Q3.) Sources D and E both describe the events of 1 July 1916. Source D was printed on 3 July 1916 in the Daily Express, and is a very favourable account of the first day. It leaves the reader little choice but to notice the successes of the BEF, and even less choice to hear of the failures and losses. In fact, no mention is made of the 60,000 casualties. This could be due to insufficient information given by Douglas Haig and the BEF command or a responsibility to portray a favourable image of the situation. Source D, although it does not mislead the public, does not give the full picture of the events of 1 July 1916. Source E is taken from ‘The Somme’, written by Leslie Coate, was published in 1983. Coate was undoubtedly able to stand back and assess pragmatically the first day’s fighting. It is unlikely that he would be unnaturally biased one way or the other because he wrote his book some sixty years later. He was also able to include high quality maps of the battlefield, which would have been unavailable to the Daily Express in July 1916. Source E is therefore by far the more reliable of the two accounts. It is succint and places 1 July 1916 in perspective.
Q4.) Sources F, G and H all relate to the effectiveness of the BEF on the first day of the Somme, July 1 1916. Source F is taken from General Ludendorff’s war memoirs. Although, on first inspection, seems to be rather complimentary to the opposing army, it can’t necessarily be taken at face value. By commenting on the ‘tremendous superiority’ of the BEF leading to ‘inevitable defeat’, he absolves himself of responsibility for failure. Although not directly mentioned, it seems very much as if Ludendorff was not satisfied with the resources (both human and material) made available to the German army. He goes a little far in suggesting that the BEF and French troops ‘worked their way further and further into the German lines’. According to balanced British sources, there was no breakthrough, just a bit of a nudge for the loss of 20,000 and the wounding of another 40,000. Ludendorff’s account, therefore, cannot be taken at face value. Source G is an extract from the memoirs of David Lloyd George. Known not to have been Haig’s greatest supporter, Lloyd George’s account is perhaps a little biased. He makes valuable points, in that Haig was planning for a swooping victory led by the cavalry and that there was a short gain for a heavy loss. Source H is a collection of estimated casualty figures for the whole of the Battle. They cannot be taken out of context, as they are relative to the size of the offensive.
The objective of the Somme was to break through the German lines, and this unarguably was not achieved. The offensive was a failure in the sense it did not achieve its objective. The question asked though is whether these three sources prove this. In my estimation, they do not. They support the failure, but do not and cannot prove it as they are either imbalanced or out of context. Ludendorff is not accurate in his estimation of the situation and Lloyd George, although to all intents and purposes not misleading, does not give the whole picture. The sources support, but do not prove the failure of the battle of the Somme.
Q5.) Firstly, it is necessary to define the term ‘butcher’. In this context, a butcher is a military commander prepared to accept heavy casualties relative to low gain. They do not send soldiers out to gain a sado-masochistic high, or because they are insane. A butcher is someone not prepared to let the prospect of heavy losses affect their plans. Secondly, is a ‘serious’ commander one that always succeeds? I would suggest not, as a serious commander is surely one that makes balanced judgements and plans sensibly for the battle. Haig made mistakes in his plans (especially for the Somme offensive), and men died under his command, but he cannot be judged on the basis of one day, or even one battle. He undoubtedly did not fully understand the Western Front, but then no-one can really say that in 1916 they knew any better. Haig’s forte was cavalry, and not artillery. Perhaps this is why his plans were often reliant upon cavalry charges and why he halved the intensity of the artillery attacks preceding July 1 1916.
The first source is useful, but not reliable. Published on July 2 in a British newspaper, it gives the impression of a hammer blow being delivered to the German line. This was far from the truth, and the source bears little relevance to the question. Whatever happened on the first day, it was always going to have an attractive spin placed on it by the press. The second source, from Middlebrook’s ‘The First Day of the Somme’, gives a detailed description of the beginning of the battle. Middlebrook mentions deficiencies in the bombardment preceding the battle that was intended to break the wire. We know in hindsight that it was Haig’s decision to double the depth of the attack and halve the intensity that led to insufficient cutting of the wire. Added to this, shrapnel shells were hardly suited to the task of breaking wire. This source tells us of Haig’s poor planning in relation to the battle of the Somme. The third source is an eyewitness account of the battle. Coppard describes the poorly-cut wire and the strength of the German defences. His account is limited to the section of the battlefield that he saw, but is reliable and useful on the grounds that what he says is certainly true. It is not balanced, and therefore not as useful as Middlebrook’s source.
Source D is taken from the Daily Express on 3 July 1916. It is very positive about the offensive, and does not mention the heavy losses sustained by the BEF. It is not misleading, but does not put the battle’s gains into perspective with the failures. It cannot, therefore be used to effectively assess Haig’s competency as a commander.
Source E is taken from a book published in 1983, written by Leslie Coate. It is succint and states the objectives and failures of the first days. The penultimate sentence (‘However, very little…’) states the truth about the offensive and the last sentence sums it up. There was little to show for the 21,000 soldiers that died that day. However, it mentions only the first day, and therefore cannot be used on its own to judge Haig.
Source F is taken from General Ludendorff’s memoirs. He speaks of a ‘tremendous superiority’. The BEF did have the upper hand on the first day, but were ineffective. They failed to achieve their objective and therefore Source F is useful, but not particularly reliable. Source G is by Lloyd George, PM from December 1916. It is well-documented that Haig and Lloyd George did not get on, but Lloyd George does make a rally of good points in the passage. He describes the situation at Verdun as having slowed down and a practical failure. He states that over 400,000 men died in the battle which is also true. He does not, however make a balanced critique of Haig, and therefore can only be added to our judgement of Haig. Source H is a set of casualty lists which can only be taken in context to the battle.
Source I is a little simplistic, although true. It is strongly biased against Haig. In Source J, Sheffield puts the criticisms of Haig into perspective. None of the previous sources mention the Hundred Days and Sheffield’s point is quite right. Haig was the commander that helped orchestrate the ‘greatest series of victories in British military history’. Source K rounds things off. Not commenting on any specific occasions, it is balanced and makes the valid point that ‘if the criterion of a successful General is to win wars, Haig must be viewed as a success’.
Sheffield’s statement regarding the Hundred Days is completely justified, and this is all too quickly forgotten by critics. Warner’s extract, source K, hits the nail on the head in criticising those who are quite ready to slam Haig for being responsible for the losses of the Somme without suggesting alternatives that he had. The point at which any argument becomes a personal attack, for example commenting on Haig’s Christian virtues, as opposed to a professional judgement is the point at which the said argument begins to lose value. The average volunteer soldier recruited by Kitchener entered the BEF on the grounds that he was fighting for right, on the side of Britain and the Allies. Whether this involved belief in a God is irrelevant. Soldiers willingly died sacrificially to save their fellow soldiers, and this was the strength of the BEF throughout the war.
Haig was a butcher, British blood stained his proverbial apron. However this must not lead to a blind alley whereby he cannot be taken seriously as a commander. The terms ‘butcher’ and ‘serious commander’ do not cancel each other out, and Haig cannot be judged solely on the events of July 1 1916.
