Kant claims that the categorical imperative can be used to justify the underlying principles of human duties. Suppose that everyone were to adopt the principle of promising falsely: since there would then be much false promising, trust would be destroyed and many would find that they could not get their false promises accepted, contrary to the theory of universal agreement of the principle of false promising. A maxim of promising falsely is not universal, so the categorical imperative requires us to reject it. Equivalent arguments can be used to show that principles such as those of coercing or doing violence are not universal, and so that it is a duty to reject these principles.
Kantian ethics has been criticized from many quarters. The critics evidently include those who support one or another form of teleological or consequentialist theories, who believe that it is possible to establish an account of the good, from which a convincing account of the right, and specifically of justice, can be derived. However, they also include a variety of writers who reject consequentialist thinking, including communitarians, virtue ethicists.
The most common and general criticisms are that, because it concentrates on principles or rules, Kantian ethics is doomed to be either empty and formalistic or rigidly uniform in its prescriptions. The accusation of empty formalism is based on the correct observation that principles under determine the action; it is usually countered with the equally correct observation that quite undefined principles such as ‘Stay within the budget’ or ‘All religions are to be tolerated’ may set significant constraints on action, so are not empty. An ethical theory that applies to principles can be more than empty and less than rigid.
Other critics object that since Kantian ethics focuses on obligations and rights, and in good measure on justice, it either must or does neglect other ethical categories, and in particular the virtues, good character or good lives; that ‘natural and human rights…are fictions’ and that obligations inevitably conflict in ways that render all deontological ethics incoherent. Some critics have laid particular stress on the point that in requiring impartial respect for all, Kantian ethics entirely ignore the place of happiness, of the emotions, of personal integrity and above all of personal relationships in the good. They have claimed that we must choose between an ethics of justice and one of care, an ethic of rules and one of relationships, an ethic of duty and one of virtue, and that the latter term of each pair is to be preferred.
Several recent writers have suggested that Kant’s ethics is the most convincing form of Kantian ethics, and that its distinctive features are strengths rather than weaknesses. Many of these writers accept much of the critique of deontological ethics, but think that not all the criticisms apply to Kant’s ethics, of which they offer detailed interpretations. Part of their effort has gone into work on Kant’s conceptions of action, reason and freedom, and part into work on his ethics.
They have pointed out that Kant’s account of practical reason and of its justification does not assume either that all reasoning about action is instrumentally rational pursuit of preferred ends, or that ethical vindication is located in hypothetical agreements or contracts reached by reasonable procedures. They have stressed that Kant’s conception of practical reason is based on universal ability rather than impartiality or reciprocity and that he views obligations rather than rights as basic to ethics. They have insisted that impartial respect for persons and a cosmopolitan approach to justice are not morally negligible matters, and have criticized communitarians, virtue ethicists and some feminist thinkers for not taking justice seriously. They have also pointed out that Kant offers accounts of the virtues, of the role of happiness in the good life, and of judgment, and argued that his position is not damagingly individualistic and that he acknowledges the importance of institutions and of social and personal relationships in human life.
Kant´s approach is valuable in that it succeeds in areas where other ethical programmes have failed. Justice is safeguarded, man has intrinsic worth and duty is distinguished from inclination and freedom is essential all in an easy to use package. However the major flaws arises from it’s deontological nature as consequences are regarded as worthless and also from the conflict of duties, a situation which Ross attempted to clarify in later years.
To what extent is it a more coherent solution to ethical problems than Utilitarianism?
Kantian ethics is flexible so that it might as well be act-utilitarianism. The way this problem is avoided is to build in internalisation of the rules. Therefore, it is unlikely that the optimal system would collapse into “Maximising the Good” because internalisation of this as a decision-procedure would be disastrous. If we had just the one rule ‘Maximise the good’, sooner or later awareness of this would become widespread. And becoming aware of this would undermine people’s ability to rely confidently on others to behave in agreed upon ways. Trust would break down. In short, terrible consequences would result from the public expectation that this rule would prescribe killing, stealing, and so on when such acts would maximize the good.
One of the advantages of Kantian ethics is it takes into account of justice, in other words it corrects the Utilitarian presumption that the punishment of the innocent can be justified in terms of the majority and benefit through ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’. Another is that unlike Utilitarianism Kantian ethics does not have to be measured like in Utilitarianism to find the amount of pleasure received. This makes Kantian ethics more universal than Utilitarianism. In Kantian ethics there would be no unjust actions since people would only be doing actions out of their duty. Utilitarianism fails to critically realise the difference between two people, that being that, places of little value on individual worth, but places equally little worth on all individuals. Since Utilitarianism is a teleological ethical theory which means that it is concerned with the consequences, this would require us to foresee the consequences of an action before we commit it. However, Kantian ethics is only concerned with duty so the problem Utilitarianism faces, is that it has to face the duty which can be predicted much more easily than the consequence.
Sources
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) B. Williams
Kant’s Virtues (1996) O. O’Neill
Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy