The fact that the principle rests on the evaluation of consequences is also viewed as a strength. It is seen as more reasonable to judge a moral choice in view of its consequences, rather than only by personal preferences. Furthermore, it means that present circumstances can be judged without reference to past precedence. In this way the theory is greatly similar to ‘situation ethics’ that allows certain actions to be taken which suit the particular situation.
Nevertheless, the principle of utility has come under fire from a number of different sources. For example, a number of philosophers have asked whether the utility principle is sufficient for an adequate, variable ethic – can a moral judgement be reduced to the question of maximizing the benefits?
Moreover, the principle has been criticized for being impractical. This is because the practical application of the theory requires the ability to predict the long-term consequences of an action and, to predict those consequences with unfailing accuracy, past experience can, to some extent, guide future experience, but there is never any guarantee that circumstances will turn out exactly the same.
There has also been criticism concerning the democracy inflicted by such a theory. John Rawles says, ‘You judge a fair society on the way it looks after its minority not its majority’. This is certainly true to some extent, as if the minority are not accounted for, the society can not reasonably be classed as an equitable one. This is similar to William Frontera’s criticism. He said that Utilitarianism is not compatible with justice, it is only concerned with the greatest happiness and how it achieves it, not with taking care of individuals within society.
Alistair MacIntyre further criticized Utilitarianism for assuming that most people are good. This is dangerous, as you can justify evil with it. Let us invisage this example; a woman is jogging through a park and comes across a gang of men who gang-rape her. Utilitarianism justifies their actions as the men’s pleasure is far greater than the woman’s and, as they are the majority, the woman’s pain would not matter. Similarly the theory cannot be used to determine what is universally good. Under Bentham’s theory it would be possible to justify acts of sadism or torture if the majority, no matter how perverse the pleasure, carried them out. Mill’s qualitative principle does go some way to addressing this weakness, however.
The theory has also been criticized for being too simplistic. W.D. Ross thought that ‘single-factor theories’, by their nature, are problematic. Robert Nozick exposed a flaw from this approach when he suggested a thought experiment to how ‘pleasure’ may not always be the most important thing. He asks us to choose between living satisfied in a fake world, and living unsatisfied in a real world. If one was to prefer the latter, then surely truth and not pleasure should be considered the priority. However, we cannot solve every dilemma by reference to one ethical theory because every dilemma is unique in some way. Furthermore, values such as justice have no relevance, as the majority may not support that which is just. Additionally, the theory gives no credit to motivation. Not every action done out of good will is going to result in good consequences, but the attitude with which it is performed should be worthy of some credit.
Theists have criticized the theory as they claim responsibility for bringing about the best outcome belongs to God and not to man. However, if such claims were to be relied upon, it would give man little encouragement to go out and shape his own future, to do things for himself.
Furthermore, the cold nature of the theory makes no allowance for personal relationships, for example if a man’s wife were dying in a fire, reason would not tell him first to rescue a scientist with a cure for cancer first. His wife would be his first priority. We have duties to those whom we love which will always be more important to us than duties to a society of unknown individuals. This is why I think utilitarianism might become a stronger theory when used from a high authority, where the person making the decision had no bias towards loved ones.
More general criticisms ask what is meant by pleasure? There is more than one kind of satisfaction that can be included in the category of pleasure/happiness. It seems that Utilitarians require a hierarchy of happiness. They need to say which kinds of happiness ought to be preferred if there is need to prefer one to another, and which kinds of happiness are to be rejected as being vicious. Furthermore how exactly is happiness to be assessed? It is not something which can be qualified to a degree. One person’s pleasure may be another person’s pain.
The amount of critics as opposed to supporters seem to suggest that there are a number of flaws in the principle of utility which have failed to be addressed by any further developments of the theory. In principle the theory does appear to be practical, however, in reality it is debatable whether it would be a workable ethic. This is mainly due to the ignorance of individual rights, especially those of the minority. However, there is a compromise. This is the idea of a qualified Utilitarianism, which accepts the claims that every individual has certain rights, but believes once these rights have been respected, Utilitarian calculations ought to come into play. Thus ensuring individual and minority rights are protected.
Tom Regan has suggested some (more-or-less) reasonable criteria for an ethical theory (see The Case For Animal Rights section 4.3), and against these we see that utilitarianism does very well indeed: It is consistent, it has ample scope (it covers all actions), and it is reasonably precise.
I can say that in terms of the core values, utilitarianism is in complete agreement with my intuitions - in my experience, happiness and happiness alone is felt to be intrinsically good or worthwhile, and suffering alone is felt to be intrinsically bad. However, I am also in agreement with W.D Ross over the point that measuring something as complex as a moral judgement should not rely on just one, quite subjective, measure. Even if we further specify the type or quality of pleasure (higher and lower pleasure), as Mill did, we can never fully distinguish between types of pleasure and some pleasures involve both higher and lower aspects simultaneously.
