Others, like British historian A.J.P Taylor, claim that the mistake was made due to The League of Nation’s lack of morals. They condemn the British policy towards the Sudentenland question and claim that the Britain abandoned their high moral standings. These high moral standings had earlier been an important part of their policy. They claim that the excuses used by Chamberlain not to help Czechoslovakia, as and ally and a member of the League of Nations, were far from the principle of appeasement. In this way, the British government acted for appeasement, but the actions that followed had diverted far from it.
A third party of historians, like American historian William R. Rock, will argue that the ‘Munich Agreement’ was a result of Britain’s failure to adapt their policy to the new political situation in Europe after Anshluss and to re-evaluate the European political environment continuously. The lack of rearmament and the neglect of the national defense over a long period of time were a burden to Britain’s position. The British government also made no attempt to hide their country’s weak position. Chamberlain made the error of assuming that Hitler acted on the same rational assumption that he did, and that it was also in his best interest to preserve peace and international trade. There was also a growing interest to preserve both countries’ economic growth and political stability. Chamberlain claimed that he acted according to appeasement because he “searched for a settlement without disturbing British position in Europe.” The British government failed to understand the expansive nature of Nazi Germany. In this way, it was not so much what Chamberlain did, but what was not done that made appeasement distorted when concerning the Sudentenland question.
Henry Kissinger’s book Diplomacy and Eric Hobsbawm’s book The Age of Extremes were chosen for further evaluation because they provide conflicting view points. While Kissinger was clearly a diplomat, Hobsbawm is known for his beliefs in Marxist principles.
Part C:
Both the book Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger and the book The Age of Extremes by Eric Hobsbawm were published in 1994. During this time, a large amount of information was available to the writers. They writers also had the advantage of time for reflection on the events that occurred in the 20th century.
Kissinger’s diverse and unique background demonstrates the reliability of his book Diplomacy. Kissinger was a member of the U.S arms control and Disarmament Agency, National Security Council, Operations Research Office. He was the 5th Secretary of the State, Director of Psychological Strategy Board, and also served as Assistant to the President for National Affairs. This limitless background of experience with international and national matters of defense, research, and psychology make Kissinger himself an expert in his field and a boundless source of knowledge. His opinions and knowledge of the Munich Agreement result from years of research and experience.
The previous works of Henry Kissinger also demonstrate his credibility and knowledge. He has written six books and more than 40 articles on U.S foreign policy, international affairs, and diplomatic policy. He also received the Woodrow Wilson Prize for the best book in the fields of government, politics, and International Affairs in 1955, the International Platform for Association Theodore Roosevelt Award in 1973, and the Hope Award for International Understanding in 1973.
Kissinger is also credible in his writing of the book Diplomacy. The book includes several detailed and well-referenced footnotes. The footnotes listed are largely primary sources. For example, there are several references to comments made by well-known people in history. There are also several references to old newspapers, radio transmissions, and conferences. As a result, there is little bias in the information that Kissinger consulted. However, the information from these primary sources had to be interpreted by Kissinger. It is apparent that the subjects touched upon in the novel are extremely well researched. There are occasions of bias when Kissinger implements his opinion without notifying the reader. For example, he writes that Eastern Europe would ‘have achieved a preponderant position by peaceful means, or perhaps even have had it handed to them by the West,’1 and that ‘Hitler’s restlessness tuned what could have been a peaceful evolution into war.’2 This is merely his opinion, but it is written as though it is a fact. The bias in the novel is limited because Kissinger acknowledges several others who helped him with the research, editing, and writing of this novel.
The book The Age of Extremes by Eric Hobsbawm appears to be written largely from personal experiences and observation. For example, Hobsbawm writes of how ‘for generations the work “Munich” became a synonym, in Western political discourse, for…retreat.’3 Although Hobsbawm does not express his own personal opinion this is an observation that can only be justified through personal experience. Hobsbawm often writes of events as the appeared to him, but he does not take sides or evidently express his own strong opinions. As a historian, Hobsbawm is well known for such an approach. He even recalls himself as a fourteen year old boy who read on a newspaper board the headline announcing the take over of the Third Reich saying ‘Anybody who saw Hitler’s rise happen first-hand could not help but be shaped by it politically....That boy is still somewhere inside me.’
As well, Hobsbawm provides detailed references for his book. The references indicate that huge ranges of sources were consulted for the research of this novel. Most of the sources that Hobsbawm consulted were secondary sources. As a result, they may have contained bias and have some limitations. For example, Hobsbawm’s explanation of Gödel’s Theorem is not completely accurate. However, some titles in Hobsbawm’s references are in German, others in French, and others in English. In this way, it is clear that Hobsbawm observed the issues discussed in his book from various, differing, and perspectives. Nonetheless, having once been a member of the Communist party, he devotes a usual amount of time to socialism, and some historians go so far as to claim that he is not anticommunist enough. Although Hobsbawm is not an ardent Marxist, he views Marxism as the best tool for examining the past because of its positivist values and clear affirmation of progress in history. Through his exploration of Marxism came his belief in the “Enlightenment project” dedicated to rationalism and human improvement. In The Age of Extremes Hobswawm does a great job of characterizing the reasons for which he is sometimes referred to as the ‘Last Marxist’.
Part D:
The general opinions of the two historians Henry Kissinger and Eric Hobsbawm are very similar. However, the reasons for which they have drawn these conclusions are, at times, very different.
To begin with, both Hobsbawm and Kissinger agree that the Treaty of Versailles was a key factor in the events that led up to the ‘Munich Agreement.’ Kissinger states that Germany ‘exploited the democracies guilty conscience about the Treaty of Versailles’.4 After the ‘Munich Agreement’ Hitler could no longer appeal to the democracies sense of guilt on Versailles, and his only weapon left to use was force. On the other hand, Hobsbawm claims that it was ‘the failure of Britain and France to respond to the unilateral German denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles…’5 Evidently, Kissinger feels that Germany was over reacting to the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and infers that Hitler ‘exploited’ it simply to achieve what he desired. Hobsbawm gives the impression that Germany was somewhat just in demanding change as he writes of ‘the failure of Britain and France…’ Both authors attach a considerable amount of importance to the long term effects of the Treaty of Versailles.
Henry Kissenger’s writing gives the impression that the Munich Agreement was the predominant cause of World War II, whereas Eric Hosbawm states that the Munich Agreement was only ‘one milestone on the road to war.’6 Kissinger writes that all Germany had to do was wait, and German leadership would in time ‘have achieve a preponderant position by peaceful means, or perhaps even have had it handed to them by the West,’1 and that ‘Hitler’s restlessness tuned what could have been a peaceful evolution into war.’2 As a result of Hitler’s violation of the Munich agreement Britain felt obliged to defend themselves. Therefore, Kissinger feels it was the agreement that began the war. Conversely, Hobsbawm blames not only the Munich Agreement but also other milestones on the road to war.
Eric Hobsbawm and Henry Kissinger agree that Britain had an apparent unwillingness to act both singly and in conjunction. Britain continuously refused to give France its full support if Germany attacked. Both historians agree that the ‘Munich Agreement’ was a result of a desperate attempt to avoid war due to the uncertainty of Hitler’s actions. The democracies seemed to avoid the annoyance of having to make difficult and important decisions. Kissinger writes ‘…leaders of the Western democracies avoided the pain of being obliged to make ambiguous choices.’8 Both felt that Britain thought it easier to wait for a ‘clear demonstration of Hitler’s bad faith’.8 Hobsbawm put it well when he wrote ‘one side clearly did not want war and did everything possible to avoid it, and the other side glorified in it.’9 In his novel, Mein Kamp, Hitler wrote that “Man kind has grown strong through eternal struggles and it will only perish through eternal peace.”
Both historians also write of the ‘forces of fascism and authoritarian government.’ They feel that the Western democracies ‘did not grasp the ideological gulf that separated them from Hitler.’ 10 The historians agree the Western Democracies failed to understand that Hitler was craving war while they were straining every nerve to avoid it. Kissinger claims that Britain was affected by the new idealistic idea of the Realpolitik, and the increasingly popular Western European diplomacy. In this way, he places much of the blame on the Western European government for being too diplomatic. Similarly, Hobsbawm wrote of the way in which the ‘crisis of liberalism strengthened the arguments and forces of fascism and authoritarian government.’10 However, he appears to feel that this was unavoidable and places most of the blame on the fascist government of Germany, stating that they viewed ‘liberals of various lands, socialists, communist, and any kind of democratic and Soviet regimes as enemies to be equally destroyed.’11 He feels Hitler’s Germany gave the impression that ‘if they did not want to hang separately, they would hang together.’11
Both Hobsbawm and Kissinger also agree that the ‘Munich Agreement’ resulted largely from the Western Democracies desire to please the public and stay in power. Kissinger writes that one of the reasons Britain did not take up the more defensive means of rearmament was because a ‘public backing for strong measures could not be relied on’12. In the wake of Munich, Kissinger wrote that Chamberlain was popular until Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, whereas Hobsbawm writes that the shame of Munich was felt almost immediately.
In general, Hobsbawm appears to feel that Germany was somewhat justifiable in its requests for and agreement with Britain and France. Often, he writes as though Britain and France are to blame for the events that lead up to the Munich Agreement. For example, when he writes of the ‘failure of Britain and France to respond to the unilateral German denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles…’7 and that the ‘crisis of liberalism strengthened the arguments and forces of fascism and authoritarian government’10. Kissinger’s approach to the Munich agreement is more open-minded. He writes of both the mistakes of Britain and France and the faults of Germany. For example, he writes of Germany’s faults when he says that ‘Hitler’s restlessness tuned what could have been a peaceful evolution into war’8. However, he also writes of fault on the part of the Western democracies when he says that the ‘…leaders of the Western democracies avoided the pain of being obliged to make ambiguous choices.’8
Eric Hobsbawm and Henry Kissinger have different opinions on the Munich Agreement for several reasons. Firstly, Eric Hobsbawm was educated in Vienna, Berlin and London whereas Kissinger was educated in the U.S at Harvard. As a result, the two would have been educated differently. They would learn of the Munich Agreement from different perspectives. The U.S was not involved in the Munich Agreement. Therefore, being an American, Kissinger was most likely to learn of both sides of the Munich Agreement from a diplomatic point of view. Hobsbawm, being educated in both Berlin and London also most likely learnt of the two sides of the Munich Agreement.
Part E:
Historians view the Munich Agreement as a careless mistake made during uncertain times. The Western democracies felt threatened by Germany’s growing military, Germany’s willingness to go to war, and Hitler’s intentions. They had a discontent and distrust of communism, but at the same time they felt guilty for the Treaty of Versailles and the harsh terms that it implemented upon Germany. The Western democracies also failed to adapt the policy of a new political situation in Europe and to re-evaluate the political environment continuously. Chamberlain also feared that public opinion would not support strong measure against Germany thus he would loose political power. The Western democracies did everything they could to avoid war because they wanted to preserve the country’s stability and economic growth. Also, they did not want to destroy the equilibrium of power in Europe. They believed that although compromising this policy of appeasement would prevent a war. However, they made the false yet rational assumption that Hitler also wanted peace. However, Hitler did not want peace. Six months after the Munich Agreement he broke his promise not to seize or demand more territory and took over Czechoslovakia. The mistake that the government made in the signing of the Munich Agreement is constantly ridiculed. However, it is a mistake that has taught us a very valuable lesson. The policy of appeasement is a policy that must be applied very cautiously. This lesson will forever be beneficial to the democracies of the world.
i A compromise or agreement drawn upon to try and maintain peace.
“The Munich Agreement of 1938.” Sorrell. <http://www.sorrel.humbolt.edu/~rescuers/book/chlup/chuplinks/munich.html>
2Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 290.
4Hobsbawm Eric, Age of Extremes (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 146.
5Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.289.
6Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 146.
9Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 292.
12Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p.37.
13Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.292.