(My name is: Sim Yong Kiat. My email address is . This work is on Kantian Ethics for university students.)

Is Christ a Kantian?

A Kantian must believe that happiness needs to be deserved, yet Christ says, “Ask and you will be given,” not “Do and you shall deserve.” Is the moral man really one who merely does moral acts? Remember Christ also says, wash the inside of the dishes and the outside will also be clean. Thus, Christ does distinguish between a moral man and one who merely acts morally. A moral man must do what Kantian Ethics says, for Kantian Ethics is indeed the correct description of ethics, though a man who obeys Kantian Ethics every time need not be a moral man at all. What I want to say is that, Kantian Ethics is only a description of ethics, rather than an explanation, for ethics is also about the man, not only about the act. Kantian Ethics can only be half-completed in answering the question, What is a moral act? The other half i.e. the question on, Who is a moral man? (or Why be moral?) is still unanswered. For as a human being, one needs not only to know, but also to be inspired. If the task of describing ethics is more important than the inspiring of man to be moral, Christ would have chosen to be a philosopher.

And that is why Kant’s contribution to ethical philosophy is as great as the contribution of Newton in Natural philosophy. For Kant has rightly seen an important truth in morality i.e. that man is capable of performing disinterested and dutiful acts, instead of merely prudent ones. Yet in making a distinction between a moral man and a happy man, Kant has also created a problem of dualism on happiness and virtuousness to arise, just as Descartes has caused the dualism of the mind and body. And as philosophers, we are naturally interested in asking the question, in a religious tone, why did God ever create two goals, instead of just one, which a man needs to attain? Why is that we need to be both happy men and yet also moral men, instead of merely just being one? Why didn’t God create three instead of two, if two is better than one? Has God been drinking, since only a drunken will see one as two? (Philosophically, this question becomes, how can I ever know which is more important i.e. happiness or virtuousness? How can two entirely different qualities be compared? In what scale can you measure the importance of virtuousness and happiness? In Kant’s view since one must always choose virtuousness before happiness, therefore virtuousness must be something more important than happiness. Yet although we would surely choose to eat first before we enjoy, that does not mean that we live merely to eat.) And therefore, if there are two goals that I need to attain, how should I then organize my time in order to attain these two? How would I ever know how am I to live today i.e. to listen to music or to spend the day helping in an old folk’s home? Who can give me the exact number of times I should practice virtue for this week? If I have just one dollar, should I buy my favorite book or donate the money away? Which is right, and how could I know for sure? Should I throw a coin to decide? (The usual answer to this question is, you need only to do the right some of the time. Or that you need to do charity till you have to sacrifice some of your personal happiness. Unfortunately, though such answers may be good enough for the layman, to give such an answer to a philosopher is tantamount to saying nothing at all. Of course, Kant is clever enough to use the term ‘imperfect duty’ in place of the word ‘some’, but if duty can be imperfect, then the circle can look like a square.)  

I believe the resolving of this dualism in ethical philosophy is as monumental as the resolving of the body-mind dualism in metaphysics. I also believe that Christ has a perfect solution to this problem, and this whole article can thus be also seen as an attempt in applying the philosophy of Christ to this most important and interesting problem in both philosophical ethics and our lives. This article is divided into 5 sections. The first section deals with the philosophical limitations of Kantian Ethics. The second section shows how the philosophy of Christ can help us resolve such problems. The third section deals with the complete explanation of ethics. The correct explanation of ethics must succeed not only in explaining the reason for a Kantian moral act, but also in resolving the problem of dualism in Kantian Ethics. The fourth section will concentrate on the task of demystifying ethics i.e. to show that there is no metaphysical realm of morality populated by divine laws. The fifth section will concentrate on the problem of free-will and determinism. The successful refutation of the doctrine of free-will will lead to the end of ethical philosophy.  

1

        First, I shall attempt to refute the famous proof by Kant in trying to show that giving lying promises is a morally wrong thing to do. Kant deduces that one should not give lying promises because one cannot will that all men should be liars intending to give lying promises too at the same time. Since if all men are liars such that no one will be keeping his promises, no one would also trust anyone anymore. Thus it becomes logically impossible for me to give any promise to anyone at all (for to give a promise implies logically that you expect another to trust you, yet no one would trust you in such a world where none will trust any other), let alone lying ones. Thus the act of giving lying promises cannot satisfy the principle of Universalizability, which says that any act that cannot be universalized i.e. willing that all should do it at the same time, is immoral or wrong.

        Is this really so? Imagine now that you are going to make a lying promise, yet knowing fully that all men are great liars. Why should it then be impossible for you to give the lying promise, since it is only you yourself who know that it will be a lying promise, not your friend (although he is as lying as you are)? How on earth is it possible for him to know that you are also giving a lying promise? Yes, you know that he is a liar, but that doesn’t mean in the least that he knows you as a liar too. He may be a liar, but that does not mean at all that he is smart enough to know you as a liar too. He could still believe you if he is gullible enough, and therefore you can still give promises to him, including lying ones. With God’s omnipotence, you could now turn all men into liars instantly, and thus know fully that you cannot trust anyone of them. But that doesn’t mean at all that they would not trust you. It is you yourself who wills all to be liars, not them. You can give lying promises so long as they continue to trust you, though of course they will be dead wrong! There is absolutely nothing logically inconsistent about giving promises in a land where no one gives true promises. It is only logically inconsistent if you are giving promises in a land where people do not know how to give promises i.e. do not know the concept of promise, not that they do not practice keeping promises. (Frankly, I must say that Kant is really being naïve here, for couldn’t an evil man delight in being more crafty (and thus superior) than his evil contemporaries? Isn’t it true that an evil man always believes that all are as evil, or even more evil than him? No maxim cannot be universalized, and therefore no man would need to choose believing himself as evil (in the Kantian way). The importance of the above proof lies in showing that there is no longer any reason for a categorical imperative i.e. an act that ought to be done solely for its own sake. Actually the principle of Universalizability is indeed related to ethics, but not in the way Kant believes, as I shall show later in my explanation of ethics.)

        Kant also tries to provide an immanent objective for a categorical imperative. He believes that a moral act could be done with joy. Yet the question arises, if joy can be placed into a moral act that is joyless initially, why couldn’t joy be placed into an act of suffering too? Joy is not an object, but rather a quality exhibited by a certain way of life or action. If the quality of joy can be anyhow placed into whatever we feel fit, then surely the quality of beauty can also be taken away from the painting of Mona Lisa and be placed into the splashing of the paint. (Joy is, as beauty, a quality rather than a quantity. It is a way of life that is lived, just as beauty is a way the painting is painted i.e. life can be lived joyously, just as the painting can be painted beautifully. Thus you cannot own joy just as you cannot own beauty, but only to live in it. If it is possible to own joy as something, why can’t we then own beauty as something private too, such that in owning beauty privately you will now see everything as equally beautiful?) Can virtuousness be good in itself? In what way can this mean? When we say that an act of happiness is good in itself, we can always imagine ourselves requesting for God to create for us a land of happiness for eternity. Yet the Kantian who believes that an act of morality is good in itself must thus request God to create a land of poverty so that he may practice the virtue of charity for eternity. Surely this is insane, and the act of morality cannot be good in itself as an act of happiness.

Kantians pride themselves in discovering the flaw in the argument of the Utilitarian that the sacrifice of personal happiness for the greater happiness of all is inconsistent, that how can it be a sacrifice at all if one nevertheless feels happy in the end for the happiness of all? Yet they have never noticed that they themselves are arguing exactly in the same way. Of course, they are clever enough to change the word happiness to goodness (or the mere performance of duty), but if it is better to choose goodness (or the performance of duty) than happiness, why wouldn’t someone do so? The Kantian would hardly be sacrificing his own interest too if he has chosen something, though not happiness, yet better than happiness. (The Kantian may say that interest is not happiness, but the Utilitarian can equally reply that neither is general happiness personal happiness. For general happiness, although it may include personal happiness, is something qualitatively different from personal happiness, as the class is different from the student.) The persistent Kantian may then say, it is not about gaining interest when it comes to acting morally, but rather about doing that which ought to be done i.e. it is absolutely not about any form of interest but only in the mere performance of duty. Well, I will simply ask then, is it nevertheless better to be doing that which ought to be done (i.e. performing one’s duty) than enjoying happiness? Surely if it is better to be performing one’s duty doing that which ought to be done than merely enjoying happiness, why wouldn’t then someone choose doing that which is better? If it is better to obey the moral laws than the enjoyment of happiness, why wouldn’t someone choose it? The Kantian may reply, “You are always free to choose.” But if I have the free will to choose that which is better, why on earth won’t I choose it? “Because you are evil.” But if it is better to be morally good than to be evil, why wouldn’t I choose the better? “Because you are weak.” If I am weak through chance, then I cannot be blamed. And if I have the freedom to be strong, which is of course better, then again, why won’t I choose that which is better? If you have chosen morality, then you must have loved morality more than happiness, and how could you be sacrificing anything if you have chosen that which you love more? And if the love of morality is better than the love of men, why then would I not choose it? Why would anyone purposely give up something that is better to love? The Socratic truth that one will love the good naturally if he sees it, is logically irrefutable.

In Kantian Ethics, a moral man is one who respects the moral laws, and acts not because of any future empirical purpose, or out of the liking for the content of the law (for there are those by nature kind and generous), but solely because it is a law. Can the respect for the concept of a law motivates one to act? Is respect a motivation or is it merely just a description? Fear is a motivation for a cowardly act because you need to commit the act, say hiding, in order to secure your physical safety and thus calm your fear. Desire can be a motivation too because you need to commit the act, say smoking, in order to satisfy your psychological craving. But need one commits the moral act itself in order to better respect the concept of a law? Surely not, just as one needs not sacrifice himself in order to better understand and respect the notion of self-sacrifice. (Even if you believe that one can somehow mysteriously increase his understanding and respect for morality through acting morally, it is still only an abstract faith and thus you cannot expect everyone to believe in it.) And if one can equally respect the moral act with or without ever been through the act itself, why should he then go through the act since nothing would have been changed any way? Isn’t it logically possible to imagine a person who although possesses this inner sense of respect, yet nevertheless carries out evil acts on every occasion? The inner sense of respect in a man is logically independent of external moral acts, and thus it cannot be related to morality at all.

What motivates a man to act morally? You may say that he wants to become moral through behaving so. Yet the question now arises, why then does he want to become moral in the first place? Yes, if I want to be a moral man, I would try to live morally, but why would I ever want to be a moral man? Nothing can ever motivate a man except the purpose of happiness. The task in ethical philosophy is to see how the motivation of happiness can lead to disinterested Kantian moral acts.

2

What is the unconditional worth in man? What is that which makes life meaningful even when there is no external contingent happiness? If there is no such an unconditional quality that a man can possess, then life would lose its meaning upon the first occurrence of suffering. It is in the possession of this quality that differentiates a happy man from a moral man. Kant is by far right in this, until he postulates this unconditional quality as the moral will (to external moral acts). And since it is entirely logically impossible to see how such a moral will is dependent on happiness or suffering, Kant deduces that it must not be related to them in anyway, except only that a man who possesses this quality is more deserved of happiness or less deserved of suffering.

Now, I want to refute this view of Kant i.e. that a moral man is merely one who does moral deeds. I would need you to recall the words of Christ i.e. first clean the inside of the dishes (or yourself), and then your outside will be clean too. Clearly, Christ feels that it is entirely possible for an evil man (with an evil inside) to be dutiful nevertheless towards external moral acts (i.e. with a Kantian moral outside). To Christ, there is a distinction between a good man and merely a man who does the good. The inside and the outside may not have any direct relation at all, in the way Kantians believe i.e. that the inside is none other than the will to do moral acts (on the outside). In other words, if Christ is right, the inside should not be defined in terms of the outside. For if the inside is defined in terms of the outside (e.g. as the moral will towards outside moral acts), then the evil man who does good dutifully at every opportunity cannot be said to be evil at all in any sense. Yet this is exactly what Christ denies. Therefore, it is not enough to define a moral man with any outside criterion, for this is just a empty analytical truism i.e. of course a moral man is one who does moral acts, if you define him in this analytical way. The moral will is only a term used to describe the acts of a moral man, rather than the moral man himself. So what describes the moral man himself? (And again, do not say that the inside is the metaphysical sense of duty one feels inside him, for as I have said, why should the sense of duty, or the sense of respect and appreciation, be able to prompt someone into action? If I equally feel it as a duty, or respect and appreciate it equally before and after the act, why should I then commit the act? Please do not say that the respect for morality will increase after committing the act, for this is surely just a superstitious belief, similar to the belief that one can become more compassionate through pretending to be so. Such inner sense of respect or appreciation, which cannot motivate the act itself in any sense, does not have anything to do with morality at all, since a moral man must act morally, though the converse is not true.)

What lies inside of a man must first be something intuitive, yet has absolutely no analytical relation with the outside (or else it will merely be an empty analytical definition), and finally, it must also be capable of prompting a man to act Kantian morally on the outside through a rational proof. What could this quality be? I need you to recall the words of Christ, “With faith, you can move mountains.” Clearly to Christ, faith is the most important quality a man could possess. Thus, I believe that this intuitive inner quality of a truly moral person is not some metaphysical moral will, but rather the down to earth will-to-hope and believe in happiness. (Ask yourself, does Kantian Ethics discuss the value of faith? Why does the Kantian need faith if he is already capable of acting morally since he has free-will? Similarly, Kantian Ethics does not study the problem of pride i.e. the greatest evil, as faith is the greatest virtue. For in what sense can you say in Kantian Ethics that a man is evil and thus prideful by failing to act morally? How can a fearful coward who surrender miserably and shamefully to pain and suffering be prideful in any sense?  If it is better and more difficult to obey the conscience than not to obey it, then he can at most be only pitiful in lacking moral power, rather than prideful. Isn’t the Kantian who scorns others for wanting happiness, who believes that he is greater (or capable of being greater) than the common happy man more prideful than any other?)

Another point I want to bring up is that many people believe that faith is needed only by cowards. This is a wrong view. If it is easy to hope and believe, then it must also be easy to move mountains. A person who believes that hope and faith is for the coward reasons probably like this: If we compare a man who can run even without a pair of shoes with one who can run only if he has a pair of good shoes, we would want to say that the first man is more courageous, for he is able to do the more difficult i.e. he can run under all circumstances. The man who is without hope (as the man without his shoes) is thus a greater man than the man with hope (as the man with his shoes). Although we all have an inclination to be weak i.e. to depend on hope as we depend on our shoes, it is nevertheless our duty to be strong i.e. to live without depending on hope and shoes. Thus we only have a duty to live in spite of hopelessness, rather than a duty to live hopefully. Now, such a way of thinking is right only if hope is really something i.e. an object like the psychological feeling of pleasure. But is this really so? Is hope really some object? Although we use the phase “to have hope”, that doesn’t mean in any way that there is something really called hope that one can depend on, anymore than saying, “There is nothing here” means that there is an object called nothing’ somewhere here. Hope is not an object at all, but is rather only a word used for the description of a certain way of life, and although there may be usual psychological objects accompanying such a way of life, it doesn’t mean at all that any of these objects must be hope itself. The feeling of hopefulness is not hope itself. Any psychological feeling can be induced by drugs, but hope cannot be induced. In other words, the correct way of using the word hope is only in an adjective way i.e. hopeful, hopefully. What misleads us is that we often use the word ‘hope’ in various ways i.e. “to hope” (thinking that hoping is an action like swimming), or “has hope” (thinking that hope is ‘something’ probably mental that can be owned at some point in time), but actually one should use only “hopefully” (describing, or better indicating your way of life). It is Wittgenstein who reminds me of this.

        And if we can say that a man is courageous and dutiful by living on his life willingly and cheerfully (rather than sulkingly) despite of difficulties, why shouldn’t he live on hopefully (rather than despairingly) despite of disappointment? The noblest man should reasonably exhibit the most active positive traits i.e. in the most desperate moments, he would still carry on living cheerfully, willingly and also hopefully. (If someone wants to say that “being hopeful” is a negative trait, then he shouldn’t step out of his house, for no one can ever guarantee that he could reach his destination safely 100%.  I mean, why do you need to hope if the chance of attaining it is already 100%? ) It is not that hope gives courage, but that a courageous man is one who dares to hope, just as he dares to act. In short, “to have hope” is not to walk with a pair of shoes, but rather to walk meaningfully i.e. with a destination in mind. Only an insane man walks with no destination in his mind. If it is wrong to try living meaningfully (and thus hopefully), then it will also be wrong to try walking meaningfully (with a destination in mind). When you live hopefully, you are not depending on anything, but rather you are choosing a certain way of life, just as the atheist chooses the courageous way of life of independency (from hope as an object, though wrongly). If you still insist that a hopeful way of life, although not an object, is still something one can depend on, then consider this reasoning: If a certain way of life is something one can depend on, then one can also lose it. Ask yourself, is the coward losing something when he refuses to live a courageous way of life? No, he is not losing anything by being a coward. In fact it is because he fears losing his life that he chooses to be a coward. He is not losing anything but rather he is failing to attain a certain way of life. Therefore, if it is in our duty to carry on living willingly and cheerfully despite of all problems, then it is also our duty to carry on living hopefully despite of how slim is the chance (as shown by science) for the ultimate happiness. (There is a certain modern wisdom believing that it is enough just to try one’s best, that the wise man doesn’t hope for any result. Yet if I am to aim yet without hoping to reach it, why should I then aim for just this particular goal? If I aim to jump 2m far in long jump without the intention to reach it, why shouldn’t I aim to jump 2 km far instead, for I surely do not hope to reach 2km either? If you should try, then you must aim, and if you must aim, then you must hope.)

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Kant is right in believing that one has a duty towards preserving life, for if one has only an inclination to enjoy life rather than a duty to preserve it, then he would choose suicide whenever he faces difficulties. Yet if one has the duty to try living no matter what, doesn’t he also have the duty to try living happily no matter what? Why should he be contented with mere living, rather than living happily? Surely it is more difficult to live happily than merely to live. One answer to this is that he cannot choose to ...

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