José de San Martín at first participated as a low-ranking military officer but soon rose rankings, and participated at several important battles against the Spanish. He at first focused his efforts on liberating Lima by taking Santiago and Valparaiso. When Carlos Maria de Alvear, a former friend of San Martín’s, wanted to replace him with another officer as the governor of the province of Cuyo, the public revolted and saved Martín’s job and cost Alvear his. Martín slowly imposed taxes and raised an army and the supplies necessary to sustain it. He also gained financing from another person who believed Lima (in Peru) could be attacked through the Andes. Once an army was gathered, Martín used sneaky tactics to fool his enemies. For example, he told the Tehuelche Indians he would be moving through the pass at Planchon, but that they were to tell the Spanish that Martín would be moving through Aconcagua. Martín also had fake notes indicating Planchon as their pass. Instead of moving through Planchon, however, he moved through a third route. Martín’s army was ready to travel through the Andes by late 1816, and he had deceived his enemies with much misinformation so that their patrols were constantly moving. San Martín took about 4,000 men with him and crossed the mountains at high altitudes which tended to kill many men, similar to the journey Bolívar would do 2 years later. Eventually, Martín met and defeated the Spanish forces at the Battle of Chacabuco, taking many less losses than his opponent. However, Martín did not pursue the royalists. In May 1817, when Viceroy Joaquin de Pezuela attempted to send 3,300 troops in a plan to catch Martín off guard. However Martín’s spies had told him of Pezuela’s plan, and after some careful military maneuvering, 4,000 royalists were against 7,000 of Martín’s patriots. During the night of that battle, when the royalists were surrounded, a second-in-command royalist officer decided to hold a charge (to escape) before the patriots had firmly fixed their defenses, and this proved successful. Although rumors surfaced that both leaders had been shot, they actually returned to Santiago to reorganize, and figured that not more than 120 would have been lost but that desertion had slimmed their army to about 5,000 men. On April 3, 1818, the Spanish army met with the patriot army in battle and was defeated in the victory of Maipu, which would eventually establish a strong advantage for patriots against the royalists in the independence from Spain in South America. After the battle, he used the help of English officers, like Thomas, Lord Cochran, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, to secure the seas. However, he had to now curb the political fighting in Santiago as well as Buenos Aires. The leaders of Buenos Aires lost interest in Lima and needed Martín to keep them together. However, he could not and Martín relied on support from Mendoza, between Buenos Aires and Santiago. In 1820, Cochrane and Martín sailed and had the opportunity to take Lima; however, he simply blocked off supplies to Lima. Not until July 12, 1821, did Martín finally enter the city after the residents, once and for all, declared independence. After this, Martín and Cochrane (once they controlled Peru) could have attacked the 3,200 Spanish troops at the shore; but instead did not, despite the urging of Cochrane. Eventually, the Spanish troops surrendered, but Martín did not press his advantage. After Martín met with Bolívar, he decided to abdicate from the protector of Peru position and live in relative isolation.
Simon Bolívar and José de San Martín also differed in character and thought. From what we may infer, Bolívar seemed to make hasty decisions more often, as he was repeatedly kicked out of Venezuela. He also seemed more intent on obtaining power rather than freeing people from oppression, as his Grand Columbia ideas imply. Martín was essentially the reciprocal of Bolívar, always making careful decisions and being very well-informed, as his spies were normally detecting important information and he was providing misgivings of information to his enemy. Martín seemed intent on solely freeing people from oppression, as he states, when refusing to take Lima until its inhabitants themselves proclaim independence, “I do not want military renown. I have no ambition to be the conqueror of Peru. I want solely to liberate the country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to me if the inhabitants were hostile in political sentiment?...The country has now become sensible of its true interests and it is right the inhabitants should have the means of expressing what they think. Public opinion is an engine newly introduced into this country; the Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of directing it, have prohibited its use; but they shall now experience its strength and importance” (Adams, 69). Also according to Adams, Bolívar seemed intent at looking in the mirror while Martín looked at reality and seemed more humble (36). Furthermore, an example of Bolívar’s character can be seen in reactions to people he knew over time: he stated to Francisco de Paula Santander, who aided Bolívar as a forward contingent leader in one of Bolívar’s first victories (in 1819), that a dictatorship was desired, in letters. Santander and other military officers as well opposed Bolívar as he grew more towards these policies. Unlike Bolívar, Martín, however, was spared from all of this as he preferred to live in isolation.
Bolívar and Martín both had similar goals, but very different methods of achieving them and very different mindsets. Their mindsets apparently affected their overall success and the amount that they changed history. The sometimes erratic Bolívar eventually gets his goals accomplished, while the step-by-step thinking of Martín proves slow but effective.
Bibliography
Adams, R. Jerome. Latin American Heroes. Ballantine Books: USA, 1991.