acts on the maxim, but where one cannot consistently or rationally will such a world.
In either kind of case, the maxim will fail the CI test. According to Kant, it would be wrong to act on a maxim of either kind.
Kant gives examples of both kinds:
i.: A person proposes to make a promise he doesn't intend to keep to pay back money in order to meet a need of his own. He must consider whether he could will a world in which everyone is motivated in precisely the same way. Kant claims that he cannot since it is only possible for people to promise in the first place if there is sufficient trust for others to believe that the person promising intends to keep his promise. But a world (otherwise like our own) in which everyone acted on this maxim would be a world in which such trust will not exist. Therefore it is impossible even to conceive of a world in which everyone acts on this maxim as though by a law of nature; therefore it is wrong to act on this maxim oneself.
Note this example also illustrates the idea of a contradiction in will. The person (in the example) who makes a lying promise uses the trust of others and the practice of promising for his own ends. But would these ends be promoted or harmed by everyone's making such promises? If the latter, then he cannot rationally will that world and also will that his own ends be promoted by his making the lying promise. Therefore, it is wrong for him to make a lying promise to advantage himself.
How far can this argument be taken? Would no maxim containing a false promise, in circumstances of extreme need, say, be such that it could be willed to be a universal law?
Kant's fourth example: a person proposes not to come to the aid of others because it is not in his own interest to do so. He then asks whether he could will a world in which everyone is similarly motivated. Clearly he can coherently conceive of such a world, so this kind of case is different from the first. But can he rationally will that everyone act on this maxim as though by a law of nature? It seems he cannot, because in willing that he act on the maxim, he is willing that his own interest be promoted, but in willing that everyone act on the maxim, he is willing that his own interest not be promoted "since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself." Thus his will is in conflict with itself.
Suppose someone were to argue that he is prepared to will that all act on the maxim of helping others only when it is in their own interest. He might be sufficiently securely set up that it would pay him on balance for all to act on this maxim since he would forego having to help others and would almost always be able to get whatever help he needed by paying for it (of course, there may well be kinds of help he might need that cannot be bought). It would seem, then, that, while it might be wrong for some people to refuse to giver aid to others unless it was in their interest (because they could not rationally will that all act on the maxim), it might not be wrong for a person such as above
According to Kant, as rational beings, we are self-directed beings. We are capable, as seen above, in prescribing rules to live by. We experience ourselves and others as intrinsically valuable, as valuable as and end, and not merely instrumentally valuable, or valuable as a means to obtaining something. According to the second formulation of the categorical imperative, the End-In-Itself Formulation, we should never treat someone merely as means but as an end also, or as someone who is intrinsically valuable. Sometimes this outlook is expressed in the following way. We should treat people with fundamental dignity and respect. This formulation should yield the same moral results as the first formulation. For example, it would be wrong to make false promises because we would be treating others as merely a means and not respecting them as persons with intrinsic value.
This interpretation faces a number of problems.
A. First, is there any reason to think that there are principles on which it would be rational for all persons to will all persons to act? If not, we may face the problem that there are insoluble moral dilemmas-- since the agent is also a person whose rational nature he must himself respect, if there are conflicts between what he and an affected other would rationally will as universal principles, then he may act wrongly whatever principle he acts on.
B. Second, Kant is often interpreted as saying here that persons can never be used as mere means, whatever the circumstances. So, for example, it would be wrong to treat someone as merely an unwitting instrument (say to lie to him) for an end, however good. But is it clear that it could be irrational for anyone to will that everyone act on a maxim licensing such treatment? Could it really be irrational, say, for a person to prefer the destruction of one person, even himself, say, if it was necessary to save the world
A fairly substantial problem now arises. It would seem that it had better be the case that, in the relevant sense, all rational persons would will the same universal laws. If this is not the case, then how can any particular person simultaneously respect his own rational will and that of another when they would will different universal laws?
Suppose, for example, that two different individuals, one needy, the other wealthy, would will different universal laws governing the giving of aid to those in need. Suppose the needy person would will that those who are in a position to help others who are in need do so until, and unless, doing so would put them into a position of greater need themselves. Suppose that the wealthy person would will that those who are in a position to help others who are in need do so until, and unless, doing so would require the sacrifice of something that they care about more than trivially (say, a sacrifice comparable to that of a nice meal out for one of us). What, then, would Kant's theory require?
One possible solution to this problem is to interpret Kant's idea of
a "kingdom of ends"
Kant writes: “The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a closely connected and very fruitful concept-namely, that of a kingdom of ends”.
Kants maxim of the Kingdom of Ends is an attractive moral position and one that seeks to respect each persons individuality in way similar to Utilitarianism.
Rawls in the ‘Theory of Justice’ suggests we understand Kant as asking, not what principles we would will to be universal law from our own individual situations,with the knowledge of our social status, natural endowments, race, sex, and what we individually value. Rather, we should ask what principles it would be rational for a person to will that all be governed by were we to make that choice from a ‘position of ignorance’ about our own individual situations. Behind a veil of ignorance, all persons have the same interests as rational persons. On this "Rawlsian" interpretation, what Kant's CI is really asking is that we act only on maxims that would not conflict with principles that it would be rational to choose as universal law from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’.
“Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals” – Kant
“The Categorical Imperative” - Paton
“The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory” -LaFollette
