But then would not it be true to say that the death of the brain would signify the death of the ‘physiological base of what is crucial to personhood,’ the death of person himself?
Let us consider the following table:
Social and Biological Life (Table)
Socially Alive Socially Dead
Biologically U.S.: All conscious U.S.: fetuses and whole brain
Alive adults dead, the PVS
some societies: outcasts, disabled, zombies
Biologically in some societies: corpses prepared for disposal
Dead ghosts, ancestors, gods
corpses still connected
to spirit
Bearing in mind the fact that the ‘The social death concept asserts that citizenship, rights and value adhere not to bodies, but to subjective persons. This means that we would charge someone who removed the ventilator from a PVS patient with interfering with corpses rather than murder.’ Also, all the resources for the maintenance of the PVS ‘bodies’ (both, financial and human) would be a waste. This point of view is in the least degree absurd and inhumane to accept.
Thus equating existence of the self to the biological life of the brain, with consequence like acceptance of the social death in case of the brain death is superficial and unacceptable in our society.
- another thing that endures through time and space is the bulk of one’s mental characteristics; so perhaps the self is one’s relatively stable and continuous psychology. First, explain what this view is in detail. Second, give some good reason to think this idea isn’t correct.
The ‘bundle theory’ as it is sometimes called states that it is our bulk of sensations that constitute ourselves-‘I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers’. Each person has his own unique bulk of experiences that are his own.
If we imagine that one morning a person wakes up in his bed, has the same sensations and thoughts that he normally has, for example, he is planning his day, experiences happiness of the sun that is shinning, feels the hunger and thirst. The only difference would be is that he does not have his usual body. He looks at himself in the mirror and sees the reflection of the room but not himself. He wants to touch himself but there is nothing to touch, so that other people will not even know that this person exists. This concept of a bundle of sensations existing independent of the body seems absurd. Not having any eyes, how can this person observe the room, not having any fingers, or hands, how can he try to reach out to touch himself, how can he think if he doe not have a brain? Going back to Descartes, for the act of thinking to exist, there has to a thinker. So, to perform all the actions, to experience sensations, it is vital for us to have a body, otherwise we cannot be seen as ourselves, nor can we live and feel as ourselves. It is our body that gives us the empirical knowledge that is necessary in order to have sensations. We can argue that not all knowledge is empirical, for example, things that we perceive by the ‘eye of reason’ (e.g. mathematical knowledge). However, in order to understand mathematical concepts, we need some kind of knowledge that will be perceived through our eyes and ears. So, we come back to the idea that the self cannot purely exist as a bulk of mental characteristics.
- Present and defend your own view on what the self is.
The self is a complex concept. One can not equate the self simply to the brain or to our mental characteristics. I personally think that our body, as well as our mind constitute our true selves. If our mind was to be reincarnated or implanted into another body, we would not be capable of operating this body it in the same way as we used to operate our own body. For example, if I was a good singer in my own body and had experienced happiness from being onstage singing, in my new body I would not necessarily be a good singer, because, firstly, singing requires vocal training which my new body might not have, and, secondly, the vestibular apparatus must work in the same way-I must have good ears, breath support etc. All of the above are required for me to gain that one sensation of happiness and satisfaction from singing. So, my old body is vital for myself to continue experiencing the same sensations.
Bibliography
∙ Brody, Baruch. 1988. "Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative State." Hastings Center Report :33-40.
∙ Hospers, John (1997). An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Chapters 5, 6. Prentice Hall Inc.
∙ Lowe, E.J. (2000). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press, pp270-277
∙ McGinn, Colin (1996). The Character of Mind. Oxford University Press, pp140-162
∙ Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), essay 3, Chapter 4.
∙ Wilbert, Ken. (1983) The Quest for the New Paradigm. Chapters 1, 3. Anchor/Double.
WWW
∙ , Prepared for the and Technological Change:
Personal Identity, Neural Prostheses and Uploading.
Essay Topic 4.
a. One thing that endures through time and change is one’s brain; so perhaps the self is the brain. Give some good reason to think this idea isn’t correct.
b. another thing that endures through time and space is the bulk of one’s mental characteristics; so perhaps the self is one’s relatively stable and continuous psychology. First, explain what this view is in detail. Second, give some good reason to think this idea isn’t correct.
c. Present and defend your own view on what the self is.
Brody, Baruch. 1988. "Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative State." Hastings Center Report :33-40.
Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), essay 3, Chapter 4.