The implementation of these economic changes had corresponding benefits to international relations, the improvement of which evidence the idea that Weimar’s prospects for survival looked good by 1929. Because the nature of the policy of fulfillment that Stresseman followed in making these economic reforms was perceived as conciliatory by the foreign powers, this encouraged in turn a more conciliatory tone to be taken by them in their dealings in Germany. The Locarno pact of 1927, where Germany’s western borders were settled, allowed Franco-German relations to improve and lessened the prospect of another “invasion of the Ruhr” (something that reflected badly on the Weimar government and had a negative impact of Germany’s economy as well.) Germanys joining of the League of Nations can also be seen as a step beneficial to the stability of the Weimar government, as it raised Germanys “bargaining powers” and gave it a voice in foreign relations important to national pride. Thus, the effects of the changes in foreign policy can be seen to contribute to the idea that by 1929, the prospects of survival for the Weimar looked good. Stemming from this, it can be seen why it can be argued that it was only with the advent of the depression that these positive developments in foreign relations were destroyed.
Another argument that supports the idea that the survival prospects of the Weimar Republic is political. In the early years of the republic leading up to 1923 there were no less than seven coups, and the challenges faced by the republic from the right (in Bavaria, where the army swore allegiance to the general and not the republic) as well as from the left (the spartacist uprising). The years after this (1924-29) were comparatively stable, with no major coups to speak of. In addition to this, Democratic Party majority in parliament had increased from 52% in May 1924 to 735 in May 1928. The election of Hindenburg as president in 1925 can also be seen as a positive step towards eventual cohesion of political systems, as the perception of him as a traditionalist was an assurance to conservatives that the Republic would protect their interests. Thus it can be seen why it can be argued that apparent political stability by 1929 contributed to the impression that the prospects of the Weimar Republics survival were good, and that had the depression of 1931 not occurred these political positives would have continued.
However, with every positive comes a negative, and there are many historians with the belief that such arguments are superficial and ignorant of the very real (and evidenced) underlying flaws within the Weimar republic. The claim laid on political stability from 1924 to 28 can be refuted by the fact that the system of proportional representation still proposed problems for German society, an argument demonstrated by the Historian K. Fischer. Fischer states that this system, because it allowed parties with very little support to stand in parliament and required such regular elections 9there were six changes of government from 1924-8), forced the republic to “function through tenuous coalitions of center to moderate right wing parties.” To a people accustomed to autocratic rule, this made for bureaucracy that further tarnished the “democratic constitution that so few of {them} understood or appreciated.” It can be argued that, even without the great depression, the Weimar constitution was too democratic for people ill used to the contentiousness of democracy, and this would lead to its inevitable demise.
The argument that Stressemans policy of fulfillment placed Weimar in a more secure position can also be refuted. The Weimar government was already tainted as SPD (center party) officials had been the main signatories of the Treaty of Versailles (despised by most Germans as unfair and purposefully ruinous). Stresseman’s policy of fulfillment, that was meant to be a means of demonstrating to the allies that the treaty was, in fact unfullfillable, put the Republic further at risk of accusations of advocates of complete revision. Revisionist arguments appealed to the masses, and right wing groups that took advantage of this could easily form a strong platform based upon it . Therefore, the foreign policy improvements of this policy had negative, destabilizing effects towards the republic, and give further cause for the argument that even by 1929, cracks had begun to appear.
Lastly, the economic arguments that support the claim that by 1929 the prospects for the survival of the Weimar government have its negative points also. The unemployment rate in Germany was fluctuating at a very high 12% from 1924-9, showing lack of motivation and reflecting the shortsighted labour laws that placed too much premium on creating a welfare state, further alienating industrial elite. Workers were alienated economically also, with financial minister Bruning’s harsh tax laws continued implementation (a move put into action with the noble goal of improving the economy following the hyperinflation of 1923).Agricultural production was hindered greatly by falling food prices, and the tough times faced by farmers and rural people were ripe for other solutions (which they found, as shown in the jump in the communist KPDs’ rural membership by 10% in 1928). It can be seen that by 1929, all was definitely not positive economically and that this would not mean well for the prospects of Weimar’s’ survival, even with out The Great depression of 1931.
In conclusion, it can be seen that while there were some positive economic, political and foreign policy developments from 1924 to 1929, these were merely on the surface and covered innumerable flaws in the Weimar system. The lack of understanding of democracy in German society, the negative perceptions and revisionist ideals leftover from the Versailles Treaty and the structurally induced economic weaknesses were all evident throughout the time period, and would have caused the republic eventual downfall. The great depression of 1931, while it sped up this process, was merely a catalyst.