Death of Weimar, Rise of Hitler - Using your own knowledge and the evidence of sources A, C and D how far would you agree that the Weimar democracy died in 1930.

Authors Avatar

Death of Weimar, Rise of Hitler

Using your own knowledge and the evidence of sources A, C and D how far would you agree that the Weimar democracy died in 1930

The first factor which led to the death of the Weimar was the world economic crisis in particular the poor handling of this situation by Bruning, a thesis strongly supported by source A. Germany is undoubtedly more susceptible to the repercussions of the Wall Street Crash than any other country. Almost straight away their investments and loans dried up and much of this repayment was demanded back.

The economic slump hit the MEDC’s harder than the LEDC’s as world trade collapsed, Germany could no longer afford to import goods as demand slumped. In this situation German industry could not afford to pay their way. Unsupported by loans and with diminished export markets prices and wages fell whilst the number of bankruptcies increased drastically. E.g. in the years 1929- 30 unemployment rose above 2 million. Only 12 months after the crash it had rose to 3million. By September 1932 it stood at a staggering 5.1 million. However it was still to peak and in early 1933 it did when 6.1 million Germans were unemployed.

In such situations it is understandable how people lost faith in the Weimar Republic and saw salvation in the solutions offered by political extremism, a political movement known as POLARISATION politics

This only happens when central politics i.e. Weimar are underperforming and the people of the country look for a NEW strong action packed government

It is important that this catastrophe is put into some kind of analytical context. In Germany 1 in 3 workers were unemployed in 1933 and industrial production (1932) had fallen by 42%.- in the comparison with the USA 1 in 4 and 46% so even the strongest nation felt the depression of the slump.

The similarities end there though because the USA’s economic problems were never seen as political whilst the German economic problems were immediately referred to as political problems simply because of the lack of confidence in the system.

The coalition government in Germany collapsed due to several reasons. Firstly were the severe internal divisions due to it being a coalition, this was made worse by the political shift to the right (due to the effective end of the left) and the death of Stresemann.

Bruning’s response to the growing economic crisis was to propose increased taxes and cut government expenditure, this budget was rejected by the Reichstag. In this situation an emergency decree was set via article 48 this was objected once again and deadlock had been reached. In 1930 Bruning called for the dissolving of the Reichstag & to call an election in which he thought he would receive majority support. However the election results proved him wrong. Hitler and the Nazi’s were the real beneficiaries, and suddenly became the second largest party in the Reichstag with 107 seats. This proves that the Weimar was dead by the 1930’s and that only through the abuse of Article 48 did, by name only, Bruning survive as chancellor. A thesis accepted in source 1, “… only survived by repeated dissolutions of the Reichstag” and in source D “since September 1930 every government had been forced almost continuously to the use of presidential emergency decrees, because they lacked a popular mandate.

The way in which Bruning handled this crisis is crucial to the Weimar’s collapse. In his time as chancellor Bruning pursued a deflationary programme in order to balance the budget. This meant cutting government spending and raising taxes with the squeeze resulting in high unemployment. These policies were very unpopular in fact after this decision he was condemned by most economists and historians.

The best tactic was believed to have been based upon “Keynesian Ideas” of deficit financing. It was necessary to pursue an expansionist re-flationary policy in order to counter the effects of depression. Unfortunately as source 1 suggests “the reflationary measures hesitatingly adopted in 1932 did not become effective until Hitler was in power”

Join now!

A very sympathetic historian- Borchardt- claims that Bruning had no real room for manoeuvre in his economic policies and due to that there was no feasible alternative to stringent deflation, Borchardt however is highly contentious.

HOLTFRERICH however argues that Bruning had options he just chose not to use them. This particular historian’s view accepts floors in Weimar’s policies, but denies that it was a sick economy doomed to collapse. Holtfrerich believes Bruning wasn’t against the depression as it would stop reparation payments.

Bruning’s fall from Power was inevitable. 1932 brought the end of Hindenburg’s first 7 year spell in ...

This is a preview of the whole essay