The debate about religious language starts with the question of whether God can be spoken of meaningfully or not.

by omgmajorojd (student)

AS and A Level Religious Studies & Philosophy

The debate about religious language starts with the question of whether God can be spoken of meaningfully or not. Some philosophers, such as the Logical Positivists, have concluded that no talk of religion is meaningful (either because religious statements cannot be verified or because religious belief can never be falsified and therefore asserts no claims.) However, other philosophers, such as Wittgenstein have concluded that religious language is meaningful. Having come to this conclusion, one meets several hypotheses claiming to present the most successful human understanding of an ineffable God. Analogy is one such theory.

Aquinas put forward the theory of analogy because he did not feel that God could be adequately expressed in normal human language. This is because our language is either univocal (we use one word that has the same meaning in all situations, for example “wise” means full of wisdom – this is the only meaning of the word) or equivocal ( some of our language has more than one meaning.

“Bat” could refer to a small animal or a piece of sports equipment.) Aquinas suggested that univocal language was not appropriate to use about God because God is unlike any human concept – if we used “good” univocally about Helen and God we would be suggesting that Helen’s goodness was the same as God’s! Obviously, Helen’s goodness, as good as Helen may be, morally and skilfully, is subordinate to that of God’s, who is pure perfection.

If, however, we use the term equivocally, then we cannot know anything about God’s nature at all. There is no link between two words used equivocally. Aquinas came to the conclusion that language used about God must be analogical.

To explain what Aquinas meant by analogy we might consider Wittgenstein’s idea about language games (I resist saying Wittgenstein’s “theory” of language games, as this word has systematic and formal connotations.)

Whilst the word “analogy” within the form of life, or language games, of English Literature, for example, refers to a story that explains the meaning of something we are unfamiliar with, by use of a concept were are familiar with, Aquinas’ meaning of Analogy is part of a different language game.

He is using the word analogy in a connected, but quite specific linguistic way. He puts for ...

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He is using the word analogy in a connected, but quite specific linguistic way. He puts for two versions of Analogy to explain how God might be described. Firstly, the analogy of attribution. The analogy of attribution relies on the fact that there is a connection between creator and created. Whilst the Via Negativa, for example, holds that there is no connection between us and God, Aquinas disagrees.

The fact that we are God’s creation is a link and because of this link we can find out about God – we can gain a human understanding. This link between us is a link between our attributes and God’s attributes. This is most clearly explained with an example. Brian Davies gives the example of the bread and the baker. The bread is good because the baker is good and so the goodness relies on the link between them. But the baker’s goodness is not a magnified version of the bread’s goodness – he is not more fluffy, more delicious than the bread! Rather, his goodness is the skill required to create the goodness in the bread.

Thus, God’s goodness is not moral goodness, but rather the capacity to create moral goodness. This is the analogy of attribution.

Secondly, Aquinas proposes the analogy of proportion. This states that everything has qualities in proportion to their nature. To say that I am good at the piano is in proportion to the fact that I practise for two hours a day. Mozart was also good at piano playing but this does not imply that we both play to the same standard! “Good” is used in proportion to the fact that he is a professional. We can also explain this in terms of purpose.

Everything has a purpose, and the potentiality to fulfil it. God has no potentiality, only actuality – so God’s goodness is in proportion to what it means to be God, as my goodness is in proportion to what it means to be me, and Mozart’s is in proportion to what it means to be Mozart. Since God has no potentiality though, whilst I could be “more good” God cannot: whatever it means to be God, He fulfils it completely.

Aquinas’ concept of God as wholly simple. So Aquinas concludes that God’s attributes are proportional to what it means to be God and that he perfectly fulfils this role. His attributes are not magnified versions of human concepts. In this way he manages to make positive assertion about God without, as Hick points out, raising the concept of God as transcendent and mysterious. He has therefore successfully experienced a human understanding of God.

Ferre disagreed however – he pointed out, considering the concept of proportionality specifically, that proportion is a mathematical concept that requires 3 of 4 elements to be known before one can create an equation. For example, 2 is to 4 as 8 is to x. When we use Aquinas’ analogy however we only know two elements – we do not know God and we do not know what it means to be God. Thus, we have not discovered anything about God at all. Ferre claimed that Aquinas does not successfully express a human understanding of God.

Duns Scotus also disagreed, pointing out that Aquinas does not reach enough of a conclusion to properly justify the claim that a human understanding of God could be reached using analogy. Rather, we are told how unknown qualities might apply to God, without knowing what those qualities are. This is an acceptable criticism of analogy and it is here that we might step back and consider all the theories that claim to present a good human understanding of God’s nature.

Symbol, for example, claims to “open up levels of reality which were otherwise closed to us” (Tillich). Perhaps analogy can only be best used if combined with another theory? Tillich’s theory of symbol is also weak by itself – it can lead to confusion if one forgets to qualify human concepts with the idea that they are greater than were can understand.

For example, if we understand talk of God symbolically – God is my shepherd – we might understand that God is caring and protecting. Unless we qualify this with the knowledge that God’s care and protection are far, far greater than human concepts though, we might start to be reductionists (such as Cuppitt or Phillips) and believe that talk of God really refers to things we all experience in the material world.

We can see then that perhaps theories of God’s nature that are perhaps weak when used alone are in fact much stronger when used together. Symbol helps us reach a truly human understanding of God by using human terms symbolically to glimpse the nature of the transcendent and ineffable.

These human terms must be qualified however and it is here that analogy can be useful – the analogy of attribution would inform us that God’s care is not just a magnified version of my father’s care and the analogy of proportion would help us to understand that God’s care is proportionate to what it means to be God (and that God fulfils whatever that may be perfectly). In this way, we have countered Scotus’ claim.

At the final turn we might also consider that, since God is ineffable, we can never truly describe Him: this is part of the human understanding of God and so, whatever we find out with symbol and analogy, we must also qualify with the knowledge that God is not exactly so. This is the Via Negativa.

In the end , we can see that analogy, which is a good foundation, but a little vague, can be used successfully to express a human understanding of God, but that this is best achieved in combination with other theories of religious language such as symbol and the Via Negativa.