Rachels’ argument follows a standard format for arguments about the moral status of certain factors. He presents two pieces of behavior that are wrapped together in the exact same situation, but only differ to the “factor” in question. If the behavior differs morally, the factor is morally significant in itself. If not, it is morally insignificant.
This method for exposing an argument falls on the assumption that, if a factor is morally significant in itself, it will be significant wherever it appears. And we can argue against this assumption, because the difference of the factor. In this case, killing and letting die, could sometimes be morally significant, and sometimes not. Some pairs of actions that differ only in that one is killing (Smith) and the other is letting die (Jones) might differ morally, while other pairs might not. Thus, killing and letting die might be morally different, even though certain instances of killing and letting die do not differ, even when all other factors are equal
Rachel’s best response to this objection would be that it is the presence or absence of premeditation that has significance. Both Smith and Jones wanted to kill the six-year old boy. So it is the fact both had exactly the same end in view when they acted that made actively killing as wrong as passively letting die.
I believe that Rachel wrote a very good essay, and that his point was made clear, but there were some loops on it in which you could hold on to “reject” his arguments and specially in the example of Smith and Jones, which is, at first look a very good example and works perfectly to make Rachel’s point, but it is not an example from which it can be possible to generalize to the kind of cases that people usually have to deal with. The example involves two pieces of malicious behavior. Both Smith and Jones wanted to originally kill the child. Perhaps there is no moral difference between maliciously killing and maliciously letting die. But we can’t necessarily generalize from this, to cases of euthanasia that doctors find themselves every day, situations that some times involve benevolent motivations.
2. Explain, what is the problem in Noonan’s use of probabilities to support contraception. Compare Noonan’s position on contraception to Marqui’s Do you think Marqui’s position makes good sense? Apart from the views of Noonan and Marquis, state another way that contraception might be plausibly defended by someone who condemns abortion on potentiality grounds.
The problem in Noonan’s use of probability to support contraception is that he is looking at the wrong probability. He says that contraception is different to abortion because the chances are 200.000.000 to one that if you hadn’t use contraception that specific ovule, with that specific egg would develop in to a human being, while there is a 4 to 5 chance, that a fertilize egg will become a person. And the problem with this argument is that the evidence of the probability is not coherent. The point is not if you are preventing a specific sperm to unite with a specific ovule, the point is that you are preventing the development of a human life. For example, there is a great probability that a fertile couple using contraception for two years prevented a human life.
Both Noonan and Marquis agree that abortion is wrong but contraception is not the same as killing, but they based their arguments on different points: Noonan’s position is based on a biological point of view. “He argues that conception is the decisive moment of humanization because it is then that the new being receives a genetic code from its parents”(Noona,83). While Marquis arguments, are based on the deprivation of valuable experiences. For him murder, is wrong because” it deprives a person of the value of his or her future”.
Noonan view of contraception is relying on the biological probabilities to establish humanity. For him there is nothing wrong of using contraception because the chances that one specific sperm) develop into a zygote, into a reasoning being, with a specific oocyte are very small, far less than 1 in 200 millions. But if a fetus is destroyed, we are destroying a being that already possesses the genetic code to develop in a human. But as I stated before he is looking at the wrong probability.
Marquis in the other hand also believes that when you kill a fetus you are preventing him from something, but in difference with Noonan he doesn’t believe that is from developing his potential. You are depriving it from a future life, with valuable experiences. And as he said on an Radio interview made by Hugh LaFollette: “it is wrong to intentionally kill the life of the fetus because it has a future like ours.” “If it’s true that it is wrong to kill Don Marquis because it has a valuable future, then is wrong to abort Don Marquis for exactly the same reason”. And based on this point of view there is nothing wrong with contraception, because you are not preventing a human future of value.
I don’t agree with Marqui’s position, I believe he is looking the fetus and a human being if they were the same thing, and they are not. It’s true that a fetus has the potentiality to eventually become a human being, but is not yet one. So it’s not the same thing to kill a person that has lived something or even a newborn that we are certain that will have a future, and in his terms will have a “valuable future”, than to kill a fetus, that it has a good chance of becoming a person, but is not yet one. Anything could happen on the way.
Contraception might be plausibly defended in terms of potentiality grounds because the sperm, or the ovules by itself would be potentially capable of forming a human being. And as we know this is not true. By using contraception the only thing we are “killing” in case we want to use this term for an easily understanding, is the sperm or the ovules, which don’t have, by themselves, the information or the potentiality to develop as humans. We have learned that to a certain point the