Prior to the Act child support was collected through the courts and via the DSS. It has been suggested that the child support legislation was totally unnecessary in the UK as there was already, within the aforementioned elements, a settled structure for the parental maintenance of children (Snow, ’98). The Government considered these systems to be failing. This was because the awards that the courts made were very low averaging at around £12 per week per for one child (Garnham,’94), which, by no means reflected the true cost of a child. Only 30% of lone parents at any one time were receiving maintenance and single and separated mothers were less likely to receive maintenance than divorced mothers via the court method (Law Society, 2000). To account for this there was a system in place whereby liable relative officers within the DSS could seek maintenance from absent parents but there was no legal obligation for lone parents to pursue this until 1990. After this period it was compulsory for women on benefits to reveal the names of the fathers so that they could be traced and maintenance sought. However this system was fraught with problems and stigma. For example liable relative officers were taken away from their posts for other duties within the DSS as and when required. There were also reports of women being locked into interview rooms and threats of benefit withdrawal if they refused to comply (Garnham, ’94). Therefore it is unfair to state that there was a settled structure for supporting children, there was a structure but it was failing.
The Child Support Act 1991 intended to do away with the failing dual system. In its place a Child Support Agency was established with powers to assess and enforce child support payments using a standard formula. All absent/lone parents were to be covered by the scheme, whether or not they were dependent on benefits. This system became unworkable due to immense administration problems. The blame for this was put at the door of organised campaigners adverse to the Act who clogged up the agency’s system with large numbers of letters of complaint and enquiries. However the Third Select Committee (CM 2865 ’95) investigated and found that this did not hold true. The making of and the implementation of the Act were found to be the problem. The Act was rushed through parliament in a lead up to the general election. Not enough time was allowed to view and debate this very complex piece of legislation. Ministers of the opposition did not voice their concerns as did not want the public to think they were adverse to the idea of parental responsibility. Due to this, lack of training and other administration problems a dual system of collecting child maintenance has now been re-established (Bradshaw, ‘99).
The child support system is now used for lone parents on benefits and for parents who would prefer the CSA to seek maintenance on their behalf (at a cost). Arrangements are made through lawyers and the courts for other people. The CSA must now recognise levels of maintenance agreed between the two parties and endorsed by the courts. The proportion of lone parents receiving regular maintenance has not been altered by the CSA it still remains at 30% (FNF). The level of payments, which have fallen due to changes in the formula, are also not much greater than they were under the dual system, when figures are adjusted to allow for inflation (NACSA). The formula is due to be replaced in 2002 by a simpler formula based on a percentage of the fathers earning. It is thought that this will reduce the award paid further still, taking the average assessment below that of the old system. The NACSA argue that if account is taken of the costs of administering the CSA then the savings to the public purse have been miniscule or non-existent over the old system (NACSA). Therefore the CSA has more or less become an agency for collecting maintenance for lone parents on benefits and has done nothing to do away with the old system of child support.
This then would add fuel to the argument that the Child Support Act is nothing more than a means to support the Treasury. This very concept was criticised by the Third Select Committee (CM 2865, ’95) who stated that targets should be set to place efficient service to the public before savings to the treasury. The Government denied doing this and stated that they were upholding the principle that taxpayers should not support children where natural parents were able to do so. The CSA set targets on how much they should aim to save the treasury every year. Although the agency failed to achieve its aim of getting £500 million back into the treasury in the first year of operation it did manage to recover £418 million Foster, ’95). In 99/2000 the CSA recovered £473.6 million from absent parents of which £149 million (33%) was paid directly to the Secretary of State where parents with care were on income support (NAO, 2000). Money received from absent parents with ex partners who are on income support will go directly to the treasury. This also applies to savings made from benefit deductions enforced due to refusal to co-operate with the agency (i.e. not name the father). £79.69 million was saved during 1996\7 by reducing benefit payment. In the first year of operation 21,000 mothers had their benefit cut (Foster,’95) There has been an annual benefit saving for the treasury of £450 million since 1993\4 (Parker, ’97). The Treasury will make a complete saving if awards are enough to lift lone parents off benefits altogether. This all goes to show that the CSA has a very large aim of supporting the Treasury and are doing so quite successfully.
The CSA’s argument against operating a Treasury Support Act is that they are providing an effective, efficient and economic use of public funds. However the evidence is to the contrary. In 1997\8 16,122 fathers disputed paternity of which 1,269 admitted paternity prior to court action or DNA testing. The number of cases referred for DNA testing in 1997\8 was 9,141 of which only 270 fathers paid for the service. Paternity was established in 87% of cases (end January '98) (Parker, ‘2000). All of this was to the cost of the taxpayer. The Agency is also failing to enforce the collection of maintenance when fathers do not pay up. The total amount of maintenance arrears (excluding interim assessments) at January ’98 was £625,870,713 of which only approximately £309 million was subject to repayment agreements (op cite). On top off this loss is the amount paid out to clients in compensation that were made as a consequence of errors or delays in the service. The Agency paid over £3 million in compensation during 1999-2000 as compared to £114 thousand in 95/96 (NAO). This shows that the agency is in fact becoming less efficient with public funds. I t is also fairly apparent from the numbers of fathers going for DNA testing and the amount of money due in arrears that the priority of getting money to the child is very low.
The Child Support Act was preceded by the white paper “Children Come First” which claimed that its guiding priority is “the interests of the child” (Bradshaw,’94). The biggest objection to the legislation is the fact that children in many cases are no better off. In many cases they are worse off than they were previously. This is mainly due to the lack of a maintenance disregard for families on Income Support. Any maintenance assessment is deducted pound for pound from lone parents Income Support. This causes problems as the maintenance is not guaranteed and the lone parent is dependant on that money coming in. Second families are also affected as when the father has to pay out for the children that he is not living with. The effect could be to dramatically reduce that family’s income down to as low as income support level (FNF). Hence instead of having one family living in poverty on benefits the end result is that two families end up at benefit level. This is hardly to the benefit of any child.
The Act also restricts fathers from contributing in other ways to their child/ren’s welfare. Lack of money will restrict them from visiting their child/ren or from providing for extras such as clothing and leisure pursuits. Fathers on income support/JSA who do not have a second family are also liable to pay for their children. There is a minimum requirement to pay £5.00 per week from their benefit (Bradshaw,’99). This could mean the difference between a father being able to have contact with their child or not. It costs money in most circumstances for contact arrangements to take place whether it is bus fares or a treat for the child/ren concerned. Some children live quite a distance from their fathers but the CSA do not allow disregards for travelling expenses (Minutes of Evidence, ’99). And what of the emotional expense of the child? Surely having contact with the father is worth much more to the child than the £5 saving to the Treasury and to the Treasury it will go if both parents are in receipt of benefit. It is clear that in certain circumstances the Act severely restricts contact arrangements and consequently will have a negative impact on the child.
The negative impact on the child may be further increased by the hidden agenda of getting lone mothers back into work. The carer’s allowance and the lack of a disregard of maintenance for lone parents on Income Support were to operate as a work incentive. The theory was that the carer’s allowance would be extra income if the lone parent began working. There was no disregard on income support so as not to encourage lone parents to stay on benefit. However, lone parents are unlike other parents, as they are not required to seek work until their youngest child is 16/18 before their benefits are affected. A recent research paper (Marsh, 2001) has shown that one of the most common reasons that lone parents do not work is because they wish to take a full time role of caring for their child/ren. The Child Support Act has served to make women to feel guilty for staying home with their children, which will inadvertently affect the child/ren (Clarke, 1996). It may have been more useful if the Government had ploughed more resources into adequate affordable child care and ensured that lone parents got their maintenance payments in full as and when they were due so that this source of income could be a reliable one. Therefore it is clear that the Act is very much against the principle of the best interests of the child because it is not putting children first.
The fact that the legislation has failed to put children first should not really come as a surprise. Legislation generally has many aims and objectives as well as hidden agendas (Daniel,’98). When the Child Support Bill was doing its rounds in parliament there was considerable concern from the voluntary sector that it was not taking the welfare of the child into consideration. An amendment was put in at the last minute stating that when officers dealing with a case had to use discretion then they should keep the welfare of the child in mind (Garnham, ’94). However little discretionary powers were given to Child Support Officers. There is little legislation aimed at children in the UK. Legislation normally aims to provide children with support only if the family is failing them. There are children’s Acts but they generally only relate to the child as a victim, a threat or as an investment (Daniel,’98). I.e. through the legal provisions if they become a threat to others or themselves, when a victim of child abuse or neglect within the family or through education and health policies so that they later have the ability to make a contribution to society. The child is generally invisible within the family unit as far as policy is concerned, just as the child appears to be invisible within the Child Support Acts.
The essay asked why the Child Support Act 1991 was introduced and whether it was a child support act or a means of Treasury support. It is clear that the child support Act was brought about to decrease lone parent dependency on the State in order to reduce public spending by enforcing parental responsibility. The Act was introduced to sweep away the old dual system of child support and put right the areas in which this system had failed. This essay has shown that it was unsuccessful in achieving this and has reverted back into a dual operation for collecting child support. The Child Support Act is evidently not in the best interests of the children it effects most and therefore cannot be viewed as a child support act. The system is failing to get regular maintenance to children. It is also negatively impacting on many children by inhibiting fathers from having contact with their children, by reducing income to second families and by deliberately defrauding mothers on Income Support of maintenance disregard in order that they will be forced into work. The Act on the whole has been most successful in supporting the Treasury.
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It is recognised that women also have an obligation to pay child maintenance in cases where the father has custody of the child. The words father and mother are used in the context that lone parent fathers represent 5/100 of all lone parents (NACSA)
There are several measurements of poverty. For the purpose of this essay it is suffice to assume that individuals on or below benefit level are ‘in poverty’.