Some of the theories that fall into meta- ethics include:
Ethical intuitionism (Ethical Non- Naturalism): Holds the view that there are objective moral properties and that sometimes we have intuitive awareness of moral properties or of moral truths.
Ethical naturalism (Definism): Is a theory that states ethical terms can be defined; the meaning of ethical sentences can be given in totally non- ethical terms. Ethical theories are like facts, and moral truths can be established so long as the evidence is looked at.
‘Naturalism is the view that ethical sentences express propositions and that they can be reduced to non ethical sentences.’ (5)
‘Naturalism takes ethical knowledge to be empirical and accordingly models it on the paradigm of the natural sciences. Ethical concepts, on this view, concern natural phenomena.’ (6)
Ethical subjectivism: holds the view that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/ or conventions of observers.
Ethical non- cognitivism (Emotivism): ‘Non- cognitivism is the view that ethical sentences do not express propositions; instead they express something else, such as emotions or recommendations.’ (5) So, expressing something as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ is simply an expression or feeling.
‘It denies that ethics is a genuine branch of knowledge or takes it to be a branch of knowledge only in a qualified sense. In either case, it denies that ethics is properly modeled on science or mathematics. On the most extreme form of non-cognitivism, there are no genuine concepts’ words like ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘good’ and ‘evil’ have no cognitive meaning but rather serve to vent feelings or emotions, to express decisions and commitments, or to influence attitudes and dispositions.
On the less extreme forms, these words are taken to have some cognitive meaning, but conveying that meaning is held to be secondary to the purposes of venting feelings, expressing decisions, or influencing attitudes.’ (6)
Moral Skepticism: holds the view that ethical statements are generally false.
‘We can not sufficiently justify any ethical claims, and therefore maintain doubt about whether they are true or false.’ (5)
So when scholars say ethical statements are no more than expressions of opinions they could be correct, but at the same time they could be erroneous.
Moral subjectivism would back up the claim that ethical statements are expressions of opinion because subjectivism states that things are true or false dependant upon the individual. So if person X thinks abortion is wrong, then that’s their opinion, and if person Y thinks abortion is justifiable, then it’s their opinion so it is also correct. So therefore, ethical statements are opinions based upon the individual and therefore, opinions would differ from place to place.
On the other hand, ethical naturalism says that it is possible to establish moral facts, so therefore, ethical statements must be more than opinions otherwise it would not be possible to determine this. Naturalism is well presented in the works of Mill.
G.E.Moore argues that ‘ethical naturalism makes a mistake, and that moral statements cannot be verified simply by looking at the evidence available.’ (1) This mistake is known as the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy.’
Non- cognitivism (emotivism) would back up the claim that ethical statements are no more than expressions of opinion because it says that words like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are simply expressions of opinion. So what is right for one person, could be considered wrong for another and what’s wrong for one person, could be right for another.
James Rachels argues that Ayer and Stevenson are wrong to remove reason from moral judgements. He thinks that there is more to moral statements than simply an expression of feeling. Moral judgements require reasons or else they are arbitary.
C.L.Stevenson is an important philosopher in this field. His work was greatly influential.
‘His early work clearly and forcefully developed the implications of the positivists’ doctrines that all cognitive statements are either analytic and a priori, or synthetic, contingent, and a posteriori, and that empirically meaningful statements must be verifiable (must admit of confirmation or disconfirmation.) In doing so, he defended reductionist analyses of the self, the external world, and other minds.’ (6)
An example of this could be a catholic saying ‘Abortion is wrong.’ Someone else might disagree, and believe perhaps abortion ok.
However, this view could be criticised. People would argue that moral statements go much further than just expressing our own approval or disproval; they have a more justifiable basis than this.
C.L.Stevenson argued this point by saying that ethical statements are expressions of attitude or opinion, but he went on to argue that these attitudes are not just arbitrary, based on the mood of the day, but are based on beliefs about the world and the ways that it should work.
In contrast, scepticism says that ethical statements are generally false, so therefore must be more than matters of opinions otherwise they could not be said ‘false.’ This view could be criticised severely.
Ethical intuitionism (non- naturalism) says that we know what’s ‘right’ and wrong’ so perhaps this is unique to each individual. Does this mean that each individual has the same intuitive feelings? If not, then ethical statements could be like expressions of feelings, as everyone’s would be different.
Moore believed that it is still possible for us to decide whether moral statement is true or false, even if we cannot use our powers of observation to give us the answers. According to Moore, we cannot use our five senses to determine whether something’s right or wrong, but use our ‘moral intuition.’
‘There is no way that we can explain yellow, especially to someone who has never seen it, and if we try to say what it is like, we end up giving examples of yellow things rather than defining yellow itself; but we still know what’s yellow when we see it.’ (1)
It could be said that it is just not a matter of opinion, but something that we can be certain about.
In conclusion, I think ethical statements are more than just matters of opinion and I think certain theories within this, for example emotivism, takes away the value ethical statements should bare.
Although certain theories like intuitionism have some truth, it is hard to pin point the ‘exact truth’ as there are so many different opinions and theories to consider.
Therefore, it could be considered ethical statements are mere expressions of opinion, but as intuitionism says, there are objective moral principles and we have an intuitive awareness of moral truths, although sometimes these differ from culture to culture.
