Majority of the prosperity and stability happened for too few who masked the ills and seething contempt of many. Overall the German economy did improve in the period 1924-29, but this recovery was fragile and flawed. It is not enough to suggest that external forces alone wrecked a thriving system - it must be questioned really whether there was ever a thriving system. "The German economy was living on borrowed time as well as on borrowed money." 1
However, research has suggested that far from being in a position to create boom, the Weimar economy was built on an extremely weak and unsound platform. There were a series of flaws and weaknesses in the economy itself that were based domestically as well as internationally. A clear example of this was the black spot in the agricultural industry. Agriculture failed to experience any of the boom and one third of farms were running at a loss. They were dealt a double blow after the slump in demand since the end of the war 1918 and the increased international competitiveness. Their failure to modernise and the inability to locate post-war funds for modernisation is often cited as the root cause of their insecurity. Most central government money that was sidelined for the farmers very often bypassed them altogether. It is significant that agricultural demand began to fall after 1926. This black spot illustrates a weak economy contrary to the belief that it was thriving as first thought.
Germany was dangerously dependent on the short term loans and foreign investment; no one could foresee how the German economy would crumble as soon as the loans were removed. Gustav Stresemann was quoted in 1928 as saying “....Germany is dancing on a volcano. If the short-term credits are called in, a large section of our economy would collapse....”2 This is highlighted in that Germany’s share of world production had declined heavily from 14.3% in 1913 to 11.6% in 1926-29. As it is, wages just about kept pace with the cost of living but as trade unionists put great pressure upon wage rises which has been suggested to have stifled economic expansion. In the same period Germany was still vulnerable to unemployment. In fact, unemployment rose in the 5 year 'boom' period: 1.4m 1926 to 1.9m 1929.
Finally, the Young Plan was seen as digestive politics - a remedy but not the appropriate cure. There was still a reparations bill that needed paying and so this encouraged continued resentment of the allies and the idea of democracy. So long as reparations were being paid Germans still felt labelled by clause 231 of the Versailles treaty which they resented deeply. The Nazis had used this to blame the government and retain the people’s votes. Under the Young Plan it meant that Germany would still be paying reparations for 58 years until 1988. The burden on the Germans was seen as a catastrophic impact on generations to come as they felt they were being treated unfairly and unjust. As the surface of the economy begins to crack, it is quite apparent that there were glitches and problems that would considerably affect the stability and the prospects of survival for the Weimar republic.
The Weimar republic’s political outlook looked very stable and there no signs of instability on the surface. There was great reason for optimism about in 1929. The Weimar government began to look quite popular as growing support for the government began to mount and support for the extremist left and right wing began to diminish. In 1928 the elections saw the left and right wing lose ground, as pro-Weimar political parties gained votes from 52%in 1924 to 73% in May 1928. There were no further attempts to overthrow the government by Putsch or revolution after 1923. The constitution seemed to provide the civil liberties and freedoms that everyone craved all significant to the success of the Weimar republic.
Moreover, the election of Hindenburg as President in 1925 reassured many conservatives that the republic might protect their interests. Thus this meant that previous opposition from the mittlestand would disappear as they would favour Hindenburg’s presidency and he would not be able to abuse his power to consolidate his elitist sympathies. His placement as President showed that the government was finally in complete authority confirming its support from the majority of the Germans.
The extremists still managed to threaten the situation even when they posed no direct threat their presence was enough to agitate the situation. The NSDP had used the time leading up to 1929 to reorganize the party and create new strategies and plans in order to gain more votes. The long-term planning brought about a slow gain in votes; however, by 1932 the party had the most seats in the Reichstag. IN the same elections the Nazis had made considerable gains in the northern rural areas. Any form of stability that the Weimar republic had enjoyed was in fact a deceptive cover up to the support that the extremists enjoyed, who would always pose a likely threat.
Although enjoying a democratic constitution, a closer look at the republic identifies the presence of the underlying problems within. The political situation still remained uncertain and unstable. An example of this was proportional representation. No party had been able to pull off a majority in the Reichstag. The general German public were becoming increasingly disappointed with unstable government and were even calling for an authoritarian leadership. Many Germans were distrustful of party politics. Parties, such as the Liberals and the Moderates, kept changing their polices and their positions. Between 1924 and 1928 there were six governments. The longest survived 21 months. Five out of six governments between 1924 and 1928 were minority governments. The elites still had a great deal to do with the running of the country and the civil service. Hindenburg's election as President was a potential threat to the future of the Weimar Republic. He provided a focus for right-wing ambitions and he did not approve of the republic or democracy.
Stresemann was able to pave the way for the long-term consolidation of the Weimar Republic through his foreign policy. H began to mediate with the allies in order to stabilise a dire situation between the Germany and its enemies. Stresemann’s policies were built upon the concept of Erfullungspolitik. He began negotiations with France and other countries and was able to persuade the French and Belgium troops to pull out of the Ruhr under the Locarno Pact. He was also able to reduce the reparations Germany had to pay, which the German people felt were harsh and immoral way to treat Germany for a war that they did not lose. He then managed to reconcile Germany’s entrance into the League of Nations.
Stresemann needed to begin by reducing public antipathy to the present noose of the Treaty of Versailles, but also seek a way to reduce those same demands handed down. The effect would be to reduce tension within the nation and reduce the possibility of national destruction and overthrow by extremist groups. Reassessment of reparations had a major effect upon public morale, national self-image and provides extra stabilisation to the economy. Stresemann was an effective opponent of the Treaty of Versailles and proved how unworkable and destructive it is. This created a spirit of sympathy from international observations and foreign ministers. Stabilising the economy had a positive effect upon businesses, the economy and provided a firm platform for the success of the new currency, the Rentenmark. The Success brought about improved Germany's shattered international reputation. This would provide a starting point for German acceptance into the League of Nations which was done in 1926.
Although Stresemann had achieved numerous political successes, these achievements were overlooked by many Germans. The acceptance of the Dawes plan and the Young plan was seen as adding to the enslavement of future generations to come. The fact that the Weimar had accepted “war guilt treaty” of Versailles, to many Germans it meant that there had been no major revision or much difference brought about. The allied troops were still present in much of the west bank of the Rhine. Stresemann also failed to reinstate the borders that were set prior to WWI and had not made Germany into a military power as he had planned. The foreign relations achieved with Germany’s European counterparts was by far the most stable aspect of the Weimar republic, however like all other aspects, it still possessed its fare share of problems.
In conclusion, “we will never know whether the Weimar Republic could have developed into a stable parliamentary system if it had not been for the impact of the Depression”3. Any successes made in the Weimar republic were minor compared to that of West Germany which illustrates the ability of democracy to prosper in that country. The experiences of the period 1924-29 were unequal and unpredictable. Although life was in many ways better than it had been than under the shadow of hyperinflation (1923) not everyone prospered in the same way. Many, including the farmers and the found the situation so dire and disastrous that it affected their contentment with , Weimar and their voting behaviour. It encouraged normal average Germans to cast their vote for the extremist parties, which had the answers to explain away their problems - invariably the Jews, the Republic, and the ''. Overall the German economy did improve in the period 1924-29, but this recovery was fragile and flawed. It is not enough to suggest that external forces alone wrecked a thriving system - it must be questioned really whether there was ever a thriving system. Stresemann described the situation as ‘Borrowed Prosperity’. I believe that the numerous problems and the instability that WWI had brought about had not been overcome and the underlying problems remained, meaning the prospects for the survival of the Weimar Republic rested on uncertain foundations.
Reference
1 - S. Lee, 1998
2 – Gustav Stresemann, 1928
3 – S. Green 2003 “How Secure was the Weimar Recovery”
