Protestants, however, seemingly from the day they became the majority, have looked at Catholics with a wary, cautious and even paranoid eye, a view that comes from the belief that all Catholic motives are insidious and are propelled by the desire to overthrow the existing government that is linked to Britain. In the period between Ireland’s independence in 1921 and the beginning of the Troubles in the 1960s, the Free Irish State and the Catholic Church only helped strengthen the paranoid perceptions throughout the Protestant community. For example, the Irish constitution created in 1937 stated that it rejected partition, would keep an enshrined position for the Catholic Church and that it would fully withdraw from the British Commonwealth. All these were already suspected fears held by many Protestants; the fact that they were stated in writing only solidified them. Catholics, meanwhile, have looked at Protestants as being oppressive and unjust in daily life. Most Catholics believe it is ultimately unjust that such a small minority would keep them from joining the rest of an already Catholic island. The gerrymandering of the Ulster government only helped foster the beliefs that Unionists wanted nothing more than to keep a significant number of Protestants in power so as to keep Catholics poor, uneducated and out of work. After a period of political and social stagnancy and stalemate in the 1950s, social disorder was ready to boil over. By the 1960s, the seeds of violence had already been placed.
In the 1960s, Terence O’Neill, the fourth Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, began to see that reform would be necessary to appease the Catholic minority. His policies indicated, however, he saw them as little more than a problem group that might be distracted with policies that only dealt with minor problems. The Catholic community, however, was not appeased and by 1967 had begun to voice their need for the realization of six different demands: one-man, one vote elections, cessation of gerrymandering, equitable housing, abolition of the Special Powers Act, disbandment of the special police known as the ‘B’ specials, and a way of voicing complaints directly to their local governments (Tonge 37-38). In an idea that had diffused from the United States civil rights marches, they took to the streets in peaceful protest to attain these demands. Ironically, it was one of these non-violent marches that spurred on the first cases of violence. In a 1968 march, Loyalists attacked Republican marchers with clubs, rocks and any kind of object they could find. A response by Catholic youths on police ended in 8 dead Catholics and 2 dead Protestants (Bew, Gillespie 4-5). Whispers of a reunited Ireland began arising again within Catholic circles. As a response, in 1969 the Downing Street Declaration was drafted, stating that Northern Ireland would remain a matter of the United Kingdom, that the border was not an issue and that Northern Ireland would remain part of the U.K. so long as the people of Ulster desired it to be so. Thus, because it had been established that Britain was to deal with the problems, British forces were sent in to quell the conflict; however, their presence only added fuel to the fire. As a result, by 1970, what had been a broken and fragmented IRA had now reestablished themselves as a viable threat. Many disgruntled youths banded together to form a militaristic and socialist branch of the “Official IRA”, which would come to be known as the “Provisional IRA” (Tonge 43).
In 1972, one of the most infamous days of violence occurred, becoming known as Bloody Sunday. British troops, who were originally seen by nationalists as a welcome sight, wore out their welcome completely on this day. During a public protest, a shot rang out amongst the crowd and public panic followed. By the time all was said and done, the Army had shot dead 13 men. These events “created a wave of anger that swept throughout the Catholic community… John Hume captured the mood of the time by saying, ‘Many people down there feel now that it’s a united Ireland or nothing’” (Bew, Gillespie 45) As a response, the Official IRA set of 15 bombs in the center of Belfast killing 9 civilians on day that became known as Bloody Friday. In 1972 alone, nearly 2,000 bombs had been planted, 11,000 shootings had taken place and 470 people were left dead (Bew, Gillespie 57). Northern Ireland had become “ungovernable” and the polarization to the extreme militant groups was peaking.
The period between 1972 and 1984 was marked by failed political efforts. The first attempt contained “devolution with power sharing and Irish dimension” (Tonge 113). After only five months of implementation it collapsed. In 1975, devolution with some kind of all-Ireland dimension was discussed but in the end it was determined that the Constitutional Convention was unworkable. The final failure was that of a Northern Ireland elected Assembly, which was boycotted by the Nationalists and ended in 1984. As soon as one side gained an advantage in talks of powersharing, it was automatically scrapped and violence would reappear. Strikes on both sides took place – the Workers’ Strike by the Unionists and the Hunger Strike by the Nationalists. It was not until 1985 that any steps were made towards peace.
When following the history of Northern Ireland, it becomes easy to pinpoint problems that typically will lead to ethnic conflict around the globe. It is for these reasons that violence first erupted and also why peace talks were difficult to begin, conclude, and maintain. It was not until pragmatism finally conquered extremism that any progress was made. So what were the factors that contributed to the 30 years of violence?
The first reason, but perhaps least important one, was the decision to partition Northern Ireland, a decision that was understandable and perhaps inevitable. Regardless of whether Northern Ireland was partitioned or incorporated into the whole of the Ireland, a minority would have existed. It can be argued that partition was the lesser of two evils, for instead of creating a larger minority group in the entirety of the island (Protestants), it instead created a smaller minority in the North (Catholics). Furthermore, Nationalists were less passionate about a united Ireland than Unionists were about remaining a part of Britain. The choice was made so as to partially satisfy the greatest number of people possible. Deciding on a path for Northern Ireland remains difficult even today. Decision-makers in 1921 lacked the benefit of history and lessons learned, making the decision that much more understandable. Other options – the restoration of direct rule, full integration into the U.K., a united Ireland, an independent Northern Ireland, joint authority, European authority, and repartition – have all been trumpeted as superior alternatives and yet each has more drawbacks than does the original idea of partition. Any decision that would have been made would have had its own relative problems.
Second, after the island was partitioned, outbidding on the part of political elites was evident. As is widely known, any displays of magnanimity on the part of the Protestants were either virtually non-existent, or were so small in scale and importance that they had no effect on easing of the tensions in the North. However, this superior attitude was encouraged by political elites who knew that taking the middle road as a pragmatist would eventually contribute to a loss in the elections. Credit must be given to the leaders in the 1990s such as John Major, the British Prime Minister, John Hume, a voice of the Catholic minority, and even President Clinton, all who were men that took chances so that peace would be realized. Until then, however, pragmatism was rarely found and anyone who seemed to acquiesce to the enemy’s desires was criticized or ignored. This is the primary reason for the failure of nearly every agreement until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which still sits on unstable ground.
Third, political corruption, state repression and gerrymandering often took place. This was a primary complaint of the activists’ marches. Because voting was based on income level and whether one had a job, many Catholics were unable to vote and felt this was an unfair practice on the part of the state. Furthermore, the government drew voting lines wherever they pleased so that a majority in each section would be guaranteed. This left power-hungry parties in office and threw accountability out the window. Thus, leaders had no reason to acquiesce to the demands and needs of the minority until protests and violence forced them to change policy.
Fourth, there was a feeling within both Protestant and Catholic communities that they themselves were the ones being exploited. It is easy to see the Catholic’s case in this. For years they were subjected to lower standards of living, housing, and education. The government began to change policies to help create more equality in these areas. But Catholics continued to march and continue their complaints, and so Protestants believe that nothing, except a united Ireland, will ever be enough for the Catholics. They saw the Civil Rights march as simply a front; behind it all was always the motivation to overthrow Unionist power. They in turn believed that they were unfairly labeled as the victimizers, thus becoming victims in their own minds.
Fifth, there was competition over resources, most notably, over housing and jobs. It all came to a head when the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) gave much publicity to an event where a single protestant woman was given preference to housing over a Catholic family. Here again, the Catholics felt this just went to prove that the legal system was unjust – which it in fact did prove. Also, for many years there existed no ‘fair practice’ laws, so discrimination in hiring was commonplace. Because Protestants owned the majority of businesses, this left poorer Catholics with little hope for their future and with very few life options. Joining the IRA and becoming a part of a group, even a violent one, became a far better option than floundering in poverty.
Sixth, as power shifted and population gaps began to close, uneasiness on the part of the Unionists and excitement on the part of Nationalists began to be apparent. This became dangerous for both sides because the more Unionists felt threatened, the less they were willing to sacrifice for peace and the more willing they were to resort to violence to keep the status quo. The closer the Nationalists got to obtaining more power, the more they were encouraged to use violence to push them over the edge into power. Although he would later change his stance, Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Fein since the early 1980s stated after a temporary peace agreement was made, “Does anyone really expect the IRA to cease its activities so that British civil servants can discuss with Sinn Fein the surrender of IRA weapons after we have been ‘decontaminated’?” (Bew, Gillespie 288) No side ever truly trusted the seemingly benevolent actions of the other. After the 1994 IRA ceasefire, only 30 percent believed it would last (Bew, Gillespie 295). After the UVF, UFF and CLMC groups (all Loyalist paramilitary groups) declared their cease fire, only a few months later, IRA claimed that it may begin the violence again if its desired outcome is not met in the peace process (Bew, Gillespie 299). All in all, it led to what is so prevalent in the buildup to ethnic violence: a security dilemma. The mistrust on each side led to the deepening resentment and widening polarization.
The reason this polarization eventually turned into a violent cycle of assassinations and bombings was because of the irresponsibility and weakness of the British state in the section of Northern Ireland. This explains the final and most important reason for the sustained conflict. Although it sounds strange to call the United Kingdom a weak state, confusion within the government, disagreement along party lines, unaccountability on the part of the military and the inability to manage militaristic extremist groups are characteristic of a weak state, and all these were also characteristic of the Troubles. The first problem, confusion within the government, all stemmed from Britain’s incapacity to decide on a course of action for Northern Ireland. The mood within Britain’s cabinet varied from backing the Unionists, to neutrality, to indifference. At first, when they felt an obligation to back those loyal to the crown, this only helped deepen the existing inequalities and encouraged the abuse of power by the Protestants. This made it difficult to gain the Catholics trust in later years when Britain tried to act as a negotiator. When sympathy for the Nationalist cause became the course of action, they lost the trust of the Unionists who felt completely betrayed because the years of loyalty shown went unrewarded. In the end, it was a neutral stance that ended up helping the peace process because instead of Britain and Ireland acting as enemies, it became Northern Ireland and Ireland who had to work out differences with a capable and neutral Britain acting as a fair negotiator. However, because it took 30 years of floundering about to come to this position, the extremists sides were never brought to the bargaining table with any kind of agreement that would satisfy either side, thus the fighting continued. The second state problem that contributed to the prolonged fighting was the disagreements along party lines and is what still threatens the unstable peace that exists today. The only party in Northern Ireland that remains in the political center is the Alliance Party, a party which has paltry support (Tonge 62). On the Unionist side there exist two main parties: the more dominant Ulster Unionist Party and the more secondary Democratic Unionist Party. Both groups are relatively hard nosed about change, however, the Democratic Unionist Party is especially so. Its respective leaders David Trimble and Ian Paisley have differed on how to integrate Nationalists into the government decisions and so it has been difficult to work out deals when agreements within Unionists cannot be met. This does not even include the different inputs and ideas that stem from the newer (and more dangerous) Progressive Unionist Party or UK Unionist Party. This infighting was the primary reason for the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974 (Bew, Gillespie 82). Inability to settle internal disputes is not limited to the Unionists, for the Nationalists have had problems of their own. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), formed after the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, remains the most sensible of the groups. While not abandoning the desires of its constituents, it “accepts that Unionists cannot be coerced into a united Ireland” (Tonge 70). The problem still remains however, that they are not vocal nor hardnosed enough to keep from being overtaken in popularity by Sinn Fein. However, Sinn Fein, the most hard-line and the most vocal of all the Nationalist groups, compounded its own problems by associating itself for years with the IRA, who had become known worldwide as a terrorist group. The disagreements within the parties and the stalemate that resulted produced years of inactivity and unwillingness to compromise. The third state problem which contributed to the continuation of the Troubles was Britain’s inability to hold military members accountable, their confusion about the power hierarchy amongst the many “peace keeping” forces such as the military, the police, and the ‘B’ Specials, and their overall inability to control the actions of the IRA, UVF, UDR, and UFF. The military, police, and ‘B’ specials were all forces that were supposed to be neutral; however, after the early years of violence it became clear that only Britain saw them as neutral. Bloody Sunday in 1972 certainly did not help the cause of the military in the minds of Catholics after they shot dead 13 men at a peaceful protest. Catholics did not help their own cause in the minds of the military either, as British soldiers were frequently the target of attack by young Catholic men and the IRA. ‘B’ specials were volunteers that were part of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It was intended to be a peace keeping force comprised of both Protestants and Catholics, but over years it became increasingly homogenously Protestant, thus losing peacekeeping legitimacy in the minds of the Catholic community. This fact leads to an extremely important and sad conclusion, and the primary reason for the existence of violence for so many years. As these peacekeeping forces revealed the weakness of Britain’s mediating abilities, Catholic groups felt the need to arm, resulting in the IRA. As the IRA grew, Protestants became more uncomfortable and so militaristic groups such as UVF, UDR, and UFF emerged. The IRA and UVF especially became the new voice for the communities, even if the communities did not wish for these groups to represent them. Most citizens simply wanted peace; however, more attention was given to groups willing to address their demands through violence and thus the mistrust on both sides grew. As one attack prompted another and as each side rejected agreement after agreement, long-lasting peace seemed hopeless. Yet, beginning in 1993 with the Downing Street Agreement and concluding in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement, peace talks were successful so that now, unstable as it remains, peace can be found in Northern Ireland. How was this possible? How were the odds overcome?
Peace was achieved for a number of reasons – citizen weariness of the conflict, drop in popularity of paramilitary groups, a robust economy, greater equality between Catholics and Protestants and international pressures are all among them. But the most important reason by far was also the most simple. Even during the resumption of violence in 1996 by the IRA and subsequent responses by the UVF, a sincere commitment to peace could be found within the parties representing each side of the argument. This seems to be the most important difference between the 1990s and the preceding 20 years (Tonge 180). Departure from the desire for a zero-sum gain, willingness to compromise and the agreement to include the ever-controversial Sinn Fein in the peace process also helped quell the uprisings of the IRA. Furthermore, sacrifices on both sides were made so that although neither side came out a true victor, neither side came out a loser either. Most Nationalists, although disappointed that Ireland no longer was committed to a united island, were satisfied with the gains they made. Sinn Fein and other Nationalist groups no longer sought to destroy Northern Ireland, but would now have a hand in building it up. This was absolutely essential. Most Unionists, although they felt it was unfair that an entity completely separate from their own would have a say in their politics, they still ended up remaining a part of the United Kingdom. But any way one dissects it, the most important ingredient existed: a desire for peace outweighed any previously held goals.
The peace in Northern Ireland is tentative, that is certain. A return to direct rule in 2001 is a testament to that. Yet the overall attitude of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Ireland continues to be optimistic. Even though the Good Friday Agreement remains vulnerable, it seems unlikely that there will be a return to previous levels of conflict (Tonge 211). Extremist positions are slowly fading away, as is the violence that accompanies them. As Northern Ireland enters a period of peace and prosperity, it seems the dreams of those who envisioned Catholics and Protestants living amicably together are no longer simply idealistic, but realistic as well.