The second and one of the most important ones was radar. The British had developed radar a few years earlier for use in detecting ships. Surprisingly they still had scientists capable of doing something productive, and so the system was adapted and improved for use in detecting aircraft. All sorts of information could immediately be obtained about all aircraft in the sky, German or British: the height, position, speed, and bearing could all be ascertained, and most importantly passed on to the British pilots. It was so vital because it alleviated the need for constant fighter patrols all along the south coast. These would not have been possible due to shortage of equipment and pilots, and even if these had been available, it would have been very difficult to detect planes, especially at night, from the air. Instead, Spitfires and Hurricanes were scrambled as soon as German planes were detected on the radar, and were told exactly where, how high and how fast the enemy was flying. This proved invaluable to the RAF. Although the Germans did have a very simple form of radar, it could only be used for detecting ships, and was therefore almost obsolete.
Even before the Battle of Britain began, the general invasion of Britain appeared to be destined to fail. However, this was without taking into account Britain’s situation at home. All the army’s supplies had been left in Dunkirk, and industry was not producing new supplies fast enough. The British people were already imagining German parachutists marching around the countryside. The Home Guard prepared to defend Britain with pikes, World War I rifles without ammunition, and ditches. It was then that Churchill launched the slogan “You can always take one with you.” The army did not believe that they could defend Britain if the Germans landed, and the Navy did not think they could stop the Germans landing. Fortunately the Royal Air Force was still intact, and prepared to defend the country.
On paper the Luftwaffe were far stronger than the RAF, although these figures were largely misleading. In fighter aircraft the two were reasonably equal, and it was only in bombers that the Germans had a huge advantage. As the British were not going to do any bombing anyway, this did not matter, especially as the German bombers needed fighter escorts. Britain actually increased her number of fighters during the Battle, and it was only the shortage of pilots that was a problem. Another problem for the Germans was that the fighters were operating at the very edge of their range, and could only stay above London for ten minutes. After that the bombers were left unguarded.
Infact, it seems that the only advantage that the Luftwaffe possessed was that their pilots were far more experienced than the British. The Germans had already had experience over France, and earlier in the war over Scandinavia. The British had had no experience at all, and were mostly new, young recruits anyway. They had been enlisted in a hurry and did not always have the necessary training. This problem was compounded during the battle, when the British lost large numbers of pilots. Although the Germans lost more, they had far greater reserves of trained pilots in Germany. Britain had none, and therefore was constantly trying to meet the demand. Britain’s saviour was Poland, who had been conquered by Germany. They had been recruited from the Polish Air Force, and were very experienced. They had fought the Germans before, so knew their techniques, and equipped with modern aircraft, which they had not been in Poland, they were highly effective. Although Polish pilots only constituted 5% of the RAF, they were responsible for 15% of the German losses.
Another advantage for the British was that they actually knew what they were doing. The Luftwaffe never decided whether they should make bombing or destroying British fighters their main targets. Therefore there was never any clear objective, and hence both ideas failed. The British, on the other hand, had one very clear aim: to cripple the German bombers. Any heroic fighter battles were avoided at all costs, with the spitfires only objective being to protect the Hurricanes from the German fighters. This is shown by the fact that although the British lost more fighters than the Germans, the Germans’ bomber losses were, unsurprisingly, enormously greater than ours.
This vague and sometimes non-existent overall strategy proved to have even more serious consequences for the Germans. On 13th August Operation Sea Lion was launched, but bad weather delayed the attack for two days. The Battle of Britain, as it came to be called, had three stages. In the first the Germans just flew over Britain, dropped their bombs anywhere they could, and then retreated to France. There were no serious targets, and no serious British losses. German losses in the air however, were large: on the first day they lost 75 aircraft to Britain’s 34. When the complete impact of this strategy was made known to the chiefs of staff, the plan changed. They began the most incisive part of the Battle. Instead of concentrating on dropping the bombs as fast as possible, there were targets, and these were the advanced British airbases on the south coast. This was a critical time for the British as the airfields were repeatedly bombed. The strain began to show, as British losses increased alarmingly. During late August and early September, in a two-week period the British lost almost 500 planes. However, on the 24th August, perhaps the most important individual moment of the battle occurred, as a lost and homesick German bomber pilot found himself over London. He released all his bombs on the spot, turned around, and ran as fast as possible back to France. Unfortunately for him, these bombs landed on a residential area, killing several people. In retaliation for this disgraceful, un-chivalrous act, the RAF sent some bombers to bomb Berlin. Hitler was enraged, especially as he had promised his people that Berlin would never be bombed. He ordered a change of tactic, so the bombing switched from the airfields to the cities.
On September 7th the largest German raid yet passed over the airfields, and carried on to London. The RAF were saved, and now had time to rebuild. The signal “Cromwell” for “invasion imminent” was said and the church bells rang around the country. Fortunately this was a false alarm, and the Germans suffered large losses at the hands of the RAF. They bombed again on September 9th, although with less affect, as only half of the German bombers reached their targets. On September 15th the Germans launched their final bombing raid. The RAF were prepared, and the Germans were shamed. They lost 60 aircraft, to the British losses of 26. The British morale was further boosted by the optimistic belief that they had destroyed 185. Even so, it was enough. Germany had failed to gain superiority of the air, and was forced, in November 1941, to abandon Operation Sea Lion. Although it was not realised at the time, the bombing of Berlin by the RAF, and then the much more serious bombing of London by the Luftwaffe, began the indiscriminate bombing of citizens and cities that continued throughout the war.
The victory in the Battle of Britain completed what the Dunkirk evacuation had begun: it restored British spirits. It provided a base for the rest of the war, and denied Germany that early chance to gain a decisive victory. The reasons for this British success have been stated above, and obviously one of the most important of these was radar. However, radar on it’s own did not win the war: it was the combination of radar, good equipment, German indecision, and British good luck that eventually secured victory, and it would seem foolish to attribute it to any one factor.
