By August 1921 branches were being established outside Munich and Bavaria, with the objective of enabling the Nazis to extend their chances of widespread support and membership through propaganda and word of mouth. However, many areas outside Munich and Bavaria were simply not accommodating the pressing antisemetic and racialist campaign, having associates that were Jewish themselves. As a result, it proved difficult for the Nazis to exercise sufficient control over such areas.
A negative public opinion of Hitler and his party was not just derived from the aforementioned dislike of his racial ideals. As identified by Ian Kershaw in Source 5, Hitler’s union with Hugenburg in their opposition to the Young Plan and scandalous attack on Muller’s government did not stand him in good stead. The Young Plan was a continuation from The Dawes Plan which had already contributed greatly to German economic recovery and it is understandable therefore, why in his resistance to this, Kershaw suggests Hitler was portrayed as ‘intransigent and irresponsible, not a statesman, an obstacle to political recovery..’.
Furthermore, Kershaw describes Hitler as ‘the head of an extremist movement with menacing socialist tenancies’. As well as a reference to his aforementioned racial beliefs, this viewpoint is representative of the widespread dislike of the appearance and conduct of Hitler’s Sturm-ableitung led by Ernst Rohm, which culminated in Wilhelm Groener banning them in 1932. The SA consisted largely of disgruntled ex-Freikorps members, the unemployed and the criminal classes. They were much feared and a law unto themselves roaming the streets and using violence at any opportunity. It is argued that the SA were responsible for the abysmal election results of May 1928 due to their numerous street brawls with the KPD Red Fighting League.
Such use of force and violence to summon respect and power is comparable to Hitler’s failed attempt to seize control of Germany during the ‘Beer Hall Putsch’. This failure came in sharp contrast to the successful overthrow of the Italian government by Benito Mussolini and the Bolsheviks’ storming of the Winter Palace in Russia. There is no disputing that Hitler drew from the experience by maximising on publicity and prestige during his trials and using his imprisonment to conclude that a policy shift was essential, that is, the legal revolution. But such a reckless act resulting in the death of a number of Nazi demonstrators revealed that the party was not infallible and by no means on the road to assured power. Hitler underestimated the strength of his opposition in this instance and his preparation and organisation for such an event was clearly lacking.
Despite the above noted change of tactics employed by Hitler, the NSDAP were often unable to take full advantage of the weak government they opposed which consisted of ever changing, unworkable coalitions. This was clear from the unstable support they received in elections, with votes rising from 2.6% in May 1928 to 37.3% in July 1932 followed by a decline to 31.1% in November 1932. Hitler also failed to win a majority vote when standing in the 1932 Presidential election against Hindenburg. There seemed no signs of certainty that he would come to power at this time, a mere nine months away from his eventual appointment. Kershaw refers to the ‘adulation of a third of the population for Hitler’ this of course in turn, identifies the two thirds of German people who did not support the future dictator.
When analysing the situation in Germany between 1924 and 1928, referred to as the ‘golden age’, it could almost seem unthinkable that only four years later the country would be under the tyranny rule of Hitler. Germany saw economic recovery and political stability and even an acceptance and tolerance from ex-enemy powers. The most crucial factors behind this recovery lay with Gustav Stresemann and intervention from America.
In 1923 Stresseman’s government helped to stabilise the currency and in 1924 the Americans formed part of a recovery programme which revised the Reparations Bill introducing the Dawes Plan of 1924 and The Young Plan of 1929. In response to this, the elections of December 1924 saw a revival of the less extreme parties committed to democracy. The Stresseman Era saw Germany recuperate its self respect and international status – the country into which Hitler re-emerged from prison had undergone considerable change. The banned Nazi Party was no longer a credible force in German politics and the SA had lost its formidable image. These dramatic changes were reflected by the meagre 12 seats the Nazi Party won in the elections of May 1928.
All was set to change however in October 1929, when Germany was struck by the Great Depression and the death of Stresemann. Although the Nazi’s had carefully used the period of recovery in Germany to re-structure their party and wait for such an opportunity where the country once again fell to its knees and turned in desperation to their extremism, neither the event nor the consequence of the untimely death of Stresseman or the Wall Street Crash could have been contrived by the NSDAP. They merely exploited these circumstances for their own gains. That this sudden turnaround of events was not of their own making strongly advocates the view that Hitler’s rise to power was anything but definite.
When Muller resigned in March 1930, the last genuinely democratic government of the Weimar Republic came to an end. The rapid disintegration within the government including Bruning’s dependency on Hindenburg and reliance upon ruling by decree again saw the German people turning towards extremism on the right and left. However, even after winning 107 seats in the Reichstag election of 1930, Hindenburg refused Hitler’s demand for a position in the cabinet. The forthcoming appointments and dismissals within the Reichstag were almost farcical and saw Hindenburg becoming part of a number of intrigues. He removed Wilhelm Groner who had previously imposed the ban on the SA and forced Bruning to stand down from his position and offered the Chancellorship to von Papen all whilst being influenced by Kurt von Schleicher who had served in the same regiment as Hindenburg during the war and was as such; held in high esteem by the President.
Von Papen removed the ban imposed on the SA and SS and he used the resultant violence which ensued as an excuse to dismiss the socialist government of Prussia on the grounds that it could not keep order. Otto Braun the leader of the SPD challenged this and was promptly removed from government and replaced by a Reich Commisar – a perfect example to Hitler and the Nazis of just how easily a democratic system could be replaced by an autocratic regime. And it was with this prompt that Hitler and his party campaigned like never before resulting in their gain of 37 per cent of the vote in the elections of July 1932. But again the Nazis had nothing like an overall majority, and again Hindenburg who strongly disliked the party offered Hitler only the position of vice-chancellor.
The decline in votes for the NSDAP in the election of November 1932 was indicative of the feeling of disdain amongst German people for Nazi-orchestrated street violence and the decline in morale amongst party members. At this stage it seems that even Hitler himself was doubting the certainty of his coming to power within Germany and this was compounded by his fear that support for Communism was rising. Hindenburg shared in this panic and felt he had no choice but to offer Hitler the position of Chancellor which he refused as the President was denying him the right to rule by presidential decree.
As stated in Source 4, ‘despite Papen’s persuasions, Hindenburg was extremely hesitant, until the end of January, to make Hitler Chancellor.’ Otto Meisner remarks that Papen suggested the appointment of Hitler would in fact restrict his freedoms and enable the President to control him and the NSDAP. This corroborates with the view that Hitler and his party were not popular within government at this time, to appoint someone in the hope to control them is clearly not a sign of their merits but more of a desperate measure taken for the wrong reasons.
However, to suggest that without his appointment, ‘a revolt of the national socialists and civil war were likely’ infers that the wide support for Hitler outside of government was acknowledged and could be used as a force against such an occurrence. This statement is supported by Kershaw’s reference to ‘more than 13.5 million’ who had voted for Hitler and were ‘potential or real devotees of the Fuhrer cult’. Of course the context of Source 4 must be noted in that Meissner’s statement was made to the Nuremburg Tribunal after the Second World War, it is quite possible his loyalties may have still lay with Hindenburg and as such his intentions may have been an attempt to alleviate blame attributed with the President’s appointment of Hitler as Chancellor.
In conclusion, I strongly concur with the view that it was not certain Hitler would come to power until his eventual appointment in January 1933. There were of course many and varied reasons why the German people were not supporting their current government, but it was apparent that they voted for extremism often as much as a result of apathy as desperation and despite Germany suffering enormous social and economical devastation, Hitler and the NSDAP never drew the majority support they required to be voted into government. Hitler’s appointment came as a result of Papen’s persuasions and even he did not support the future dictator but believed the position of Chancellor would restrain Hitler and his party and used it as an opportunity to seek revenge against Schleicher. A success which was ironically born out of the dislike for his political motives and objectives and based on a decision made by those who were largely attempting to protect themselves is difficult to view as one which was foreseeable from the outset.
Bibliography
Years of Weimar & the Third Reich – David Evans & Jane Jenkins
Germany 1919-45 – Martin Collier and Phillip Pedley
