However many other negative effects have been found. Wood (1992) found earthquake survivors experienced twice as many nightmares as a control group of P’s from the university of Arizona who did not live near the earthquake.
In a case study of survivors from the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster Joseph et al (1993) found increased levels of alcohol, cigarettes, sleeping pills, anti depressants and tranquilliser consumption, and these effects were still evident 30 months after the disaster.
This suggests that psychological effects of disasters may be widespread and long lasting.
In contrast to environmental disasters, evidence suggest that technological catastrophes do not increase social cohesion. Cuthbertson & Nigg (1987) found people exposed to toxins (asbestos and pesticides) in two separate incidents in America, were divided into victims who were worried about the effects and those who were unconcerned. The difference in opinion was a basis for conflict and resentment, and no evidence was found of the development of supportive and cohesive groups. This was field experiment using interviews questionnaires and observations.
However some research has found similarities in the effects of technological catastrophes and natural disasters, particularly in stress related problems. Davidson & Baum (1986) studied people living near Three Mile Island at the time of a nuclear disaster and radiation leak. They found effects of stress 6 years after the event – these included physiological measurements such as adrenalin levels and self-report measures such as sleep disturbance questionnaires.
This research suggests people may suffer from the effects of catastrophes long after the event is over.
- Evaluate what psychologists have learned about environmental disaster and/or technological catastrophe
The first evaluation issue is Methodology, and the fact that most of the research into disasters and catastrophes is carried out after the event and therefore it is impossible to make comparisons of responses before the disaster. For example Wood’s (1992) findings of earthquake survivors suffering twice as many nightmares after the disaster than a control group, however there is no information on these people before the earthquake. IN COMPARISON Davidson’s (1986) study of stress levels people living near Three Mile Island also could not compare these responses with pre disaster information. In CONTRAST Bowman (1964) was able to observe responses of psychiatric patients during and immediately after an event and made comparisons to their behaviour prior to the event.
However in most cases research cannot make such comparisons.
The second evaluation issue is measurement, which is how psychologists actually measure the variables they are interested in. In disaster situations measurement is often difficult due to the chaotic conditions in which research is carried out. Cuthbertson & Nigg (1987) used interviews, questionnaires and observations to try to measure social cohesiveness in two communities where technological catastrophes had occurred. These measurements may lack validity, which is being sure that a measurement actually does measure the variable it claims to measure, and reliability, which means the measurement being reliable over time, since the methods used may suffer from problems of social desirability responses and observer bias. In COMPARISON the measurements used by Simms & Baumann were personality based questionnaires and interviews, and these may also lack validity and reliability, as these researchers used these measurements as an indication of perceived risk from natural disaster.
In CONTRAST Davidson & Baum (1986) used a range of both physiological and self-report measures of stress, and these measurements were high in validity and reliability.
The third evaluation issue is ethnocentrism, which means applying the norms found in one culture to the whole of the world. A great deal of research in disasters and catastrophes has been carried out in America and Europe, western cultures. For example Simms & Baumann’s research was carried out in Illinois and Alabama, but these researchers used their results to make generalisations about personality and perception of risk from disaster. In COMPARISON Bowman’s research with psychiatric patients was carried out in Alaska, however Bowman also made generalisations about social cohesiveness in responses to disasters. It could be argued that in some cultures collectivism is already much greater than in western cultures that tend to be more individualistic, and therefore this research may be of little use in predicting responses to disaster globally.
In further COMPARISON research in technological disasters and social cohesion by Cuthbertson & Nigg (1987) was also carried out in America and again may be of little use in predicting how people may respond in other cultures.
The fourth evaluation issue is sampling methods, that is the way in which psychologists have obtained a sample from their chosen population. The best sampling method to use is a random sample, where each member of a population has an equal chance of being selected. However in research carried out in the aftermath of some disaster or catastrophe this is rarely possible. Measurement must often be done quickly and therefore samples may be non-representative and can limit the extent to which generalisations can be made. In research carried out by Bowman an opportunity sample was used of psychiatric patients, and therefore generalisations from these individuals to other populations cannot really be made. In COMPARISON Wood (1992) also used an opportunity sample of earthquake survivors therefore it is not safe to generalise from these findings. In CONTRAST the study carried out by Simms & Baumann was not conducted in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and could therefore have used random sampling methods such as the electoral role in order to select participants from the two areas compared.
The fifth evaluation issue is reductionism, which means reducing complex situations to one simplistic explanation……………………………
The sixth evaluation issue is in defining a situation as a disaster or a catastrophe. This is a problem for researchers, as whether an incident can be defined seems to depend on its effects. The degree of destruction caused by an incident is one measure, so if a tornado occurs in an unpopulated desert this is unlikely to be defined as a disaster, whereas if it occurs in a large populated city then it probably will be. Degree of disruption has also been used as a measure of disaster, which means to what extent individual and group functioning is disturbed. For example some disasters such as snow storms may cause very little destruction but may cause a massive amount of disruption (including injury or death)
- Giving reasons for your answer, suggest ways in which psychologists can help people prepare for the occurrence of disaster and/or catastrophe.
It is clear from research discussed that there are several ways in which people can be helped to prepare for a disaster or catastrophe. Fritz & Marks (1954) found that a lack of warning about a disaster makes its consequences worse. This would suggest that careful monitoring where possible for things like severe weather or earthquake is extremely important, as is keeping people informed so that adequate warning to evacuate or take some other action can be given.
It is also clear that the way warnings are given is equally important. Drabek & Stephenson’s findings would suggest that it is particularly important to give as much warning as possible, as people will obviously want to locate family members before evacuating. In addition the results of this research may suggest that providing people in danger areas with advice about evacuation procedure would help with the speed of evacuation and may get over the delays of wasted time spent locating each other.
Research by Simms & Baumann suggests that locus of control may be an important factor in determining responses to disaster risk. This research suggests it may help to provide training for residents in areas of risk, to increase both people’s perception of their own personal risk and their belief that they are able to take preventative measures to reduce this risk.
The research into social cohesiveness suggests that this increase in natural disasters (Bowman 1964) but may decrease after technological disasters (Cuthbertson & Nigg 1987). It could therefore be suggested that in areas at risk of natural disaster people prepare by forming help groups which would be ready to provide assistance in the event of a disaster. This would then help capitalise on the immediate feelings of wanting to help which appear to be shown after a disaster. In the case of technological disaster it could be a good idea to provide information sessions for people living in risk areas or those who have been affected and advice lines and help groups set up in communities at risk or affected. This may help negate the effects found in research by Cuthbertson & Nigg, and in addition Sjoberg (1991) found that the more knowledge people had about exposure to toxins the less their perceived risk.
Once a disaster or catastrophe has occurred research shows that those affected will need support for stress related problems and psychological disorders such as sleep disturbance and nightmares, (Wood 1992; Davidson & Baum 1986) therefore in known risk areas it may be advisable to train members of those communities in counselling skills in order to ensure a resource base for coping with any event. This would also be supported by a theoretical explanation of the effects of disasters, particularly stress, which argues that the extent to which people are able to conserve resources will determine the amount of stress suffered after a disaster (Hobfoll 1989)
It can be seen that psychological research has contributed extensively to an understanding of the effects of disaster and catastrophe and measures which can be taken to minimise these effects.