How fair is Louise Shaw's Interpretation on Chamberlain? The interpretation revolves around the idea that a pact between Britain and the Soviet Union could have been a turning point in stopping or discouraging Hitler
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Many different interpretations were given throughout modern history on Chaimberlain’s policy of appeasement between 1937 - 1938 where Nazi Germany’s expansionist ideologies were allowed. Interpretation A expresses an Academic counter-revisionist view point. As the policy of appeasement failed to prevent war, those who advocated it were quickly criticised. The public opinion was strongly opposed to war, anything was to be done so that the outcome and losses suffered in World War One were not reproduced. This piece of writing will attempt to determine how fair Interpretation A is on former prime minister Neville Chamberlain.
Interpretation A is a an extract from the writing of British historian Louise Shaw written in 1987. The interpretation revolves around the idea that a pact between Britain and the Soviet Union could have been a turning point in stopping or ‘discouraging’ Hitler’s expansionist ideologies, however, Chaimberlain’s fear of communism (‘anti-Bolshevik prejudice’) made sure that such an alliance was not formed. To a certain extent this source is correct. It indicates that if Hitler had faced a more aggressive and coordinated response at the time of appeasement, he would not have gained territory or resources. This seems to be corroborated by the failed attempt by Hitler to invade Austria in 1934; Mussolini, in line with an agreement signed with Austria simply put troops on Austrian border and deterred Germany’s forces. This goes to show that Hitler did not force through his expansionist agenda if he was met with adequate military response. If the Soviet and British military had combined to fight German forces, it can be argued that Hitler would have acquired less resources that made the war so devastating on such a large scale. It is also fair to state that Chaimberlain’s anti-bolshevik ideologies misguided him in his actions during the 1930s. Often it is described that appeasement was justified in Chaimberlain’s eyes, because he wanted German military to flourish; so as to keep the threat of the communist East away from mainland Europe: though Stalin spoke of prosperous negotiation against Fascist dictators, Chamberlain feared world revolution by Comintern greatly. Since Hitler’s beliefs included this same fear of communism, Chaimberlain saw an opportunity to use Germany as a buffer to communism without having to use British resource. At the time Chaimberlain must have thought he was choosing between the less of two evils, however, of course this was a crucial mistake.
At the time this interpretation was written, conventional views on society and history were still being heavily questioned and criticised. The revisionist movement, was prominent between the 1960s-90s. Interpretations formed within this period were less harsh on Neville Chamberlain;. Many studies published share the opinion that indicates how Chamberlain did the best he could under impossibly difficult circumstances. Alternatively, some sources still held the view that Chaimberlain was too confident in his policy, he failed to realise the weight these concessions would bring if war was to break out. Interpretation A was written towards the end of the ...
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At the time this interpretation was written, conventional views on society and history were still being heavily questioned and criticised. The revisionist movement, was prominent between the 1960s-90s. Interpretations formed within this period were less harsh on Neville Chamberlain;. Many studies published share the opinion that indicates how Chamberlain did the best he could under impossibly difficult circumstances. Alternatively, some sources still held the view that Chaimberlain was too confident in his policy, he failed to realise the weight these concessions would bring if war was to break out. Interpretation A was written towards the end of the Academic revisionist movement where the line of thought still followed ideals that rehabilitated Chaimberlain. However, some historians began to think highly critically of Chamberlain following the start of the academic counter revisionist movement. Source A seems more in line with the counter-revisionist movement, that heavily criticised Chaimberlain’s character. In 1958 the government passed the Public Records Act, which resulted in government papers and research being available to the public. Chaimberlain’s conditions at the time of appeasement were considered, researched and re-evaluated. In the light of the information made available Shaw inferred that Chaimberlain was at fault because his political stance was unchanged in international relations when circumstances evolved.
In 1938, Britain and France negotiated the Munich Agreement with Nazi Germany. Stalin opposed the pact and refused to recognise the German annexation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland. Stalin was often excluded from western diplomacy and negotiations. After the Munich agreement Stalin negotiated with Germany to invade and split control of Eastern Europe including Poland and the Baltic nations. It was only in 1941 when the German’s launched Operation Barbarossa, attacking the USSR that the Soviets became an Ally of World War II. This shows political neglect from Chamberlain's side, by presenting Europe and the USSR with opposing views Chaimberlain was allowing Germany to take advantage of the situation. If Hitler had been presented with a unified stance shared between Europe and the USSR he would have been more cautious of the combined military force of Britain, France and the USSR. Britain’s political stance against German expansion would have been more influential and could have lead to the prolonged militarisation of British armed forces and less resources gained by the German army. From the information presented above Interpretation A can be considered valid and fair on Chaimberlain because it can be backed up by specific evidence contemporary to Chamberlain, and the decisions he made in international relations.
Interpretation C by Historian Donald Cameron Watt, written in 1991, seems to indicate as its main argument that Chaimberlain’s character and self appreciation was a flaw to his person, and this attribute influenced British politics greatly. Interpretation C similarly to Interpretation A aims to show how Chamberlain was purely self motivated in the actions he took, Interpretation A indicates this characteristic by describing how his colleagues were in dismay towards Chamberlain. To a certain extent Interpretation A is fair on Chaimberlain, because other Historians using information available to the public thought of the former prime minister in the same way.
Nevertheless, Interpretation A is not entirely fair, it fails to show and describe the difficulty of European politics at the time. Interpretation A describes a ‘workable solution for discouraging, or if necessary defeating, Hitler.’ However, once more if fails to include many of the issues Britain faced: It does not consider the economic problems Britain was facing after the effects of the Depression, the incredible debts it had to pay from the First World War, the public opinion (that would not support going to war), the independence movements Britain was struggling to control throughout the empire, Britain’s poor military, or the whole countries fear of communism. This interpretation seems to be challenging many academic revisionist view points developed at the time, Shaw’s purpose for writing from such contradictory viewpoints may have been entirely to gain recognition and so we can infer what she has written is not fair on Chamberlain. In addition, interpretation A is not fair on Chamberlain if the following is considered. Though it might have been advantageous to form an agreement with the Soviet Union, Stalin’s opinion on Chamberlain and Western European politics would have made such an agreement difficult to form. Stalin thought of Britain and France as weak nations, that were not to be trusted. The Soviet Union was playing a double game where it held discussions separately with both Daladier (the French prime minister), and Hitler, an agreement with the Nazi foreign minister that agreed that Germany and the Soviet Union would not attack each other. Therefore, we can infer that even if Chamberlain had attempted to form an alliance with the Soviet Union, negotiations would have failed.
A source from British historian Paul Kennedy, written in 1981, helps to understand or Appreciate the severe situation Britain faced prior to the Second World War. Source 4B describes Britain’s dire position in 1938, ‘loosing its place in world affairs’, with a weak military and even weaker economy; the will of the people was completely against war and British resource could not support such a cataclysm. From this source we can infer the sentiment of being trapped that Chamberlain felt, Britain was cornered into accepting Germany’s demands. This source when compared to interpretation A shows two polar opinions, this source takes into account external factors that restricted Chamberlain from taking decisions that could go against Nazi demand, whilst Interpretation A criticises Chamberlain and controversial decision making process.
In conclusion, overall Interpretation A is not fair on Chaimberlain, though as many other sources suggest, Chaimberlain’s character was difficult, the prime minister presented Britain’s position in international affairs weakly and he could have strove to negotiate with the Soviets to present Europe as a united front that could threaten and control Nazi Germany, external factors made it evident that Chaimberlain could not have dealt with the German problem in any other way. Interpretation A shows a one sided biased argument that does not try to explain Britain’s difficult situation, and can be interpreted as a criticism on the revisionist view purely for self promotion and recognition. Source A is also not fair if we take into account the Soviet’s opinion on British politics and government, and their unwillingness to cooperate and negotiate with Western Europe. Britain’s declining economy, small military and unwillingness to go to war meant that politicians were forced down the route of appeasement and though potential alternative processes can be assessed such as is done in Interpretation A, such interpretations are never truly fair for they cannot justly encompass the complexity of International relations during the late 1930s.
