The peasant’s antagonism towards the autocratic system was also heightened due to the fact the peasants were not free men but were bound to a village commune. The government was hesitant to change the village commune system, as it made it easier to gather taxes and it was believed the peasant communes were a bulwark against the spread of subversive left-wing ideas. It was not until the unforeseen 1905 ‘revolution’ that the governing elites finally realised the urgency to create a class of peasant farmers as a reliable support to the social order against propaganda of left-wing groups. This attempt took the form of two decrees in 1907 and 1910 that broke up the peasant commune as a binding foundation through the allocation of land to individual peasants and the capability to disband the communes into a number of individual proprietors.
But in 1917 a great bulk of the peasantry was still commune governed, though agrarian reform intended at removing this was progressively spreading. It is likely if the movement had continued it would have resulted in the formation of a substantial class of farmers, but was interrupted by the war and revolution.
When Russia entered into WW1 the vast majority of peasants were still fighting for their individual land. But it was not a mere desire for land that constituted such a powerful political incentive; the peasants believed they had a right to the land as they had maintained and worked on it.
The war also greatly affected the peasants as they bore the brunt of the war casualties after peasant conscription was introduced. The peasants not recruited to the front line were forced to hand over their grain supplies to the government in order to feed the troops, which ultimately led to peasant famine and great unrest. In January 1916 the daily bread ration per person had fallen to 2.7 lbs, forcing the peasants to rebel against the autocratic regime and protest in order to stay alive.
Another cause of tension in Russia that ultimately led to the collapse of Tsarism was the emergence and expansion of a working class. Capitalism in the Western European form came to Russia very late, and it was due to this that it made such rapid progress against the old-fashioned background. By the end of the 19th century huge mechanised businesses had been established, particularly in the metallurgical, mining and textile industries. Whereas in 1801 the number of workers in Petrograd averaged around 95,000, by 1896 the number had dramatically grown to around 1,742,000. This growth was mainly due to the heavy flow of foreign capital into Russia, as by 1914 one third of capital invested in Russian stock companies was foreign. This rapid growth of a huge new industrial class moving to the cities resulted in very poor living conditions for the workers, and many urban workers were forced to sleep on their workbenches.
Joel Carmichael saw the strong influence in the dissolution of Tsarist rule from the social tensions among the peasants and working class, but believed the definitive collapse was as a result of the war. He states “It was this combination of generalised peasant discontent and the intensification of working class growth that was to provide the background for the crumbling of the Tsarist regime. But the deciding factor was the war itself.” Although the war exacerbated social tensions in Russia, even before 1914 the urban workers were holding strikes and protesting. For example in 1905, in an event later named Bloody Sunday, workers protested outside the Winter Palace for a reduction in the working day, increased wages and improved working conditions. It is clear that even before the war workers were dissatisfied.
The large concentration of labourers in huge enterprises allowed the city workers to talk to one another each day and engage in the same everyday struggle to live, which resulted in a huge unified urban workforce. By consolidating thousands of workers on the same premises for years on end they developed into an unparalleled political entity. Libertarian historians emphasise this growing unrest and strength of the workers as an unequalled political unit as a critical factor in the collapse of Tsarism. They take the view that without the efforts of the working people the revolution would not have taken place.
When war broke out in 1914 Russia was not equipped for a modern war, and from the very beginning it was clear that the Russian forces were inferior to the German military in everything but numbers. Though Russia had endured an embarrassing defeat to Japan in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, she had not seemed to learn any lessons in the intervening years. The Russian fighting forces were very badly equipped and there were massive shortages of ammunition, weapons and food supplies, as well as poor leadership, particularly after the Tsar assumed sole command. In 1914 there was just one machine-gun allocated for every 1,000 men and rifles were similarly in short supply. This resulted in huge numbers of Russian casualties, mainly inexperienced peasant conscriptions.
The railways were particularly inefficient when placed under the heavy demands of the war. The volume of supplies and the distances they had to travel were too great and many food supplies ended up rotting in ports, as the trains could not travel further. Supplies travelling to the main cities were at first inconsistent and then stopped completely.
The First World War had an extremely destructive effect on the morale of all the Russian people, even on the commanding staff as is illustrated in an account made by War Minister, General Polivanov after a German attack in 1915 that destroyed the bulk of Russian Army. In his statement he said Russia’s only hope lay in “immeasurable distances, impassable roads and the mercy of St. Nicholas, patron of Holy Russia”. War-weariness began to grow. “World War I subjected every belligerent country to immense strains, which could be overcome only by close collaboration between government and citizenry in the name of patriotism. In Russia, such collaboration never materialised.” Richard Pipes. This opinion seems convincing given the level of opposition to the Tsarist regime from almost every level of society.
While the Tsar was away on the front line commanding the Russian forces, the day to day running of Russia was left in the hands of Tsarina Alexandra. The Tsarina’s authority was greatly resented by the Russian people as she was German and was thought to be overly influenced by the peasant ‘holy man’ Grigory Rasputin. Rasputin had managed to obtain access to the court through his professed ability to cure the heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexis of his haemophilia. Whilst the Tsar was absent from Petrograd Rasputin's influence extended to giving the Tsarina advice on ministerial appointments. The Tsarina had always been ostracised by the masses but her close and contentious relationship with Rasputin heightened their condemnation of her and led to a loss of faith in the Tsarist regime as a whole. However, this argument seems unconvincing in explaining the collapse of Tsarism. Whilst this incident unavoidably added to the people’s distrust of the Tsar, it contributed little to the instability that led to the February revolution.
Due to the repressive and domineering nature of the government and increasing distrust in the Tsarist regime there were many opposition groups in Russia, fighting for the dissolution of the autocratic system and the abdication of the Tsar. In a broad perspective the revolutionary movement was made up of two different schools of thought: Populism and Marxism. The Populists began opposing the government by trying to convert the peasants to their divergent way of thinking. This proved unsuccessful as the majority of peasants, despite their desire for land, were supportive of the Tsar and saw him as a cult figure, their ‘Little Father’. The Populists later developed a terrorist wing, and in 1881 members from the Populist faction ‘The People’s Will’ assassinated Alexander II. Far from increasing the support for the party in this single act the Populists found they had alienated themselves from other opposition groups, and in the following years Populism abruptly decreased. By the end of the century it had completely deteriorated.
Marxism became popular during the 1890’s when Russia began industrialising and a working class developed. Before 1890 Marxism had merely been a way of arguing against the ideas of Populism. The Marxist movement only truly became unified by the emergence of the Russian Social-Democrat party in 1903, which divided into two separate groups-the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. But in the years before the revolution both groups had little effect on the people of Russia and hardly contributed to the unrest. Destructive factionalism and limited membership held back the Marxist revolutionary movement and the size of Russia kept the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alien to the peasantry and working class for many years. Many Soviet historians and Western sympathisers have claimed the February 1917 revolution that led to the collapse in Tsarism was due to the influence of the Bolsheviks who foresaw the revolution and encouraged it. Although Soviet historians claim that Bolsheviks were amongst the leaders of the unrest this seems unlikely when we take into account that Lenin at this time was in exile in Switzerland, Trotsky was in America and Stalin was living in Siberia. Although it seems likely that the Bolsheviks provoked some unrest amongst the workers by spreading propaganda and inciting a sense of class-consciousness, the likelihood of the revolution being premeditated by the Bolshevik party appears remote.
Opposition also began to grow from the Tsar’s previously traditional supporters such as members of the aristocracy and the Duma. In August 1914 the Tsar dissolved the Duma due to disagreement over increased repression the government was using to control the discontented masses. The Duma accepted its prorogation, but within a year it was demanding a recall. The Tsar eventually permitted the Duma to reassemble in August 1915. But the Tsarist government rejected collaboration with non-governmental agencies and Nicholas II refused to replace any of his ministers so as to produce a more proficient administration. This forced 236 of the 422 Duma legislatures to unite in a ‘Progressive Bloc’ made up of the Octobrists, Kadets, Nationalists and the Progressive Industrialists. This growing internal unrest and factionalism further put pressure on the Tsar and ruling elites to make reforms and change the direction of the war. However, without the involvement and support of the Petrograd workers it seems doubtful that the Duma would have assembled the courage to challenge the authority of Nicholas II and the governing elites.
The crucial, most damaging resistance to the Tsarist regime came from the army and the Cossacks. The loss of army loyalty meant the Tsar no longer had the means to control the protesting masses. Many historians believe the revolution would not have taken place without the military abandonment of the Tsar and take the view that without the army joining the protesting workers in Petrograd, Russia would have simply relapsed into a repeat of the 1905 ‘revolution’ or at worst, a civil war. They consider it was the army Generals and police force that made the revolution possible. Michael Lynch stresses, “It was when the army and the police told Nicholas that they were unable to carry out his command to keep the populace in order that his position finally became hopeless”. Though this view seems valid, it is questionable as to how much control the army and police would have had in repressing the masses revolting in Petrograd if they had remained loyal. The incentive for change was so great, and the political system in such a critical state that it is likely that even without support from the army a revolution would have occurred.
In conclusion, although the war exacerbated Russia’s problems and brought them to a head, WW1 was not the fundamental reason for the collapse of Tsarism. Russia’s problems were deep-seated in the inept and corrupt political system. The avarice and need for power lay deeply rooted in the Tsar and governing elites and the aspirations of the peasants and workers would never have been met.
The poor execution of the war and the huge loss of life with conscripted peasants and workers poorly equipped and treated as little more than cannon fodder increased the level of discontent and acted as a catalyst for revolution. However, even if Russia had been successful in the war Tsarism would still have unavoidably collapsed given the widespread and deep-seated injustice and distrust of the ruling regime.
Bibliography:
Mark Almond: ‘Uprising!’
Mitchell Beazley, 2002
Joel Carmichael: ‘A Short History of the Russian Revolution’
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http://www.pvhs.chico.k12.ca.us/~bsilva/projects/russia/Alex_II/asess_caldwell.htm
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