The turbulence of rapid change in agricultural method unsettled the peasantry; prompting them to destroy over ½ the livestock population and burn harvested and planted grain. This contributed to famine that plagued Russia throughout the early 1930’s, killing at least 10 million. However, the execution of those guilty of destroying food supply would not bring the lost product back. By 1932, food consumption had fallen drastically below 1928 levels- e.g., 214kg of bread was consumed per person in 1932 whereas it had been 250kg in 1928. These figures are averages for the whole country, in reality, suffering was intensified in the countryside as the main purpose of grain requisition was to feed the industrial towns. Collectivisation had been achieved at the cost of many millions of lives and the devastation of the agricultural system
In an attempt to retain Stalin’s image as a ‘great planner’ the communists denied the existence of the famine to outside nations. Leading to the ‘sacrifice’ of many to save the reputation of Communism, but primarily Stalin. This, added to the isolationist attitude of ‘socialism in one country’ meant that aid from capitalist nations could not be applied for. Isaac Deutscher referred to this period as ‘ the first man made famine in history’. It is certainly clear that the Russian population paid a high price for the new agricultural policy – it is almost as difficult to justify the ‘success’ of 98% of farms being part of a collectivisation in 1941 on an economic basis as it is a humanitarian one. There was never a large enough surplus to generate the forecasted capital, however, trade continued with the deficit coming from grain needed to feed the population, exacerbating the effects of the largely avoidable famine. It did however, allow the mechanisation of agriculture to occur as previously, privately owned farms had been to small to necessitate or afford modern equipment such as tractors. Machine Tractor Stations were set up and by 1939; the famine was easing although productivity levels were just meeting those of 1913.
Stalin wished to promote a ‘great leap forwards’ by enlarging heavy industry i.e. iron steel and coal. Heightened iron and steel production would help to fortify Russia and then spark off growth in other sectors. Gosplan (state planning commission) set a series of input/output quota targets, known as 5-Year Plans in an attempt to increase production in heavy industry 3 fold and double it in all other sectors. They also hoped to extend the transport infrastructure with canals, roads and railways. The first was launched in 1928, aiming to improve education and healthcare in addition to the industrial expansion. Initial success lead to unobtainable targets being set, for completion over 4 years. The subsequent failure to meet these (60% in iron and steel should not tarnish the fantastic improvement of expansion in general and the gross industrial product - in 1928 – 1934, it grew from 18.3 million roubles to 43.4 million, in addition to production being up by an average of 118%.
Despite these successes, Stalin was extremely unhappy that his aims had not been carried out. Failure was blamed on ‘saboteurs’ and the secret police (NKVD) were enlisted to track them down. The ‘wrecking scare’ of 1928 involved the expert engineers of the Shakhty area of Donbass. Stalin claimed that they had wrecked machinery to slow the improvement of industrially output. This was an attempt to deflect from the failure of the regime. This even marked the onset of the ‘Great Terror’ in which many millions of people lost their lives in the name of Stalin’s reputation and the assertion of autocracy. Stalin ruled by terror, using purges carried out by the secret police forces to destroy opponents and terrorise civilians into obedience.
Those who were arrested were often placed in labour camps, carrying out large tasks in atrocious conditions. Unskilled, untrained people branded ‘wreckers’ were forced to work in Gulags as slave labour. At the time, these were thought of as beneficial as ‘enemies of the people’ were being punished and also they were building what would become assets for Russia. One such project was the ‘Belomor Canal’ - a 270km, long strategic waterway, allowing the Navy access to the Baltic. The 250.000 prisoners worked in poor conditions, often without sufficient food. After its opening in 1933, the workers were sent to alternate projects. It was soon discovered that the canal was to shallow and narrow for use - 60.000 men, women and children had worked tirelessly for crimes they probably didn’t even commit and died in vain.
Whenever Stalin felt that a member of his government or organisation was accumulating too much power, he had it eliminated. The murder of Kirov, a close rival of Stalin’s in 1934, is often seen as the catalyst for the onset of ‘High Stalinism’ and the establishment of Stalin as the absolute authoritarian. Kirov had made speeches renouncing collectivisation, which greatly angered Stalin. After the 17th Party conference in which Kirov received 292 votes to Stalin’s 3 for the position of General Secretary, his fate was sealed. The voting papers were altered to show 3:3 and a short while later, Kirov was assassinated. It could have been expected that Stalin would cease the purges once he had achieved this level of power but instead they intensified and show trials were implemented to prove the guilt of ‘unfaithful’ communist colleagues for example, Kamenev and Zinoviev in 1936.
The Russian people were caught up by the flurry of accusations, arrests and show trails of the Yezhovschina (1936-38 when Yezhov was head of NKVD). They were encouraged through the reward of a share in possessions of any person they reported as an ‘enemy of the people’. A crowd of 200.000 attended the show trial of Piatakov in 1937, heckling for the death penalty. Stalin turned on his armed forces in 1937, fearing a military coup against him. The commander in chief of the Red Army- Marshal Tukhachevsky was shot, along with 7 other influential generals. By 1939, all admirals and ½ of officers were shot or imprisoned. This was a controversial move for Stalin as pre-war tensions were rising. In 1938, Yezhov was executed as a way of transferring his authority to Beria. He had become, like so many other influential figures of the time, literally a victim of his own success and Stalin’s intense paranoia.
The purges were an integral part of Stalinism. By 1937, purging had developed such a momentum that the NKVD had quotas of their own to fulfil, driving them to arrest and interrogate at will. ‘Nobody was guilty therefore no one was safe’. Stalin had his own colleagues and associates killed as well as members of his own family – his sister-in-law was arrested in 1949. Without the ‘mass terror’ they caused, the economic transformation could never have occurred so quickly - although this could never absolve the communist leaders from guilt, nor offer a valid explanation for the suffering they caused.
The 2nd 5-year Plan was to concentrate on consumer goods and better housing for the urban population. The expansion of industry occurring in tandem with the annihilation of the agriculture system led to an influx of people into the towns. The contrast in living standards was so stark that a passport system had to be introduced to prevent all peasants flocking to the newly industrialised areas. It was impossible to provide sufficient accommodation for the new workers flooding onto cities. Many people were living in overcrowded rundown buildings. The agricultural problems also led to shortage of food – rationing was introduced on 1930. The abundance of willing workers and abolishment of trade unions created a high turnover rate, allowing low wages (down 50% 1928-1933) and strict discipline to be imposed. Workers were fined for lateness and bad workmanship, whilst those who were absent for more than 1 day were fired. Colleagues were encouraged to inform upon each other and anybody suspected of obstructing work was sent to a forced labour camp. Workers were also offered incentives to work harder and increase their personal production rates. They were urged to meet standards set by model workers e.g. Stakhanov – the miner who allegedly produced 10X his quota. Although workers responded to this and were able to increase productivity slightly, it was only due to the incredibly low pre-existing levels. They also competed for medals such as the ‘Order of Lenin’. By 1939, Malafayev estimated that although prices for consumer goods had risen by 80%, wages had, on average, doubled. Although on paper, this is true, living standards at this time were lower than they had been in 1928.
From 1934, the aim of the plan changed due to increasing pressure of war from Hitler and the Nazis. Focus returned to armaments and defence expenditure. This became the number 1 priority for the 3rd 5-year plan. Defence spending rose from 4% of the industrial budget to 17% 1933 to 1937, with the 3rd Five –year Plan increasing it to 33%. Once again, despite an almost unbelievable increase in industrial production, the set targets were not met, the exception being steel, in which the aim for 1 7million tons was exceeded by 0.7tons. Although in itself, the 5-year plan had failed, the improvements made had a profound effect on social and economic conditions by 1940. Russia has become the second most powerful industrial country, 12 years previously it had been an industrial non-entity.
This evolution of industry meant that more skilled workers were required – the new education system implemented provided the communists with a skilled workforce but also a new method of indoctrination. The children of factory workers were offered a free primary education, following a curriculum set to promote and glorify Stalinism. By 1937, over 1million Russians were receiving training in ‘technical colleges’ while a further 200.000 continued on into higher education. This gave rise to a new elite in the ‘classless society’. Skilled workers i.e. teachers and scientists were paid far more than ordinary workers enabling them to have a higher standard of living. Although beneficial to those with the qualifications, it incited jealousy within the others. The skilled and educated received ‘privileges’ and Party members were placed at the upper end of the social hierarchy. Stalin was branded a despot, perverting the ideals of the revolution and Leninism, if not the ideology behind classless communism. However, investment in education had allowed most of the population to become literate by 1939.
Stalin’s leadership of Russia during World War 2 was very controversial. With hindsight, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a grave error of judgement. It contravened Stalin’s fear of the western invasion. Once again, the Russian population would pay dearly for Stalin’s inability to understand the consequences of his actions. He had failed to notice the increasing strength of the Nazis. It would have made sense for the KPD (German communist party) to support the Nazis, but in ordering them not to ally with the Nazis, the Kremlin successfully severed any possibility of creating a political barrier against them. By 1934, and the signing of the ‘German-Polish non aggression pact the Soviet realised that its new foreign policy must concentrate on establishing new alliances with the other Western countries. It was a reversion to Lenin’s aversion to international isolation. The collective security of the League of Nation agreement in 1934 was largely superficial, with the main powers Britain and France, unlikely to uphold a war to protect the communist principles. With war becoming increasingly likely, the indifference of Paris and London towards the situation lead Molotov to sign the Nazi-Soviet. This was a formal pledge to keep peace with each other – resulting in the division of Poland after the German invasion of 1939. Russia continued to seize land in the East and 1941 had regained all territories lost in the Great War. Stalin seemed to have achieved this in addition to the nullification of threat from Germany. However, he had fallen for Hitler’s, and his own, propaganda.
In June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, i.e. Nazi invasion of Russia was launched. It is thought that Stalin had known about this for many months and had failed to do anything through fear of admitting he was wrong. Not for the first, or last time, Russian people were sacrificed to prevent Stalin’s embarrassment. Barely weeks after the onset of war on the Eastern front; the Soviet Union was overrun. After 5 months, ½ of the population and 1/3 of the industrial towns were occupied; 60% of iron and steel and 40% of grain. Military conscription and alarming casualty rates meant that women and children had to fill the vacant positions.
The result of this was that all Stalin’s good work since 1929 had been undone. The new industrial sites mines and dams were targeted and destroyed. 98,000 farms and 4.7million homes were ruined, leaving 15million homeless. From 1942, 55% of the budget had been spent on arms, causing industrial production to plummet. Disruption of food production and distribution resulted in a further 5million deaths through starvation being added to the 15million killed by the Germans. The invasion had interrupted the 3rd 5-year Plan, working and living conditions once again fell during the mission to resurrect it in 1943. Post war reconstruction led to a quality of life lower than that of 1928. In fact, the economic policy almost reverted to its 1928 roots – prioritisation of heavy industry, improved only by adjustments to the Central Planing Community. However, even with Soviet inflation of statistics taken into account, the 4th 5-Year plan was wildly successful, with its aim to restore production to 1941 levels reached after 3 years. However, this was only true for the traditional industrial areas, with the agricultural regions remaining impoverished., Output in steel, iron and electricity had more than doubled but although claims were made in both the 4th and 4th 5-Year Plans to improving living conditions and agricultural efficiency, in reality, little was done until Khrushchev’s era. Stalin remained dedicated to showing off his achievements – huge construction projects, too advanced for the current industrial level, draining the economic resources. This was also an aspect in the Cold War – the attempt at triumph of communism over capitalism. By 1949, they had detonated their first atomic weapon and were rapidly gaining speed in the ‘space-race’. Although rationing was ended in 1947, food shortages continued working conditions remained harsh and the lack of accommodation continued to deteriorate. Stalin lived out his last years in isolation. He continued to play major forces (police, army, and Party members) off against each other – this policy was known as ‘divide and rule’. He still made all decisions for the country – and in the Government. The Politburo reshuffle after Zhdanov’s death in 1948 created great insecurity. Stalin suspected that his heir had been murdered and it was quite clear that he intended on continuing the bloodletting up until his death.
Stalin’s task of building up the Russian economy had been colossal one. He inherited a nation that had been devoid of political stability for 10 years, a nation still reliant upon wooden ploughs for the majority of its income. Its economy had collapsed following decades of international warfare and civil warfare. His achievement, in bequeathing one of the worlds super powers; armed with new atomic weapons and flourishing industrial production, is unquestionably great. Stalin’s guidance had lead to the restoration of land lost during the wars and the implementation of an education and a social security system. The means by which he did this however, are unjustifiable. His economic system had allowed not only the survival but also eventual success of the Soviets in World War 2. However, the rapid development of this new system had meant death and suffering for many millions of people.
It could be argued that the vast size and populace of Russia, in addition to the unnaturally short time over which industrial revolution occurred makes the death rates look higher than they should be. For instance, the British revolution took place over a century to reach a reasonable standard – the Russians had done this, twice if war devastation and subsequent resurrection is counted, in 1/5 of the time. Superiority of communism over capitalism was being asserted through advancements in nuclear technology and leading the ‘space race’. The great depression in the USA coincided with the major industrial gains in the USSR of the 1930’s – ascension of communism at a time of capitalist crisis furthered the apparent achievements of Josef Stalin.
Stalin was a very successful ‘ruthless moderniser’ organising a vast, backward country into a well oiled super power. The experience of the Provincial Government showed that, at this time, Russia could not be ruled democratically and required ‘rule with a whip’ – although no country or its people deserved the extent to which Stalin abused this ‘whip’ with his disregard for human life. Although he managed to implement the communist regime, he perverted it, introducing a marked hierarchy. Despite being a Communist state the Russian people were always given lowest priority under Stalin. Lenin had started the revolution ‘for the people’s and Stalin soon became, to utilise his own phrase and quote from Khrushchev’s secret speech, an ‘enemy of the people’.
Russia became ‘over-centralised’ with every decision hanging upon Stalin. Russian industry was based on quantity, not quality which although at the time gave the impression of success for Stalin, left the people an economically weak nation. Stalin made a great achievement in industrialising Russia in such a short time. However, the heinous crimes against humanity in addition to the destruction of Russian agriculture through the failure of collectivisation detracted so greatly from this success, it is hardly recognisable. It is highly unlikely that any form of major economic and political revolution can occur in a country without bloodshed. Total stability of the political system is required but annihilation of any opposition, both in the government itself and from the public is unacceptable and unnecessary. It is estimated that at least 30million died at the hands of Stalin – 25million from purges and repression, and about 7 million through the easily avoidable food crisis caused by collectivisation.
Stalin feared capitalist take-over if the Soviets did not industrialise quickly. The Soviet Union was a fully operational developed country just 20 years after Stalin began his program. However the simple retort to this statement is that if 30million had to die to allow for this, then it occurred too quickly and an alternate strategy should have been used.
