This case history documents events that occurred at the Markham coal colliery in Derbyshire, England in 1973. A descending mine cage failed to slow down as it approached the bottom of the mine shaft and 18 miners were killed by the impact.

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Report of The Markham Colliery Disaster

Background

  This case history documents events that occurred at the Markham coal colliery in Derbyshire, England in 1973. A descending mine cage failed to slow down as it approached the bottom of the mine shaft and 18 miners were killed by the impact. The shaft was sunk in 1886 and has a depth of 429m.

  There are two double-deck cages, each capable of carrying a maximum of sixteen persons per deck. In operation, the two cages are attached to opposite ends of a winding rope so that as one cage goes up, the other descends. At the pit bottom, each cage rests on wooden baulks set into the walls of the shaft. The winding ropes are attached to the winding drum which is driven by the winder motor. The armature of this motor is supplied by a generator set which is driven by an a-c induction motor. To begin a winding cycle, the engineman gradually increases the power applied to the winder motor while slowly releasing the mechanical brake. The cages are allowed to accelerate to a speed of about 6m/s and this speed is maintained until the cages approach the ends of the shaft. The engineman then gradually decrease the generator voltage to produce regenerative braking.

Basically the brake consists of a servo spring mechanism that applies brake shoes to the underside of brake paths on the winding drum. These shoes are activated by the compressed spring nest which operates through a series of levers. Force is transmitted from the spring nest to the main lever of the brake via the vertical brake rod which lies along the axis of the spring nest. Since the nest of springs is compressed, the brake rod is in tension with the brake in the “on” or “off” positions. The brake is released by using compressed air to counteract the force of spring nest and so move the brake shoes away from the drum path.

In terms of safety devices, there is an automatic controller, driven from the shaft of the winding drum through a system of gears, which is designed to cut off the power supply to the winder motor and to apply the mechanical brake. There is also an emergency stop button which activates the “ungabbing” gear that immediately disengages the engineman’s brake control lever from the control valve on the servocylinder; the mechanical brake is then applied automatically.

The Investigation

 

The accident was the subject of a formal investigation by the U.K. Department of Energy. This encompassed all electrical and mechanical components of the winding system. It was confirmed that the ungabbing gear had operated, and a supply of compressed air was still available at the value above the servo cylinder. The brake shoes, however, were about 3 mm clear of the brake paths. Thus, attention was directed to the mechanical brake system.

Metallurgical examination of the brake rod

 

This examination include: visual inspection, non-destructive testing, chemical analysis, metallographic examination and mechanical testing. The visual inspection illustrates the first finding: that the rod broke in the threaded region, 119 mm from the bottom end where the rod passed through the ‘distance piece’, below the cross-head trunnion axle. Second, a polished and etched section of the rod, produced by cutting longitudinally along the axis of the smaller broken piece, revealed that there was a small crack at the root of the thread adjacent to that at which the rod broke; this is called a secondary crack. Non-destructive testing provides a detailed mapping of secondary cracks. The presence of secondary cracks indicates that the failure was not due to a local metallurgical or surface fault. Chemical analysis inspected whether the brake rod material met the specified chemical composition. We can see all elements met the specified chemical composition. Each element value of brake rod steel lie within the ranges of BS 970:1947 for En 8 steel. Metallographic examination also revealed the secondary cracks present at thread roots close to the main fracture plane and inclusions were present in the steel. Mechanical testing inspected the properties of the brake rod and the brake rod material met the specification of material properties because measured values exceeded the minimum values given by BS 970:1947 En 8 steel. But the Charpy impact energy did not meet the specification for 080M 40.

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The work practices used and the design of the machinery

The work practices was so bad, they never inspected the brake rod and trunnion during the 21 years. The design of machinery was so bad too. The brake rod was always in tension with the brake on and brake off. And the emergency stop system was effective when the brake rod was effective. If the brake rod is broken, the system can not do anything to stop the accident. In the cross-head trunnion, the top surfaces of the axle in contact with the bearing pads were fretted and ...

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