Another example could be, someone might say that the formal cause of a statue is what it is for it to be a statue: that it have a head, that it be a certain height, that it portray a certain goddess.
Thirdly, there is the formal cause. This answers the question of what are its characteristics?
This is the characteristics that make the object fit into whatever category it fits into. The form cause provides the form. For an example the formal cause of the statue is that it has the characteristics of a statue. It is not a lump of marble that someone is making; it actually looks like a particular person or whatever.
Lastly, Aristotle describes a fourth way of understanding something's cause. This is the final cause. This explains the cause of something in terms of its end, or what it is for (the overall purpose.) Additionally it is the teleological purpose, the end to which the change is being drawn like a magnet.
According to Aristotle it is the most important aspect of Aristotle’s thinking of the subject for an understanding of his contribution to the philosophy of religion. He believed that all objects have an ultimate reason for their existence. For example “What is the purpose of buying this car?”
To which the answer would be “For comfort and ease allowing transportation between places.”
When something is doing what it was meant to do, or had developed into whatever it was supposed to develop into, it has achieved goodness. The purpose of an object, it is a part of the object itself. It gives the best explanation of an object. It gives the thing its full perfection and reality.
Aristotle theory of the four causes is convincing. Discuss
What causes something to be what is, to have the characteristics that it has, or to change in the way that it does. Small children often wonder about this. They go through a phase of asking why? About everything and anything. Many answers that are given are usually “because it is, “
“ Because I say so,” or “because it is made like that.” Aristotle thought about this, he concluded that the explanation of things could be seen in four different ways, at four different levels.
In actual fact, Aristotle believes that the natural scientist should consider all four causes. He begins to show this by saying that natural science is analogous to various crafts. In the make of building houses, for instance, the builder knows both the form that the house is to take, and the materials of which it is to be composed. So, because the builder knows both the material and formal causes of the house, the natural scientist should know the material and formal causes of his subject as well.
Material Cause is the elements out of which an object is created; Formal Cause is the expression of what it is; Efficient Cause is the means by which it is created; and the Final
Cause, the end for what it is.
Conversely, many people disagree and consider the following definitions are somewhat complicated in that they do not give us a concrete idea what the following causes explain in describing the processes and functions of a being or object in this world.
Another argument is the prime mover. The prime mover to Aristotle is the first of all substances, the necessary first source of movement which itself unmoved. But the prime mover causes the movement of other things, not as an efficient cause, but as a final cause. This is significant to Aristotle because he thought that an efficient cause would be affected itself by the act of pushing. However the prime mover is not efficient cause, it is a final cause because it is the object of everything. It appears that Aristotle crosses over from a consideration of physics.
Therefore I conclude that I agree with the statement, Aristotle’s four causes is convincing. On the other hand I am just looking at the small picture and believing what one philosopher Aristotle is saying. Maybe I am just agreeing it because it is there no other explanation. Perhaps I’m in both minds because Aristotle crosses over from a consideration of physics but also the explanation of things can be seen in four different ways, at four different levels.
The proper definitions that Aristotle gave in explaining the concept of each cause are the following:
1)Material Cause- That out of which something occurs comes to be and which is present in that thing.
2)Formal Cause- That in virtue of which something is the sort of thing that it is.
3)Efficient Cause- That from which comes the beginning of motion or rest.
4)Final Cause- That for the purpose of which something comes to be.
. A simplified explanation of the Four Causes is given through an article in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001), and these are the following: These simplified versions of Aristotle’s definitions for the Four Causes are sufficient enough for us to be able to explain the essence of these concepts in applying to the actuality of existence, the processes, and functions of the being or object."
In Chapter 3 of Book II, Aristotle establishes four different ways of understanding something's cause. The first has come to be called the material cause, and it describes the cause of something in terms of the physical constituents present in it (or, simply, in terms of what it is made of). As an example of a material cause, Aristotle writes that in some sense we can think of bronze and silver as the causes of a statue.
. For example, the final cause of a statue could be to portray a goddess, to serve the gods, or, perhaps, to provide aesthetic utility. Similarly, the final cause of something like a house would be to provide shelter.
Now that we have an understanding of Aristotle's four causes, let us now consider how Aristotle contrasts an investigation of natural science with one of mathematics. He begins by writing that, in some cases, it seems that the two disciplines overlap. For instance, natural bodies have length and curvature--properties that are of the concern of a mathematician--yet it would be absurd to say that the natural scientist could study these bodies without having knowledge of these properties (Physics, 193b25). What is distinctive of the mathematician, then, is that he will study the physical world only insofar as he can abstract from it mathematical properties that are changeless. For example, the mathematician will not concern himself with snubness (a property of the nose), but rather with curvature, as it is an abstraction of snubness. So, while the mathematician abstracts form from matter, his only concern is with the form. Consequently, when considering causes, the mathematician will only be concerned with formal causes.
The natural scientist's pursuits, on the other had, differ. Aristotle writes that one can conceive of nature in two ways: as form and as matter (Physics, 194a15). This differs from what his materialist predecessors thought, as they tried to explain nature merely in terms of matter. His rationale for including form in the conception of nature is that, for instance, one would not call a heap of matter flesh when it is only potentially so; the matter must be actualized, and this actualization comes from the form (Physics, 193b7). Now, because natural objects can be conceived of as both matter and form, the natural scientist should study them "neither independently of their matter," as the mathematician would, "nor [simply] insofar as they have matter," as the materialists would (Physics, 194a15). Thus, Aristotle concludes that the natural scientist should study enmattered forms.
(Physics, 194a25).
This analogy to crafts, however, only establishes that the natural scientist should consider both formal and material causes. Aristotle will go on to give arguments for the remaining causes in this chapter, but they are complex and, frankly, poorly understood. Perhaps the clearest and best explanation he gives, however, appears in Chapter 7. He states that an appropriate answer to questions in natural science must be given in terms of all four causes2 (Physics, 198a25). This certainly implies that it is necessary for the natural scientist to study all four causes.
Furthermore, the final cause seems to be closely related with the other three causes in that it places constraints on them. For instance, if the final cause of the house is to provide protection from the elements, it must be characteristic of the form of the house to have a roof, walls, and windows. Similarly, the material of which the house is made must be strong, and could not be something like gingerbread. Lastly, the final cause places a constraint on the efficient cause in that if the end of the house is to provide shelter, someone like a pastry chef (in virtue of being a pastry chef) will be inadequate in realizing this end.
Now that we've established that the natural scientist should study all four causes, let us consider the similarity and differences between Aristotle's and Plato's types of explanation. A striking similarity is that both Plato and Aristotle believe that the form plays a role in explanation. This differs from the teachings of their materialist predecessors, such as Empedocles and Democritus, who taught that explanations should be given in terms of matter and not form (Physics, 194a20).
Where Aristotle and Plato differ, however, is that Plato believes there should be a unity in the explanation of something (i.e., that it should be explained exclusively in terms of its form), whereas Aristotle requires multiple explanations of something (i.e., explanations in terms of the four causes) that are not radically ambiguous. Aristotle requires this because he believes that Plato's forms cannot be efficient causes. For instance, he writes in Book II, Chapter 9 of On Generation and Corruption that Plato's forms are neither sufficient nor necessary for efficient causation. There are some cases, he writes, where they fail to generate things continuously (a claim against sufficiency); and there are other cases where something else can be the efficient cause, such as a doctor being the efficient cause of health, and not the Platonic form of Health (a claim against necessity) (De Gen. et Corr., 335b8ff).
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle will continue to criticize Plato's forms as sources of efficient causation. In Book I, Chapter 9, his claim against sufficiency is that, regardless of the existence of the forms, partakers do not come to be unless something initiates change. Likewise, his claim against necessity is that certain things can come to be, like houses or rings, even though we do not consider them as having forms (Metaphysics, 991b5).