Swinburne feels that religious experiences can be put in to two main groups, public and private ones. Public religious experiences are ones where God’s actions are seen in the world at large, or in large scale events. When people argue for the existence of God from a design argument, they will often refer to seeing God’s wonder at work in the universe. Whilst the atheist may see nothing more than a starry sky, a theist may look at this and see the wonder of creation; a creation so perfect that it could only have come from God. The other group, private experiences, are ones that are for a certain individual only. They may include experiences such as seeing the Virgin Mary, or the feeling of a ‘presence’ that you associate as being religious. Although not always describable, the experiences are nearly always a lot more convincing to those who experience them, than to someone hearing about them. A J Taylor argues that have the presence of God semi-permanently or permanently in one’s life also counts a religious experience; although not a singular event, God’s presence as a guide in one’s life can bring about a similar effect to a singular experience.
Caroline Franks Davis broadly agrees with Swinburne, taking the view, in The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, that with all the inferred arguments for God’s existence, the probability is roughly equal for God’s existence as not.
Religious experiences, however, may tip the balance in favor of God’s existence.
C F Davis is most recognized in the field of religious experience for her three challenges over religious experiences, aimed mainly at Swinburne’s principles of testimony and credulity.
The description related challenge challenges the experience on the basis of self-contradiction, or the inherent difficulty that surrounds the use of language as a communicating tool. Since one person may not necessarily use language the same way as another, the use of language as a communication tool is flawed. The subject related challenge challenges the experience on the basis of the individual experiencing them, and the condition that they were in when they had the experience. If the person was under the influence, then their report may not hold as much weight as someone who had a religious experience when they were in a normal condition. However, a common rebuttal is that, just because someone is somehow mentally impaired, it does not nessecarly mean that what they experienced was not real. The third challenge is that of object related challenges, which challenges the existence of an object that was in the experience.
If someone said that they had experienced the Loch Ness monster, the objection may be on the grounds of the object related challenge. These challenges can be linked to objections to corporate religious experiences, where it is argued that people cannot know what the other people are feeling, on the basis of objections to understanding language, and the difficulties of expressing emotions and feelings in words.
Anthony Flew is also well-known for his objection to religious experiences, the vicious circle. Whilst perhaps the most relevant objections for long-term corporate experiences, the vicious circle challenge is one which questions the nature of the experience itself. As Flew says, the nature of religious experiences “seems to depend on the interest, background and expectations of those that have them, rather than anything separate and autonomous.” Religious experiences, according to Flew, only seem to reinforce our previously held beliefs, and should not be used for the basis of an argument for the existence of God. Despite C F Davis rejecting this argument, by saying that it is not easy to distinguish between an experience and its interpretation, it remains an important criticism for religious experience.
In Verities of Religious Experience, William James says: “Religion, therefore, as I ask you to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitudes.” This quite vague description includes nearly every experience where a person experiences an overwhelming emotional response to an event; this could even include listening to a favourite piece of music, or looking at an important picture. According to James, there are four markers of a mystical experience: ineffability, the impossibility of putting an experience accurately into words; noetic quality, intuitive states of insight or knowledge that cannot be reached by argument or reason; transiency, though the experience does not last for a long time, it alters life; passivity, the feeling of a person’s will being surrendered.
Although his definition of an experience is vague, his approach to identifying religious experiences is epically based, and is similar to more modern approaches, like those employed at the Hardy Institute. James also refers to the fruits of the experience being more important than the experience itself, a feeling that holds true with modern theologians.
If the objections are combined, then it appears that any religious experience can be objected to in some way: a person’s state, the language that they use, the experience, or the person themselves can all be used as an objection; Freud and Jung believed that religious belief was a neurosis, caused by the repressed love of the mother, or from “penis envy.” Hume took a less scientific route when he said that theists could not be truly trusted, as they are prone to lying, and are devoid of a “good sense, education and learning” to make sure that they are not fooling themselves.
In conclusion, if by a secure basis for belief, we mean a feeling of certainty, then religious experience will only boost the faith of those who believe, and strengthen the criticisms of those who do not believe in God. In short, the religious experience debate falls foul of Flew’s vicious circle.