However, after three years of being in power, Hitler refused to agree to restrictions the treaty put on Germany, and he made this clear as he left the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in October 1933, and proclaimed his intention to triple the size of the German army in 1934, denounced the disarmaments clauses of the Versailles treaty altogether in early 1935 and remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936. But he did not increase the army size outright, to get around it he got men who wanted to join the army to join the political parties instead, and so it was not technically an army. At the time, Hitler had only weak protests from France and Britain even though he was in clear breach of the treaties. This pointed out that Hitler still had his expansionist views in mind. But, it was not just Hitler who disagreed with the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, but also the German people and they felt humiliated and resented it. Thus, the people therefore have to be taken into account when considering the reason for the outbreak of war, and not just Hitler.
Before coming into power, one of Hitler’s main goals was to increase employment as there were high unemployment levels and so this goal was achieved. But, in order for Germany to have foreign trade with foreign exchange controls, the Minister of Economics implemented a plan in 1934 to try and balance imports and exports. In order to enable remilitarization, Hitler gave precedence to the imports of raw materials for rearmament over the imports of foodstuffs even though Germany was not importing enough food such as butter. At this time, the country was therefore suffering from a trade deficit as imports were exceeding their exports. Although the minister proposed to slow down rearmament in order to sustain the German economy’s exports, but Hitler disagreed and stated that foreign exchange should not be diverted to purchase of foodstuffs at the expense of rearmament. Hitler was opposed to foreign trade, and so he saw the solution in form of the conquest of the east to fulfil the German economy’s needs by making it self sufficient. This shows the desire for a Lebensraum (addition living space). This Lebensraum to Hitler was a land of German Aryans. Hitler changed the concept of Lebensraum. Rather than adding colonies to make Germany larger, Hitler wanted to enlarge Germany within Europe. The Nazi modified theory of Lebensraum became Germany's foreign policy during the Third Reich.
There are two pieces of evidence that are usually used to highlight that Hitler “planned” a war, one piece that is claimed to show the plans of Hitler is the Hossbach memorandum at the Nuremberg trials. Hitler reaffirmed the need for the conquest of the living space by the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. According to A.P.Adamthwaite “The Hossbach memorandum confirms the continuity of Hitler’s thinking: the primacy of force in world politics, conquest for living space in the east, anti-Bolshevism, hostility to France. Hitler’s warlike intentions were now explicit.” At these trials, Goering also claimed a personal role in the outbreak of war. However, it can be argued that the phrase warlike intentions may be taking it too far, but Hitler may have been just stating that he wanted living space, which he might have thought could have been possible without war. This was his aim even at a time when most of party were not in favour of his plan. But some argue that Hitler knew that these plans were paving the way for war and by importing materials for rearmament, would have a detrimental effect on the German economy at the cost of the German people. Although many Germans before Hitler wanted additional living space, he was not quite sure that it was a priority for them still at a time when the economy was suffering from butter, bread and other foodstuffs shortages.
These views are also conveyed in Hitler’s autobiography Mein Kampf (1924) written while he was in prison. In this book there is evidence that points to the fact that Hitler was indeed aware that in order to achieve a Lebensraum, war was inevitable. This can be supported by the fact that Hitler was rearming Germany and reintroduced conscription, despite the treaty of Versailles. It can therefore be argued that war was in the making and this was all part of the preparation. Nevertheless, Taylor does not see this as likely and says far too much as been read in to Mein Kampf. He suggests that these were merely “day dreams” and can not be regarded as foreign policy objectives because at the time Hitler was not a politician and probably never thought he would actually come into power. He also notes that we should judge his foreign policy after 1933 in the light of circumstances at the time he directed it, and disconnect it from its supposed ideological origins in Mein Kampf. But there is evidence that suggests that although he wrote the book 9 years before coming into power, he still had this foreign policy in mind. Strategies written about in his book and are similar to speeches made to his generals when he became chancellor. The only questions were ‘when and how’.
But what is more important is not whether or not Hitler had these plans in mind, but the importance of what he actually put into action that would ultimately decide whether there would be a war or not. And in 1938 his plans became a reality when he captured Austria. At the time the act was subdued by the French and British as they acknowledged Hitler’s claim that it was an internal German affair. Trying to stop war, the Munich Pact formulated and signed by Germany, Italy, France, and Britain at Munich, on September 29 1938 protected the approval to Germany that Sudetan in Czechoslovakia (a German speaking region) be given up to Germany. This was done on the terms that once it was ceded to Germany, they promised not to go to war. But, Hitler could not be trusted with the promise of peace and he invalidated the pact when in March 1939 the Germans marched into Czechoslovakia and then made most of the country a German settlement. Britain then assured Poland a unilateral security and this was the end to appeasement by France and Britain. However, this was not enough to stop Hitler invading the country on September 1. And it was at this point, on September 3, that war was declared on Germany.
Examining the evidence, it been seen that Hitler probably suspected that at one point there would an occasion that Britain’s and France’s appeasement would not last forever, after breaching previous treaties. Every time Germany invaded a country, it was bring them one step closer to war. He was however willing to take a risk and when the time came, it seems with his rearmament policies he was merely preparing himself for the war. On the other hand, it can be seen by that Germany did not want to go to war, and it can be argued that if they knew they were moving closer and closer to war, then it is doubtful that he would have invaded Poland.
In conclusion, the war would have been easier to overcome, if it were not for appeasement on the account of Britain and France. So they can be blamed partly alongside Germany for the war even if it seems that the war was going to go ahead in order for Hitler to accomplish his goals and moreover the people of Germany’s desires from previous decades. Therefore it is not solely Germany’s fault, but Germany paved the way for it to happen.
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Bibliography
Childs David (1991) Germany in the Twentieth Century London: B.T. Batsford Ltd.
Craig Gordon. A. (1991) Germany 1866-1945 Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Golby John et al (1990) War, Peace and Social Change: Europe 1900-1955, Book III, Between Two Wars London: Open University Press
Martel Gordon (1993) Modern Germany Reconsidered 1870-1945 London: Routledge
Gordon Martel (Modern Germany Reconsidered 1870-1945 pg.178)
Gordon Martel (Modern Germany Reconsidered 1870-1945 pg. 180)
Gordon Martel (Modern Germany Reconsidered 1870-1945 pg. 181)
Gordon Martel (Modern Germany Reconsidered 1870-1945 pg. 183)
A.P.Adamthwaite(The making of the Second World War)
John Golby et al (War, Peace and Social Change Book III, Between Two Wars pg.248)
John Golby et al (War, Peace and Social Change Book III, Between Two Wars pg.248)
John Golby et al (War, Peace and Social Change Book III, Between Two Wars pg.248