We could say that a spiritual substance could not exist without any mental states and may or may not have been presupposed by existence of conscious mental state. The fact that spiritual substances is doubted should not allow us to obscure the issue that there is unitary no bodily aspect to a person. This non-bodily aspect is what we call a persons spirit.
The empirical concept of the soul
It is not enough to describe the soul as mental states and events that belong to the person and to describe the soul as some thing logically distinct from the body when the idea of a serious of mental states involves some reference to the particular human body it possesses. There for a non bodily criteria for personal identity must be produced. This seems like a logical form of criteria for identification, which rest on the view that memory presupposed a bodily criteria. In other words if we say that memories of a certain person lead to their identification we must assume that the memory is physical.
If we where to program a human brain with the characteristics and memory of another person would they be identifies as that person. Would this programmed person still posses certain spiritual qualities that may have existed in that person, qualities such the courage of a warrior. I would say that there is more to a person then a set of characteristics and memory and that the spirit of a person is a faculty which is crucially identifiable.
The mental and bodily criteria of identity
Many philosophers have insisted that the basic and indispensable criteria of human identity is bodily. This form of identification has a number of virtues mainly it is simple and is used most commonly and successfully. The fact is that a person can be both identified by physical appearance and metal characteristics. But it could be said that bodily identification is not a complete form of identification, at best a necessary condition of personal identity.
Sentimental relationships that wouldn’t survive a change of body may be rejected because they lack any substance. The continuation of a person must be base on there mental characteristics.
Disembodiment
If it where possible to remove a brain from a dead person and fix it into a manufactured body which as a result become perfectly active we would have to assume that the dead person is no longer dead.
Does William offer a compelling argument against Quinton’s claims?
The self and the future
Williams seems to agree with Quinton in the first section stating that identification should be made by memories not by ones body. This conclusion comes around after Williams experiments on to people who switch memories. whatever scenario he puts on them they become identifiable by memories.
Williams goes on to explain the association of pain with certain mental states. If I am to fear spiders and know that soon I will be surrounded by them it is inevitable that I should fear them, however if I new between now and then that I would undergo psychological change resulting in loss of fear and should have no reason to fear the later encounter. The changers of beliefs or character my be manipulated in order change a certain emotion but no amount of change in belief or character would change the emotional affect of torture.
Williams also talks about a scenario that involves a machine that would enable us to live forever with an unending sequence of delicious and varied experience one might reject this option. The reason for rejecting this scenario would be are consciousness of duties to others, which would be undone in certain situations. The prospects of vegetableness may also stir the same feelings of fear. The point that Williams is making is that even thought we no that are character and impressions are altered beyond recognition we will still fear torture after the change. This suggests that even thought my character and memory is altered there is still an underling substance that predetermines my feeling and is unchangeable.
Conclusion
Williams’s strongest argument against the claim made be Quinton is that there seems to be an underlying non-changing identity that is separate from character and memories. Quinton uses the prospect of torture to illustrate that no amount of change in a persons memory or characteristics could have an underlying affect on the fear produced by the prospect of torture.
The presents of emotions not consisting solely on memory is a strong enough argument for me to say that there is something other to identity then consistency of characteristics and memory suggested by Quinton. Quinton ideas of the soul may need more explanation as although he does not doubt its existence he questions its importance in the identification process. From my understanding of both Quinton’s and Williams arguments I would have to say that there is definitely some relating factors that do suggest the presence of a soul, but whoever I would have to agree with the fact that there is more to the a person then just their characteristics and memory.
The importance of the body or some physical connection to our soul may point to our underlying sentimental hung up of material things. I agree that the identification of a human does not necessarily relay on their physical attributes and that a person can solely be identified by their characteristics but I would have to argue that there is something consistently identifiable at birth, and that this may be present throughout life. I would describe this as spiritual a substance the seat of consciousness. There is more to a person then their ever changing psychological characteristics and this is inevitable consistent and identifiable.
