Hervieu-Leger continues the theme of believing without belonging. She agrees that fewer and fewer people are attending church is most countries. She believes that this is partly because of cultural amnesia. For centuries children used to be taught religion in the extended family and the church but nowadays we have largely lost the religion that used to be passed down from generation to generation because few parents now teach their children about it. Instead parents are allowing their children to decide for themselves as to what they want to believe. While traditional institutional religion has declined, religion itself hasn’t disappeared. People now feel they have a choice as consumers of religion and have therefore become spiritual shoppers. Religion has now become individualised in which we choose beliefs that give meaning to our lives and fit in with our interests and aspirations. Religion has now become a spiritual journey. Hervieu-Leger therefore argues that there are two types of religions that have emerged which are pilgrims and converts. Pilgrims follow an individual path in a search for self-discovery, for example exploring New Age spirituality by joining groups, or through individual therapy. Converts join religious groups that offer a strong sense of belonging which is usually based on a shared ethnic background or religious policy. Such groups re-create a sense of community in a society that’s lost many of its religious traditions. One example of this is evangelical movements.
Because of these trends, religion doesn’t act as the source of collective identity that it once did. Hervieu-Leger does note however that religion does continue to have some influence on society’s values like the values of equality and human rights have their roots in religion.
Lyon does agree with Davie that believing without belonging is increasingly popular. He argues that traditional religion is giving way to a variety of new religious forms that demonstrate its continuing strength. In his view, postmodern society has a number of features that are changing the nature of religion which include globalisation, the increased importance of the media and communications and the growth of consumerism. Globalisation refers to the growing interconnectedness of societies which has led to greatly increased movements of ideas and beliefs across national boundries. This has increased ideas & beliefs across national boundaries. This is due to media and I.T which saturate us with images and messages from around globe giving us access to ideas and beliefs previously remote regions and religions. However these ideas have become ‘disembedded’. The media lift them out of their original contexts and have moved to diff place/time. (e.g. electronic church and televangelism). As result religion has become de-institutionalized: because signs and images have been detached from place in religious institutions, floating and multiplying on tv and cyberspace. Postmodern society also involves the growth of consumerism and especially the idea that we now construct our identities through what we choose to consume. This links in with the spiritual shoppers because we can now pick and mix elements of different faiths to suit our tastes and make them part of our identity. Therefore in Lyon’s view, religion has relocated to the sphere of consumption. Whilst there may be a decline in the number of people belonging to religious organisations, they haven’t abandoned religion. Instead they have become religious consumers. One effect of having a great variety of religious products to choose from is a loss of faith in meta-narratives – where there’s many different religions claiming to hold the monopoly of truth. Lyon criticises the secularisation theory for assuming that religion is declining and has now been replaced by a rational, scientific worldview. Although Weber focuses on disenchantment and rationalisation, Lyon focuses on re-enchantment. He agrees that traditional religions have declined but points to the growing strength of non-traditional religion in the West and its recovery elsewhere in the world.
Postmodernists claim that the growth of religious media and the electronic church as evidence against secularisation however research shows that people choose to view programmes that confirm their existing beliefs. Therefore it’s unlike that religious media attracts many new converts. Lyon criticises the evidence used by secularisation theorists, such as church attendance stats.
Stark and Bainbridge are very critical of the secularisation theory which they argue in Eurocentric – it focuses on the decline of religion in Europe but fails to explains its continuing growth in America and elsewhere. In their view, the theory puts forward a distorted view of the past and future. The secularisation theory focuses on how the mid-19th century was the golden age of religiosity however they argue that there never was and they are that the future won’t mean everybody will become an atheist like the secularisation theory argues. Instead they focus on two ideas; people are naturally religious and religion meets human needs. Therefore the overall demand for religion remains constant even though there are particular types of religion and its human nature to seek rewards and avoid costs. When people make choices, they weigh up the costs and benefits of the different options available. According to them, religion is attractive because it provides us with compensators. For example, immortality is unobtainable but religion compensates by promising life after death and only religion is able to provide such compensators. An alternative of the secularisation theory is the concept of cycle of religious decline, revival and renewal. They focus on some religions declining and others growing and attracting new members but the secularisation theory is one-sided and sees the decline of religious organisations but not the growth of others.
The demand of religion increases when there are different sorts to choose from, because consumers can find one that meets their needs. On the other hand, where there’s a religious monopoly – one church with no competition – it leads to decline because without competition the church has no motivation to provide people with what they want. Stark and Bainbridge argue that religion thrives in the USA because there’s never been a religious monopoly there but this differs in Europe. Therefore they conclude that the main factor influencing the level of religious participation isn’t the demand for religion like the secularisation theory suggests but the supply. Participation increases when there’s plenty of supply of religious groups to choose from, but declines when supply is restricted. Also, Stark and Bainbridge argue that the decline of religion isn’t universal like the secularisation theory suggests. One study to support Stark and Bainbridge is by Hadden and Shupe who argue that the growth of televangelism in America shows that the level of religious participation is supply-led. When commercial funding of religious broadcasts began in the 1960s, it opened up competition in which evangelical churches thrived. Televangelism responded to consumer demand by preaching a prosperity gospel. However the religious market theory has been criticised. Bruce rejects the view that diversity and competition increase the demand for religion. Stats show that diversity has been accompanied by religious decline in both Europe and America. Bruce also argues that Stark and Bainbridge misrepresent the secularisation theory because the theory doesn’t claim the there was a past of golden age of religion or that everyone will become atheists but focuses on how religion is in long-term decline. Nor does it claim secularisation is universal but just that it applies to Europe and America. Beckford also criticises the theory as being unsociological because it assumes people are naturally religious and fails to explain why they make the choices they do.
Norris and Inglehart reject religious market theory on the grounds that it only applies to America and fails to explain the variations in religiosity between different societies. They argue that the reason for variations in religiosity between societies isn’t different degrees of religious choice but different degrees of existential security. Religion meets a need for security, and therefore societies where people feel secure have a low level of demand for religion. Two societies included are poor societies and rich societies. Poor societies where people face life-threatening risks such as starvation, disease and environmental disasters, have high levels of insecurity and therefore high levels of religiosity. Poor people who live in rich societies also face greater insecurity and are therefore more religious than rich people in those societies. Rich societies focus on where people have a high standard of living and are at less risk, have a greater sense of security and thus lower levels of religiosity. Therefore the demand for religion isn’t constant like Stark and Bainbridge believe but it differs both within and between societies. Norris and Inglehart note that global population growth undermines the trend towards secularisation. Rich, secure, secular Western countries have low levels of population growth whereas poor, insecure, religious third world countries have high rates. As a result rich countries become more secular but the majority of the world is becoming more religious. In Western Europe, the trend is towards increasing secularisation and Norris and Inglehart argue that this isn’t surprising because these societies are among the most equal and secure in the world with well-developed welfare states offering comprehensive health care, social services and pensions. This reduces poverty and protects those at the bottom from insecurity. Although America is more religious than Europe, this is explained by Norris and Inglehart’s general theory of religiosity as the result of insecurity. E.g. they point out that although America is religious by the standards of other rich nations, it’s less religious than poor ones. Norris and Inglehart’s argument is supported by Gill and Lundegaarde who found that the more a country spends on welfare, the lower the levels of religious participation. European countries that spend more than the USA, are also more secular than the USA.
Vasquez accepts that Norris and Inglehart’s offer is a valuable explanation of different levels of religious participation not only in Europe and the USA but globally. However he makes two criticisms. Firstly they only use quantitative data about the income levels; they don’t examine people’s own definitions of existential security. He argues qualitative data is also required. He also argues that Norris and Inglehart only see religion as a negative response to deprivation. They ignore the positive reasons people have for religious participation and the appeal that some types of religion have for the wealth.
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safiya122 (student)
