Some logical positivists developed this idea by saying that moral language was not only worthless, it was also nothing more than an expression of our opinion. In his book, 'Language, Truth and Logic' (1934) A.J Ayer, a well-known logical positivist said: " Sentences which express moral judgements are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth or falsehood. What he really means is, when we say 'torturing children is wrong', we are simply saying 'I personally do not believe in torturing children'. We cannot actually judge whether the act is right or wrong, we can only give our personal opinion or preference.
Ayer's claim that moral language simply conveys our beliefs and opinion was further developed by another logical positivist, C.L Stevenson (1908- ) He said that if, for example I say 'abortion is wrong', I am really announcing how I feel about abortion, i.e. that I disapprove of it. Even if I give numerous reasons as to why I believe abortion to be wrong, such as 'the foetus is a living being and as such has the same right to life as the rest of us', I am doing no more than finding other reasons which appeal to my emotions and original feelings. Stevenson said that when we strip away all of the 'rational arguments' for moral behaviour, that is, choosing to do X instead of Y because one is 'good', the other is 'bad', we are left with mere personal preference based on our own feelings of approval or disapproval. He refereed to this theory as the 'Boo-Hurrah Theory'. If we applied this theory to the example of abortion, it would go as follows. 'Abortion is wrong, I disapprove of it', means 'Abortion? Boo!' Similarly, if I say 'Abortion is ok, I approve of it' what I really mean is 'Abortion? Hurrah!'
In conclusion, according to the logical positivists, establishing language as the means by which the truth or falsehood or certain propositions can be demonstrated is the whole point of philosophy. Strictly speaking, if a statement is neither logical nor empirical, in philosophical terms it must be meaningless. Moral statements, which cannot be proved or disproved must therefore be meaningless, and this is where the logical positivists claimed that morality was little more than a matter of like or dislike, 'boo!' or 'hurrah!'
2. How far do you consider these views to be justified?
For the most part, emotivism seems like a fairly straightforward idea: each person devises a set of moral guidelines according to their personal opinions and preferences. But is it really this simple? As with all ethical theories, emotivism has been criticised and hotly disputed for a number of reasons.
One of the principle problems with emotivism is that if we accept it to be a correct analysis of moral discourse, then all ethical debate is reduced to little more than hot air. We may provide reasons to support our beliefs until we are blue in the face, but in reality, what we are saying will have absolutely no meaning. This concept seems illogical and highly improbable. Morality is not simply about emotions or the way we feel about something; it can be debated rationally. By using human reasoning and recognition we do have verifiable evidence that some situations and experiences are more positive or beneficial than others. For example, to say "murdering innocent people is wrong" is not just a matter of personal preference. Surely, there must be a way to prove that this is fact. We know that the mass murder of millions of innocent Jews during the second world war was wrong, and feel that we are totally justified in our conviction. By simply examining photographic evidence, and the written accounts of soldiers and survivours we surely have proof that the Holocaust was wrong. Similarly, reducing moral statements to mere matters of personal opinion we can ignore certain evidence. For example, the statement "caring for your child is right" is a moral statement which can be scientifically tested. We could study children who have been cared for, and compare them to those who have been mistreated or abused. Such research could provide empirical, factual evidence that being properly looked after is more beneficial to a child's welfare. To simply say "Caring for your children - hurrah!" ignores these important points.
When we talk about the "Boo-Hurrah Theory", we may be tempted to ask whether it actually constitutes an ethical theory at all. The whole idea seems rather crude and infantile, reducing matters of serious moral importance to a simple 'yay' or 'nay'. Going back to the Holocaust example, it seems difficult for us to accept that such terrible atrocities as those which were committed can be debated from two simple contrasting attitudes: "the Holocaust-Boo!" or "the Holocaust-Hurrah!". Given the many complex layers of meaning which regulate human behaviour and moral standards, this elementary theory seems totally ludicrous. Human behaviour needs to have such complicated complications and diversities taken into the account, and this is something which emotivism fails to do.
Another main criticism of emotivism is as follows: If all conduct and action is simply a matter of expressing our psychological response to an event or situation, then how can we really be sure of anything in the world? Is the rightness and wrongness of murder, for example, simply a matter of how we feel on the subject? If so, what is the point of certain rules and laws? Emotivism seems to render the legal system a totally arbitrary practice, and yet this idea seems thoroughly absurd. Serial killers are convicted for a reason, and surely this reason is more substantial than whether the judge and jury approve or disapprove of murder.
When we say something is right or wrong, good or bad, we are not simply expressing our personal opinions about that particular moral issue. To say "I believe abortion to be wrong" is different to saying "abortion is wrong". The latter statement claims that this view point should apply to everybody, and as such, provides an objective, absolute set of moral guidelines. Some philosophers who went on to look at the work of the logical positivists both developed the debate about moral language further by contradicting some of their ideas. The ideas of prescriptivism give purpose and meaning to moral statements by claiming that when we use ethical language, we are actually recommending or prescribing a course of action which could be applied in view of the situation. For example, prescriptivism states that if I were to say "murder is wrong", I am not just saying "Murder-Boo!". What I really mean is "do not murder". This theory undermines emotivism by giving moral statements a purpose i.e. to advise others against certain behaviour and actions. Prescriptivism suggests that an ethical statement does more than just say what is the case; it also states what ought or ought not to be the case. Also, by saying something is 'right' or 'wrong', we are providing a rule which is universally applicable, not just a viewpoint which may be good for me, but bad for everyone else.
Personally, I believe there is some truth in the ideas of emotivism. Each human being has a different opinion and idea on how to act. However, these views do not differ so enormously. If this is the case, why then do we have to live by a set of laws and rules. It is impossible to say that statements like "murder is wrong" are a matter of opinion, because if they were, and our society was divided into a group of people who said "murder-Boo!", and a group who said "murder-Hurrah!", then our current laws would not be able to stay in place. We would live in a totally lawless society, where everyone acted as they pleased, without fear of social or legal constraint. I am sure most people would agree with me in saying that the idea in itself is totally ridiculous.
In conclusion, I find the views of emotrivism justified only to a small extent. There are numerous criticisms of emotivism, as I have demonstrated. The theory often neglects to take certain facts into account, which we can provide as evidence to support our claims. It also ignores the fact that as humans, we have some sense of what is morally acceptable, even if it is only slight, and completely unexplainable. Although it is often true that we make moral statements according to our personal opinions, and our own experiences may colour our views somewhat, however, this does not mean that our beliefs are meaningless. The human ability to think and argue rationally renders this impossible.
