereign authority. We’ve also seen how this economic change enabled states to engage more effectively in warfare. The process of extracting revenue and re-distributing resources forced the state to develop bureaucracies which not only enabled them to wage more wars but also to further cement and centralise their sovereign territorial authority, giving them the upper hand against rival forms of political organisation like city states and city leagues. It would be a gross oversimplification to try and pinpoint the development of the modern state to an individual cause. It took centuries for the map of Europe to even begin to resemble what it did by the 18th century and this was in no way a smooth or linear process.

Referencing

Diamond, J. M. (1999). Guns, germs, and steel: the fates of human societies. New York, Norton.

Weber, M. (1948) Politics as a vocation. In: From Max Weber: essays in sociology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Tilly, C., Evans, P.B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T., (1985). War making and state making as organized crime (pp. 169-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hirst, Paul (1997). “The International Origins of National Sovereignty”. In Politics and the ends of identity; edited by Kathryn Dean. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. pp 265-287