The Battle of Loos The officers had already been told that they were going into the biggest battle the world had ever known, and where also told that their role would be to march through to Douai and hold it, a task which was considerably modified before we actually reached the battle.On the morning of September 25 the 72nd Brigade moved to Beuvry, and from there marched to a point behind behind Vermelles, where the battalions rested on the road-side. The Battle of Loos was now in full swing, and many prisoners and wounded were coming down from the line, but no very definite information could be got from them. The task now allotted to the division was that it should pass through the village of Hulluch, which was belived to be in our hands, and then capture and organise the Pont-a-Vendin bridgehead some three and a half miles further east. As a matter of fact, the 73rd Brigade and two battalions of the 71st were detached to other parts of the line, leaving only 72nd Brigade to carry out the attack. When night fell the brigade moved up from Vermelles, and opened out into artillery formation, as the exits to the village were being shelled, advancing first on Le Rutoire Farm and then on a compass bearing to the Lone Tree, where the battalion halted and got in touch with the other battlions of the Brigade. Later the advance was resumed, with the Battalion leading the Brigade, and the the final position reached during the night was a line of old German trenches parallel to and some 1,000 yards west of the Lens-La Bassee road. It is interesting to note that although this part of the line was supposed to be occupied, no troops were passed on the way
up, and there were none in the trenches to be relieved. Although the shelling had been fairly heavy, the casualties were not very serious, but included Lieut. P. T. Smith, slightly wounded in the foot. He refused, however, to be sent down to hosipital. Col. Vansittart was also slightly wounded in the hand during the night. Our instructions were that we should attack at dawn, the main objective for the Brigade being the main German position some 2,000 yards away, which stretched from Hulluch village on the left to the Bois Hugo and on to the Hill 70 on the ...
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up, and there were none in the trenches to be relieved. Although the shelling had been fairly heavy, the casualties were not very serious, but included Lieut. P. T. Smith, slightly wounded in the foot. He refused, however, to be sent down to hosipital. Col. Vansittart was also slightly wounded in the hand during the night. Our instructions were that we should attack at dawn, the main objective for the Brigade being the main German position some 2,000 yards away, which stretched from Hulluch village on the left to the Bois Hugo and on to the Hill 70 on the right, our frontage being from Hulluch to the Bois Hugo. Considerable sniping and random shell fire was kept up the enemy during the night, but did very little damage. The Battalion scouts, under 2nd Lieut. Harris, were sent forward during the night, 25/26th, and came back with the report that Hulluch was in the hands of the enemy and strongly organized, and that they were also holding the line of the Lens-La Bassee road. The whole battalion could not be accommodated in the main firing trench, and an attempt was made by C and D Companies to dig a parallel trench in front, but, owing to the approach of daylight, and the increasing attentions of the enemy's whizz-bangs and machine-gun fire, this was abandoned, and the surplus was drawn into a communication trench, where the men hollowed out scoops for themselves as additional protection from shelling which was enfilading them. No orders for the attack at dawn came to us, and we had to wait. As the light grew stronger, the enemy's artillery fire increased and casualties became more numerous, while our guns did heavy counter-battery work. At about 10.20 a.m. Col. Vansittart was sent for by the Brigadier and got orders to attack at 11 a.m.; he reached to battalion at 10.53, and only had time to give orders for whole Battalion to move up into the fire trench, and to tell off companies as firing line and supports. We were told that there were plenty more fellows in reserve to go through us, and that the troops on either flank would attack simultaneously with ourselves. We were to leave Hulluch village on our left, and it would be dealt with by the troops on our flank. Punctually at 11 o'clock the first wave, with B and D Companies in the front line, left our trenches,followed at short intervals by the subsequent waves. The 9th East Surreys were on our right, and the 8th Buffs (right) and the 8th Queen's (left) were in support. Instead of a whole division on our left, a handful of some fifty to seventy-five men, belonging to a Welsh regiment, alone left our trenches, the orders apparently having arrived to late, while the right flank of the East Surreys also appears to have been in the air.The ground to be covered sloped gradually down to the Lens- La Bassee road, and from there rose to the main German positions, about 1,100 yards beyond, near the crest of Hill 70. The attack was carried out at a marching pace in order to save the men's breath for the final charge and bayonet work, and the advance was so steady and the formations so regular that it looked more like a field day at Aldershot that part of a great battle. The enemy brought a very heavy rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire to bear on the attacking lines, and shortened his range to keep pace with the advance with wonderful precision ; but the casualties up to this point, though severe, were not inordinately heavy. When the first wave was still some hundred yards short of the main road, the enemy withdrew, some retiring in very open order up the hill, and many of these were shot down by our men, while stronger parties made off to either flank, those on the left gaining the village of Hulluch, and those on our right reaching a sunken road on the near side of the Bois Hugo. A very severe machine-gun fire from either flank swept the road, and very heavy casualties were sustained in crossing it. About 400 yards east of the road the Battalion passed a forward German trench full of enemy dead.As the advance swept up the long slope towards the main German trenches the machine-gun fire increased in intensity, being very severe from both flanks. Shelling directed from behind hill 70 and from the south-eastern part of Hulluch was also very heavy, and two field guns were brought up to a position from which they took the attack first from the flank and later from the left rear, firing practically over open sights. In spite of the very heavy casualties which were being sustained, the Battalion continued its advance up the slope with the upmost gallantry, but it was found on reaching the enemy's main position that the barbed wire protecting it was absolutely intact. What more hopeless situation could possibly have arisen? When the orders for the attack had been issued, it had been assumed that all the enemy's wire had been cut by our bombardment, but here, after a most gallant advance of about 2,100 yards in face of murderous fire, not only from the from the front but from both flanks, the Battalion, and in fact the whole Brigade were faced with a thick belt of uncut wire, swept by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire from three different directions. With assistance from our flanks to keep the enemy occupied and to draw a proportion of his fire, it would perhaps still have been possible to force a way through the wire and capture the trench. We wish to make it quite clear that we are not blaming our comrades on either flank for their failure to help us. The facts appear to be that at the timefixed for our attack the enemy himself launched a counter-attack against the troops on our right, who were consequently pinned to their ground, while the orders did not reach those on our left in time, with the consequence that the 72nd brigade had both its flanks exposed, and the enemy was able to concentrate on the one brigade the fire of the artillery and small arms which would normally have been used on the front of three divisions. Many men made gallant attempts to get through the wire, 2nd. Lieut. Don being killed when half-way through. The remainder dropped to the ground where they were and returned the heavy fire from the enemy's trench. The situation, however, was hopeless. In front was an impenetrable belt of wire, and the line, such as what was left of it, raked with rifle and machine-gun fire from the front and both flanks, and enfiladed by an equally deadly artillery fire. What were the men to do? Turn to their officers for orders? Out of the twenty-five officers who had left our trench little more than an hour before, only one was un hit. To stay where they were, outflanked on both sides, was impossible, and the poor remnant of that gallant Battalion was forced to make is way back to the line of German trenches from which it had started.Taken from "The History of the Eighth Battalion The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment 1914-1919" Printed privately for the battalion by Hazel,Watson & Viney, LD. In 1921. Used with out permission from the author
