Stalin was able to keep such a tight ‘following’ due to the fear and propaganda that followed his infamous Red army. He had placed them within his sphere as a warning to the people. If they opposed, they would be dealt with by the Red Army through means of ‘re-education’. They kept an eye over the people, and crushed any sort of uprising. This would have been a deterrent enough for anybody looking to rebel against communism. This proved to be effective as there are no real incidences where the Red army have been called in to sort out a situation (apart from in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but that was under different circumstances).
When Stalin saw the lure of the Marshall Plan, he definitely felt under pressure to counteract this – coming up with Comecon 1949. This shows he was desperate, as firstly, this goes against communist views, as the idea was to send money to communist countries to aid them in their economic process. This was a bribe, nonetheless; but it worked. No countries already within the control of the Soviet Union left the sphere – if they were tempted by money, they could still have it, and Stalin would still have control. They only probably stayed with Stalin out of the fear of the consequences, and therefore this tactic was successful due to previous attempts of control, mainly because of the Red Army.
Stalin finally dies in 1953, and Khrushchev takes over. He introduces a new relaxed policy, and looks to ‘de-Stalinise’ Eastern Europe, hoping to promote better relations with the West. Subsequently, other countries within the sphere wanted a more liberal government, and started to rebel. This shows that Stalin himself, along with his attitude and thinking, was an effective way to keep control over Eastern Europe. he was not a liberal man, he insinuated fear and death throughout the people, who dared not oppose. Now that there is a more liberal leader in office, the people feel this is the opportunity they need to express their feelings. What Khrushchev may have done wrong, was to initiate an ‘instant’ change, which could not be done on a large scale in regards to the whole of Eastern Europe at one given time. Stalin was effective in what he did, as he used gradual changes to implant his policy.
1953 also saw riots in Czechoslovakia, where people where burning Soviet flags and demolishing Stalin statues – this was an obvious attack on Soviet power. However, the riots were quickly put down by the Red army, but the consequences were not great ones, and therefore encouraged strikes in East Germany to occur. East Germans aired their grievances about wage cuts, but the Red army was called in to crush all uprising. 400 people were killed; Khrushchev was reverting back to Stalin’s old methods, however people were not put off, as there are further problems in Hungary in 1956. Does this mean that the Red Army were no longer feared, or was there a change in attitude from the people? A level of both, most likely, but why? This leads back to Stalin and fear that he as an individual imposed on the countries. Khrushchev did not have that same effect, and from then on, people were more open to oppose him, knowing they could probably get away with a lot more.
There was also a problem with East Germany, and how the collapse of it could have been crucial, in terms of ‘winning’ the Cold War. Germany had been one of many significant factors in the Cold War, and a collapse in Germany would mean a collapse in Soviet power if the West were to reclaim it. This might have been a short term cause for the Warsaw Pact in 1955 – the Soviet’s version of NATO – this not only gained support against the West, but also helped to unite a dividing sphere. This does not prove to be of any worth (at this time) as in the following year, Hungary has a revolution.
There main aim was to get rid of Rakosi – a mini Stalin – through mass demonstrations, which later turned into street fighting. Oddly, Khrushchev introduces Nagy as the new leader of Hungary, instead of sending in the Red army. Was it now that he realised that the Red army did not have so much of an effect that it used to? This is the first time compromising had been used, but quickly backfired. Riots continued, and Nagy had declared Hungary would be leaving the Warsaw Pact. The S.U. was looking at losing control over one country, and sure enough, others would follow. The Soviets again, reverted back to trusted methods, calling in the Red Army to crush all uprising – killing Nagy in the process. The exact same happened with Czechoslovakia in 1968.
It now seems that from 1945-68, there were times when the Soviet had complete control over Eastern Europe, and others, quite the opposite. Stalin had realised that in order to have control, he would have to use extreme tactics – the fear of the Red Army, propaganda etc. He also knew that with complete control, there was no edge way for choice or compromise with the people. This is where Khrushchev went wrong, expecting to have complete control when he gave individual countries more power. Knowing of such a relaxed attitude, the people then took advantage of this, and were no longer scared of the repercussions, as there is uprising after uprising under Khrushchev’s rule. By the mid-50’s effective control is on its way to becoming highly non-existent.
