Assess the significance of the Treaty of Versailles in the reasons for the eventual collapse of Democracy in Germany between 1
Assess the significance of the Treaty of Versailles in the reasons for the eventual collapse of Democracy in Germany between 1918-1934.
Despite that 'the idea of democracy had finally succeeded in shaping the constitution and institutions of Germany, the Treaty and other significant factors were evident in the inevitable collapse of Democracy in Germany. The real position of the Weimar Republic was determined by the unequivocal military defeat of the German empire and its severe restriction of power in the Versailles peace treaty.'1 Emphasis upon the ideological establishment of pluralistic democracy within Weimar Republic, 'was resisted and continually undermined both by powerful and influential forces in the central government administration and by local business interests.'2 Bessel suggests 'the collapse of Weimar democracy was due to a peculiar combination of long-term and short-term pressures. These pressures, many of which are found in other industrial societies, came together with particular force in Weimar Germany.'3
Despite the significant influence of the Treaty and its reparations evoking a sense of hatred and anger amongst the German populace, there were numerous factors contributing to the eventual collapse of Democracy. 'Economic constraints in particular, both domestic and international, greatly limited the possibilities for positive political actions.'4 Democracy was weakened severely after the onset of the economic depressions in 1922-23 and 1929-1930. Accordingly, 'the collapse of Weimar can be seen in large measures as the consequences of a failure of German political elites to accept, effectively adapt to, and successfully to legitimate the democratic political system - failure which took different forms in the different 'eras' of the Republic.'5 Thus, 'the anti-Weimar alliance of Nazis with Nationalists and the rise of Communism reduced the possibilities of parliamentary government even more.'6
The Treaty of Versailles or popularly perceived Diktat emerging May 7 1919, indeed 'was not the Wilsonian peace envisaged by many Germans.'7 However, 'in terms of the actual political and economic constraints imposed by Versailles, it is no longer tenable to maintain that the treaty was excessively burdensome.'8 It is therefore teleo-logical to conceive the treaty as a dominating factor. Weimar's economic problems certainly cannot be blamed on the imposition of reparations alone. Versailles should not be interpreted as a significant constraint on Weimar's successful political development. Yet, it still fuelled popular discontent within the German populace, for ...
This is a preview of the whole essay
The Treaty of Versailles or popularly perceived Diktat emerging May 7 1919, indeed 'was not the Wilsonian peace envisaged by many Germans.'7 However, 'in terms of the actual political and economic constraints imposed by Versailles, it is no longer tenable to maintain that the treaty was excessively burdensome.'8 It is therefore teleo-logical to conceive the treaty as a dominating factor. Weimar's economic problems certainly cannot be blamed on the imposition of reparations alone. Versailles should not be interpreted as a significant constraint on Weimar's successful political development. Yet, it still fuelled popular discontent within the German populace, for Layton suggests 'it was genuinely perceived as the real cause of the country's problems...(and) developed into a vital propaganda theme with which the anti-republican movement was able to attack the Weimar system.'9 Democrat Hugo Preuss comments 'the criminal madness of the Versailles Diktat was a shameless blow in the face to such hopes based on international law and political common sense. The Weimar constitution was born with this curse upon it...its implementation and evolution were inevitable fatefully restricted and lamed thereby.'10
The consuming effects of economic instability were most significant in the inevitable collapse of democracy. After the First World War, 'and indeed for the whole of the Weimar period, a strong government that had the entire population behind it was precisely what was absent from German politics.'11 Accordingly, Bessel argues that the republic endured 'a lack of capital for investment, a large trade deficit and the difficulties of readjusting a war economy to the requirements of peace were certainly not helped by demands for reparations from the Allies and the loss of important industrial regions by the Treaty of Versailles.'12 Germany was further entrapped by 'the economic crises unleashed by world recession, which had particularly harsh reverberations in Germany...the Wall Street (October 1929) crash had peculiarly serious implications, given the dependence of the German economy on short-term loans from abroad which were rapidly withdrawn.'13 Some of the staggering results included the rise of unemployment to over 6 million, by the beginning of 1933. 'No compromise could be reached between alternative schemes, with unions, employers, and members of the different parties all having very different positions on the matter, characterised by varying degrees of intransigence.'14 The presence of extensive hyperinflation was also prominent in stirring the disillusioned middle class. Thus, fiscal and monetary problems caused the first presidential cabinet to be appointed to rule without serious regard to democracy in March 1930, amounting to the collapse of the inherently unstable and ill-fated Weimar Republic. Salmon indeed comments that 'Germany had undergone traumatic economic crises, which had undermined the integrity of the Weimar Republic.'15
The presence of underlying political structural problems were evident and prominent in the eventual collapse of a democratic Germany. These contentions lay 'deeper than the criticisms of the (Weimar) constitutional framework.'16 Despite the success encountered by the republic during the Reichstag elections of January 1919, difficulties were manifested in the very nature of the Weimar political establishment. 'The republic was confronted by political opposition from the extreme left and right, whilst its democratic supporters were faced with the ongoing problem of creating and maintaining government coalitions.'17 The 'final political crisis' of 1932 was instrumental in the demise of the Weimar Republic and the triumph of Nazism. 'The electorate in turning away from the democratic parties, and even from the parties of the constitutional right,'18 undermined democracy, ensuring 'that a majority of the votes (51.9%) and of the seats in the Reichstag had been won by anti-democratic parties.'19 The failure and lack of political support of the political elites was at the fore in the political collapse of the democracy. 'During the terminal phase of Weimar democracy, Germany's political elites could destroy, but they could not build. Their failure to adapt successfully to democratic politics or to defend Weimar democracy was in large measure a failure to accept responsibility.'20 Indeed, the problematic nature of Weimar Germany's political framework could be responsible for such misadventures. For, as Bessel states 'the dilemma of Germany's first experiment in democracy was that it took place in a country too advanced for either a continuation of the old autocratic system or a genuine popular socialist transformation, (and) too divided to allow the smooth working of a liberal democracy.'21
Despite the teleo-logical influence of the Treaty of Versailles evoking a sense of discontent and anger amongst the German populace, there were numerous factors contributing to the eventual collapse of Democracy. 'Economic strains eroded democracy and prepared the path for an authoritarian solution.'22 Accordingly, 'the collapse of Weimar can be seen in large measures as the consequences of a failure of German political elites to accept, effectively adapt to, and successfully to legitimate the democratic political system - failure which took different forms in the different 'eras' of the Republic.'23 Thus, 'the anti-Weimar alliance of Nazis with Nationalists and the rise of Communism reduced the possibilities of parliamentary government even more.'24 Yet, the advocates of an alternative political solution or Nazism, 'intrigued Hitler into power and were opposed to Weimar democracy and favoured a return to authoritarianism, but they neither wanted nor expected the triumph of Nazism.'25
,120
Bracher, K.D., The Nazi Takeover, , from the compendium Book IV, pp. 1319
2 McElligott, A., The Collapse of Weimar, History Today, from the compendium, Book III
3 Bessel, R., Why Did the Weimar Republic Collapse?, from the compendium, Book III. pp. 148
4 ibid, pp. 121
5 ibid, pp. 133
6 Bracher, K.D., The Nazi Takeover, , from the compendium Book IV, pp. 1319
7 Layton, G., From Bismarck to Hitler: Germany 1890-1933, pp. 89
8 ibid, pp. 90
9 ibid
0 ibid, pp. 91
1 Bessel, R., Why Did the Weimar Republic Collapse?, from the compendium, Book III. pp. 124
2 ibid
3 Fulbrooke, M., A Concise History of Germany, pp. 172
4 ibid, pp. 173
5 Salmon, P., Weimar Republic: Could it have survived?, Modern History Review, from the compendium Book III, pp. 10
6 Layton, G., From Bismarck to Hitler: Germany 1890-1933, pp. 98
7 ibid
8 Salmon, P., Weimar Republic: Could it have survived?, (1992) Modern History Review, from the compendium Book III, pp. 9
9 Bessel, R., Why Did the Weimar Republic Collapse?, from the compendium, Book III. pp. 141
20 ibid
21 ibid, pp. 132
22 James, H., Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, from the compendium Book III. pp. 30
23 ibid, pp. 133
24 Bracher, K.D., The Nazi Takeover, , from the compendium Book IV, pp. 1319
25 Salmon, P., Weimar Republic: Could it have survived?, (1992) Modern History Review, from the compendium Book III, pp. 10
